United States District Court, District of Columbia
is a prisoner incarcerated at the Federal Correctional
Institution ("FCI") in Loretto, Pennsylvania. He
has filed an application to proceed in forma
pauperis and a "Verified Civil Complaint for
Declaratory and Civil Rights Relief against former Bureau of
Prisons Director Richard Kane and several other BOP
employees. All of the defendants are sued in their individual
capacity. Compl. Caption. For the reasons explained below,
the in forma pauperis application will be granted
and this case will be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915A, which requires immediate dismissal of a prisoner's
complaint that fails to state a claim upon which relief can
alleges that in January 2017 while incarcerated at FCI Milan
in Michigan, he was awarded a Second Chance Pell Grant, which
would have permitted him "to attend collegiate courses
from Jackson College offered by FCI Milanf.]" Compl. at
4. Allegedly, defendants "stripped" plaintiff of
the award when "he was involuntarily placed into
[BOP's] transport custody for disciplinary
retaliation." Id. Plaintiff claims that he
"had every right to attend the necessary college
courses." Id. Plaintiff seeks equitable relief,
compensatory damages exceeding $4.7 million, and punitive
damages. Id. at 5-7.
due process and equal protection violations, plaintiff sues
defendants under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 and 1986,
none of which is applicable here. First, by its terms, §
1983 does not apply to federal officials acting under federal
law. Settles v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 429 F.3d
1098, 1104 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Second, plaintiff has not
alleged facts establishing that "two or more persons . .
. participated in a conspiracy motivated by class-based
discriminatory animus" to state a claim under §
1985. Atherton v. D.C. Office of Mayor, 567 F.3d
672, 688 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citing Griffin v.
Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 96-102, (1971)). And third,
"a colorable claim under § 1985 is a prerequisite
to a claim under § 1986[.]" Philogene v.
District of Columbia, 864 F.Supp.2d 127, 132 (D.D.C.
2012) (citation omitted).
from the doomed causes of action, the premise of plaintiff s
due process claim is simply wrong. Plaintiff concludes, without
any citation to authority, that he has a constitutional right
to take college courses, and at a particular location. But to
trigger protections under the due process clause, plaintiff
must identify a liberty interest. The Supreme Court long ago
defined a liberty interest in the prison setting as
"'restraint' that 'imposes atypical and
significant hardship' as compared with 'the ordinary
incidents of prison life.'" Franklin v. District
of Columbia, 163 F.3d 625, 631 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting
Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)). Such
"commonplace judgments in the day-to-day management of
prisons" as housing determinations, transfers and
classification decisions "do not give rise to liberty
interests" absent a showing of "extraordinary
treatment." Id. at 634-36 (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). In direct contrast to
plaintiffs point, it is established that "prisoners do
not have a due process right to participate in vocational and
educational programs, let alone one of their choosing."
Boulware v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 518 F.Supp.2d
186, 189 (D.D.C. 2007), citing Women Prisoners of Dist.
of Columbia Dep't. of Corr. v. Dist. of Columbia, 93
F.3d 910, 927 (D.C. Cir. 1996), citing Inmates of
Occoquan v. Barry, 844 F.2d 828, 836 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(inmates do not have a constitutional right to work and
educational opportunities) (other citations omitted).
plaintiff has mentioned the equal protection clause, Compl.
at 4, but he has alleged no facts establishing that
defendants discriminated against him as a member of a
protected class, see Pers. Adm'r v.
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979), or treated him differently
than another similarly situated individual or group, see
Women Prisoners, 93 F.3d at 924. And a "complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009), quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Accordingly, this ease Will be
dismissed. A separate order accompanies this Memorandum
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388 (1971),
the Supreme Court "recognized for the first time an
implied private action for damages against federal officers
alleged to have violated a citizen's constitutional
rights." Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534
U.S. 61, 66 (2001). A proper Bivens claim is brought
against the individual in his or her personal capacity for
monetary damages. As a result, "a plaintiff must plead
that each Government-official defendant, through the
official's own individual actions, has violated the
Constitution." Ashcroft v. Iqbal,556 U.S. 662,
676 (2009). Although plaintiff purports to sue the named
defendants in their personal capacities, he ...