United States District Court, District of Columbia
MEMORANDUM OPINION
JAMES
E. BOASBERG UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff
Keith Laverpool brought this pro se action under the
Freedom of Information Act requesting documents related to
the foreclosure of his Georgia residence. In now seeking
summary judgment, the Government contends that it has
conducted an adequate search and released all retrieved
documents in full. The Court concurs.
I.
Background
The
underlying factual background here is undisputed. Laverpool
submitted essentially identical FOIA requests on July 13,
2015, and May 23, 2017, to the Department of Housing and
Urban Development. See Compl., Exhs. A, B. Both
sought five categories of material: (1) anything related to a
specific Federal Housing Administration file number
concerning a property at 1580 Smithson Court, Lithonia,
Georgia; (2) proof that Plaintiff canceled his FHA insurance;
(3) proof that the lender did so; (4) any request for a
foreclosure sale of the property; and (5) loan documents
relating to the property. Id. A search uncovered 144
pages, all of which were ultimately released in full.
See ECF No. 6-1 (Declaration of Michael German),
¶¶ 5-6. Laverpool nonetheless initiated the instant
suit on February 12, 2018, and HUD now moves for summary
judgment.
II.
Legal Standard
Summary
judgment may be granted if “the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A genuine issue of material fact is one
that would change the outcome of the litigation. See
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986) (“Only disputes over facts that might affect the
outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly
preclude the entry of summary judgment.”). In the event
of conflicting evidence on a material issue, the Court is to
construe the conflicting evidence in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party. See Sample v. Bureau of
Prisons, 466 F.3d 1086, 1087 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Factual
assertions in the moving party's affidavits or
declarations may be accepted as true unless the opposing
party submits his own affidavits, declarations, or
documentary evidence to the contrary. Neal v. Kelly,
963 F.2d 453, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
FOIA
cases typically and appropriately are decided on motions for
summary judgment. See Defenders of Wildlife v. U.S.
Border Patrol, 623 F.Supp.2d 83, 87 (D.D.C. 2009);
Bigwood v. U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev., 484
F.Supp.2d 68, 73 (D.D.C. 2007). In FOIA cases, the agency
bears the ultimate burden of proof. See DOJ v. Tax
Analysts, 492 U.S. 136, 142 n.3 (1989). The Court may
grant summary judgment based solely on information provided
in an agency's affidavits or declarations when they
describe “the documents and the justifications for
nondisclosure with reasonably specific detail, demonstrate
that the information withheld logically falls within the
claimed exemption, and are not controverted by either
contrary evidence in the record nor by evidence of agency bad
faith.” Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656
F.2d 724, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Such affidavits or
declarations are accorded “a presumption of good faith,
which cannot be rebutted by ‘purely speculative claims
about the existence and discoverability of other
documents.'” SafeCard Servs., Inc. v. SEC,
926 F.2d 1197, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (quoting Ground
Saucer Watch, Inc. v. CIA, 692 F.2d 770, 771 (D.C. Cir.
1981)).
III.
Analysis
In
seeking summary judgment here, the Government maintains that
its search efforts sufficiently comply with FOIA. “An
agency fulfills its obligations under FOIA if it can
demonstrate beyond material doubt that its search was
‘reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant
documents.'” Valencia-Lucena v. U.S. Coast
Guard, 180 F.3d 321, 325 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (quoting
Truitt v. Dep't of State, 897 F.2d 540, 542
(D.C. Cir. 1990)); see also Steinberg v. DOJ, 23
F.3d 548, 551 (D.C. Cir. 1994). The adequacy of an
agency's search for documents under FOIA “is judged
by a standard of reasonableness and depends, not
surprisingly, upon the facts of each case.”
Weisberg v. DOJ, 745 F.2d 1476, 1485 (D.C. Cir.
1984). “When a plaintiff questions the adequacy of the
search an agency made in order to satisfy its FOIA request,
the factual question it raises is whether the search was
reasonably calculated to discover the requested documents,
not whether it actually uncovered every document
extant.” SafeCard, 926 F.2d at 1201. To meet
its burden, the agency may thus submit affidavits or
declarations that explain the scope and method of its search
“in reasonable detail.” Perry v. Block,
684 F.2d 121, 127 (D.C. Cir. 1982). To satisfy the dictates
of FOIA, a defendant must, at a minimum, “aver that it
has searched all files likely to contain relevant
documents.” Am. Immigration Council v. Dep't of
Homeland Sec., 21 F.Supp.3d 60, 71 (D.D.C. 2014)
(quoting Am. Immigration Council v. Dep't of Homeland
Sec., 950 F.Supp.2d 221, 230 (D.D.C. 2013) (emphasis
added)). If the record “leaves substantial doubt as to
the sufficiency of the search, summary judgment for the
agency is not proper.” Truitt, 897 F.2d at
542.
To
support its position regarding the adequacy of the search
here, Defendant attaches the Declaration of Michael German,
the Director of HUD's Georgia State Office. German avers
that “[a] search was conducted by HUD Single Family
staff of all HUD databases that would have information
responsive to Mr. Laverpool's FOIA request.” German
Decl., ¶ 5. HUD released 133 pages in full to Plaintiff
and explained that those documents were responsive to his
first and fifth categories of records sought, but that HUD
had none responsive to his remaining categories. Id.
After initially withholding 11 additional pages responsive to
his first category under FOIA exemptions 4 and 5, HUD
ultimately released them all in full several months later.
Id., ¶ 6 (mistakenly labeling exemptions as 5
& 6); id., Exh. C (Oct. 2, 2017, Letter from HUD
to Plaintiff citing exemptions 4 & 5). On its face, then,
the Court has little reason to question the thoroughness of
HUD's performance here.
Laverpool
nonetheless raises several distinct challenges. He first
inexplicably targets HUD's reliance on FOIA exemptions to
withhold the 11 pages. See Opp. at 2-3. Yet, as just
explained, while Defendant relied on the exemptions in its
first response to Plaintiff, it ultimately abandoned that
tack and released them in full. This issue is thus moot.
Laverpool
next points out that German “may lack personal
knowledge, ” Opp. at 4, apparently as to the search.
Yet, “FOIA affidavits can be based on hearsay, and
there is no requirement that the declarant must have been
personally involved in each of the challenged
searches.” Wisdom v. U.S. Trustee Program, 266
F.Supp.3d 93, 102 (D.D.C. 2017); see Barnard v. Dep't
of Homeland Security, 531 F.Supp.2d 131, 138 (D.D.C.
2008) (“Declarants are not required to participate in
the search for records.”). German has been involved in
HUD's responses from the beginning and is the author of
the letters to Laverpool describing the searches and
documents recovered, so he self-evidently has
“familiarity with the documents in question.”
Wisdom, 266 F.Supp.3d at 102 (internal quotation
marks omitted); see German Decl., Exhs. C, D. He
thus has sufficient knowledge to act as the declarant here.
The
central point Laverpool appears to be urging here - and the
motivator for his FOIA requests in the first place - is that
he himself never canceled his FHA insurance. He seems to wish
to obtain a written document showing who canceled it and how,
which, the Court assumes, he believes may be helpful in
demonstrating that there may have been an error in his
foreclosure proceedings. See Opp. at 4. German,
however, took the extra step - not required by FOIA, which
mandates only the release of documents, not the answers to
requesters' questions - of elucidating this issue:
In a seven-page document entitled FHA Case Details that was
released to you, there is information regarding cancellation
of the FHA mortgage insurance in 2013. Specifically, on pages
3 and 4 of that document, there is information that
Roundpoint Mortgage Servicing Corporation, which was the
servicer/holder of your mortgage in 2013, effected
cancellation of the FHA mortgage insurance, effective April
29, 2013. The information input by ...