United States District Court, District of Columbia
L. Toolasprashad, Plaintiff,
David J. Shulkin et al, Defendants.
matter, brought pro se, is before the Court on
plaintiffs application to proceed in forma pauperis
and complaint. The Court will grant the application and
dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3)
(requiring the court to dismiss an action "at any
time" that it determines that subject matter
jurisdiction is wanting).
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only
that power authorized by Constitution and statute," and
it is "presumed that a cause lies outside this limited
jurisdiction." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of
Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations omitted). A
party seeking relief in the district court must at least
plead facts that bring the suit within the court's
jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Failure to
plead such facts warrants dismissal of the action.
resides in Guyana, South America. He has filed suit against,
among others, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, the U.S.
Ambassador to Guyana, and the U.S. Secretary of Homeland
Security. Plaintiff alleges that the defendants "acted
collectively and individually, through an orchestrated
conspiracy to deprive plaintiff of medical treatment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment," the Americans with
Disabilities Act, the Convention Against Torture, and
"the promise by the U.S. government that disabled
veterans will receive medical treatment." Compl. at 3.
Plaintiff states that he is "a 70% disabled American
veteran" who suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder
and a host of other ailments for which he was being treated
while in the United States. Id. at 2. Plaintiff
alleges that he was "forced banished [from the United
States] in July 2013" before the Veterans Administration
("VA") had "completed its
evaluation[.]" Id. He seeks, among other relief,
for Homeland Security to grant his request for
"humanitarian parole" for thirty days so that he
may receive medical treatment at the VA. Id. at
to decisions "affecting the provision of veterans'
benefits" are generally the exclusive province of the
Court of Veterans Appeals and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Price v. United
States, 228 F.3d 420, 421 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (per curiam);
accord Hunt v. U.S. Dep 't of Veterans Affairs,
739 F.3d 706, 707 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (per curiam), citing 38
U.S.C. § 511(a); Thomas v. Principi, 394 F.3d
970, 975 (D.C. Cir. 2005). "Benefit means any payment,
service, commodity, function, or status, entitlement to which
is determined under laws administered by the Department of
Veterans Affairs pertaining to veterans and their dependents
and survivors." 38 C.F.R. § 20.3(e). Because
plaintiff is challenging "the VA's action or
inaction with respect to a veterans' benefits
matter," i.e., his medical treatment, this
Court lacks "subject matter jurisdiction over the
complaint." Price, 228 F.3d at 421 (citing 38
U.S.C. § 511(a)); see Id. at 422
("[C]ourts have consistently held that a federal
district court may not entertain constitutional or statutory
claims whose resolution would require the court to intrude
upon the VA's exclusive jurisdiction.") (citing
cases)); see also Thomas, 394 F.3d at 975
("Because adjudicating . .. allegations [of] failure to
render appropriate medical services and denial of. . .
necessary medical care treatment would require the district
court to determine first whether the VA acted properly in
providing . . . benefits, [such] claims are barred by section
511.") (internal quotation marks and omitted)).
Therefore, this action will be dismissed. A separate Order
accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
 Plaintiff initially requested to
"Seal All Records and Documents," which was denied.
See Order [Dkt. # 6]. Plaintiff has "agree[d]
to proceed on the public record." PL's Reply to the
Court's Order and Motion to Proceed at 1 [Dkt. #
Plaintiff is no stranger to the federal
courts, having brought eight prior cases in this district
alone while a federal prisoner. In addition, the federal
district court in New Jersey has described plaintiff as
"a very frequent, repetitive, and prolix litigant"
who "is prohibited from bringing a civil action in
forma pauperis, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g),
unless he is under imminent danger of serious physical
injury." Toolasprashad v. Wright, No.
02-cv-5473, 2008 WL 4845306, at *1 (D.N.J. Nov. 3, 2008). It
is reasonably safe to conclude that plaintiffs "forced
banish[ment]" was in fact the result of removal
proceedings under the Immigration and Nationality Act that
followed his release from federal custody on May 13, 2011,
https.7/www.bop.RQv/inmateloc. See Toolasprashad
v. Schult, No. 10-cv-1050, 2011 WL 3157297, at *4
(N.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2011), report and recommendation
adopted, No. 9:10-cv-1050, 2011 WL 3157290 (N.D.N.Y.
July 26, 2011) (finding plaintiffs challenge to immigration