United States District Court, District of Columbia
CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Timothy Dugdale filed this pro se petition for
habeas corpus on March 8, 2017. The petition relates to an
earlier habeas petition filed by Mr. Dugdale in this Court,
in which he challenged among other things an expedited
removal order entered against him by U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (“CBP”). See Dugdale v. CBP,
88 F.Supp.3d 1 (D.D.C. 2015). The Court in 2015 partially
granted CBP's motion to dismiss that petition. See
id. Before the action could proceed any further,
however, CBP informed the Court that it had vacated Mr.
Dugdale's removal order and contended that the case was
therefore moot. The Court agreed and dismissed the action in
its entirety. See Dugdale v. CBP, 2015 WL 2124937
(D.D.C. May 6, 2015). The D.C. Circuit affirmed that
dismissal. Dugdale v. Lynch, 672 Fed.Appx. 35 (D.C.
Cir. Oct. 25, 2016).
habeas petition currently before the Court, Mr. Dugdale
alleges that the vacated removal order continues to adversely
affect him, and thus seeks to have the order
“expunged” from his record. He also requests a
declaratory judgment stating that he is a U.S.
citizen. This Court previously held that, whatever
the merits of Dugdale's claims, his action was not a
proper habeas petition and ordered him to pay the filing fee
for civil actions in order for the case to proceed.
See Minute Order, May 16, 2017. But after Mr.
Dugdale moved for reconsideration, the Court allowed the case
to proceed as a habeas petition “so as to give
petitioner an opportunity to establish that the Court has
jurisdiction over his claim, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §
1252(e)(2) or otherwise, that he is entitled to
‘expungement' of the vacated order of expedited
removal and associated monetary relief.” Minute Order,
June 9, 2017. The Government subsequently moved to dismiss
Dugdale's petition, and Dugdale responded. After considering
both parties' arguments, the Court will dismiss the case
in its entirety.
extent Mr. Dugdale seeks to bring this latest petition under
the general federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241,
both this Court and the Sixth Circuit have already made clear
to Mr. Dugdale that a district court lacks jurisdiction over
such a petition if the petitioner is not “in
custody” when he files it. Minute Order, May 16, 2017;
Dugdale v. CBP, No. 13-1976 (6th Cir. Apr. 7, 2014).
Despite offering some creative arguments to the contrary,
Dugdale still is not in custody, and thus cannot bring a
habeas petition under § 2241.
other claims are presumably brought under the REAL ID Act of
2005, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2), which allows for habeas
petitions to challenge expedited removal orders on a limited
set of grounds. These claims are barred by res judicata (for
claims arising out of the same transaction or occurrence that
have already been decided on the merits) or by collateral
estoppel (for issues essential to a previous judgment that
have already been litigated and decided). The purpose of both
res judicata and collateral estoppel is to “preclude
parties from contesting matters that they have had a full and
fair opportunity to litigate.” Montana v. United
States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1979). All of the claims
and issues Dugdale raises in his petition and motion for
declaratory judgment have been fully and fairly litigated in
prior cases. First, Dugdale again argues that he is entitled
to U.S. citizenship. This Court and the D.C. Circuit have
already held that he is not. 88 F.Supp.3d at 5; 672 Fed.Appx.
at 36. Next, he claims that his expedited removal order
should be expunged. The D.C. Circuit has already rejected
this argument, which Dugdale argued in his appeals briefs.
Reply Brief of Appellant at 9, 672 Fed.Appx. at 36. Third,
Dugdale repeats arguments about the potential impact of the
now-vacated removal order, which the D.C. Circuit has already
found moot. Id. And finally, Dugdale
challenges the constitutionally of expedited removals, an
argument this Court already found it lacks jurisdiction to
consider because it was not brought within the 60 day time
period as required by § 1252(e)(3)(B). 88 F.Supp.3d at
Dugdale seeks attorneys' fees through the Equal Access to
Justice Act (EAJA). However, because attorneys' fees are
not available under the EAJA for pro se plaintiffs,
the Court will deny Dugdale's request. See Kooritzky
v. Herman, 178 F.3d 1315, 1321 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
foregoing reasons, the Court will deny Plaintiffs Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Motion for Declaratory
Judgment, and grant Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. A
separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
 Dugdale has filed his motion for
declaratory judgment “independent of [his] habeas
petition” but without paying the filing fee applicable
to non-habeas civil actions. Mot. Declaratory Judgment at 2.
The Court will consider this motion in the interest of
judicial economy because it raises largely the same arguments
as the habeas petition. The Court will not, however, consider
any future non-habeas civil filings from Mr. Dugdale without
the proper filing fee.
 Dugdale has made six separate filings
in response to the Government: an opposition to the motion to
dismiss (ECF No. 17), a supplemental response (ECF No. 19), a
notice of supplemental authority (ECF No. 20), a surreply
(ECF No. 22), a motion to amend/correct his petition (ECF No.
23), and a motion to withdraw his motion to amend/correct his
petition (ECF No. 25). The Court has reviewed and considered
all these filings and has construed Dudgdale's arguments
liberally in consideration of his pro se
 Dugdale argues that changes in case
law now alter the merits of his citizenship claim. However,
none of the cases Dugdale cites has any bearing on his claim,
which turns on whether U.S. law distinguished between adopted
and biological children at the time of his birth. See,
e.g., Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S.Ct.
1678 (2017) (gender-based distinction of §§ 1401
and 1409 of Immigration and Nationality Act violates equal
protection); Maslenjak v. United States, 137 S.Ct.
1918 (2017) (in order to secure a criminal conviction under
§ 1425(a), Government must establish that
defendant's illegal act played a role in someone's
acquisition of citizenship); Obergefell v. Hodges,
135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015) (same-sex marriage is right protected
by Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment); Pavan v. Smith, 137 S.Ct. 2075 (2017)
(Arkansas law treating same-sex couples differently from
opposite sex couples was unconstitutional).
 In addition to being barred by
collateral estoppel, the Court does not have jurisdiction to
review either this claim or Dugdale's expungement claim
in a habeas petition under § 1252(e)(2)(A)-(C), which
limits judicial review to three specific questions: (1)
whether the petitioner is an alien; (2) whether the
petitioner was ordered removed; and (3) whether the
petitioner can prove that he is an alien lawfully admitted
for permanent residence. See 8 U.S.C. §
 Dugdale's argument that the 60-day
clock should reset “any time the executive or the
legislative branch tinker with or modify the expedited
removal system” is unavailing because Dugdale only has
standing to challenge the constitutionality of a
“section, regulation, directive, guideline, or
procedure” that has harmed him specifically.