MEMORANDUM OPINION
CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER, United States District Judge
Christopher
Peek brought suit against SunTrust Bank, Inc., raising a
variety of statutory and common law claims related to a
purported agreement to modify a mortgage loan. Because Peek
previously brought suit against SunTrust Bank's
wholly-owned subsidiary in the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia, the bank has moved to dismiss
Peek's suit as barred by res judicata. The Court agrees
that res judicata applies and will grant SunTrust Bank's
motion.
I.
Background
A.
Factual Background
The
Court draws the following factual background from the
complaint, taking as true all well-pled factual allegations
as it must on a motion to dismiss. See, e.g.,
Warren v. District of Columbia, 353 F.3d 36, 39
(D.C. Cir. 2004). In 2008, Plaintiff Christopher Earl Peek
obtained a mortgage loan from SunTrust Mortgage, Inc. secured
by his residence in Washington, D.C. See Compl. at
2, ¶¶ 4, 8. In late 2015, after suffering some
economic hardships, Peek applied for modification of this
loan. See id. at 2-3.
By
January 2016, Peek was under the impression that he and
SunTrust Mortgage had “entered into [a] repayment
modification agreement[].” Id. ¶ 13.
According to Peek, that agreement involved a three-month
trial payment plan. Id. at 3. But when Peek
attempted to make these trial payments, SunTrust Mortgage
erroneously returned them. Id. ¶¶ 16-39.
After some continued communication, in June 2016 SunTrust
Mortgage accepted the last of the three payments.
Id. ¶ 30. On June 2, 2016, it notified Peek
that the trial modification period had concluded and that he
would receive final documents during the next 30 days.
Id. ¶ 40. A few months later, however, SunTrust
Mortgage changed course: on November 4, 2016 it initiated
foreclosure proceedings in the Superior Court of the District
of Columbia. See id. ¶¶ 29.[1]
B.
Peek's Prior Civil Action in the Eastern District of
Virginia
Less
than one week later, on November 10, 2016, Peek filed a civil
complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia (“the Virginia action”)
against SunTrust Mortgage alleging violations of the Real
Estate Settlement Practices Act, the Equal Credit Opportunity
Act, Titles VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as
well as a claim for breach of contract. See
generally Def.'s Reply Mem. Support Mot. Dismiss,
Ex. 1 (Complaint, Peek v. SunTrust Bank Mortgage,
Inc., No. 1:16-cv-01415 (E.D. Va. Nov. 10, 2016)). He
demanded a declaratory judgment and monetary damages.
Id.
In
response, SunTrust Mortgage moved to dismiss the complaint
under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that it failed to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. The district court granted
the motion. See Peek v. SunTrust Mortgage, Inc.,
2017 WL 3258729, at *5 (E.D. Va. Feb. 15, 2017). It held that
“whatever merits claims plaintiff may have regarding
SunTrust's disposition of his mortgage must be litigated
in the foreclosure proceeding in D.C. Superior Court, ”
and so resolution by declaratory judgment would be
inappropriate. Id. at *2. In addition, the court
stated that Peek failed to plead the necessary elements for
his various claims, such as identifying “a
federally-financed program from which he sought and was
denied benefits” as required for Title VI or an
employment relationship between the parties as required for
Title VII. Id. at *3-4. In all, the district court
concluded that “none of plaintiff's claims states a
cognizable cause of action or seeks an appropriate form of
relief.” Id. at *4. Peek appealed the district
court's order to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit, which affirmed in an unpublished per
curiam decision. See Peek v. SunTrust Bank Mortgage,
Inc., 693 Fed.Appx. 231, 232 (per curiam) (4th Cir.
2017).
C.
The Present Suit
After
the Fourth Circuit's ruling on appeal, in November 2017,
Peek filed suit in this Court, this time against SunTrust
Bank, Inc. As in the Virginia action, his complaint revolves
around the alleged loan modification agreement. Compl. at
2-4. He alleges that as a result of SunTrust Bank's
actions, he has sustained various harms, including “a
decline in credit score, ” id.¶ 79, the
inability to “secure a refinancing of the SunTrust
loan, ” id., and difficulty in securing
“employment due to the derogatory credit ratings,
” id.¶ 83. He claims that SunTrust
violated the Real Estate Settlement Practices Act, the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act, and the Fair Credit Reporting Act,
and also asserts fraud and breach of contract claims. Peek
again seeks a declaratory judgment, id. ¶
52-54, and monetary damages, id. ¶¶ 69,
81, 84-87.
Following
service, SunTrust Bank filed a motion to dismiss, arguing
primarily that Peek's suit is barred by res judicata in
light of the Virginia action.[2] The Court agrees, and will
dismiss this case with prejudice.
II.
Legal Standards
A
complaint survives a Rule 12(b)(6) motion if it provides
“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief, ” Fed.R.Civ.P.
8(a)(2), that “gives the defendant fair notice of what
the claim is and the grounds on which it rests, ”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)
(citation omitted). Courts must construe complaints in a
light most favorable to plaintiffs and “assume the
truth of all well-pleaded allegations.”
Warren, 353 F.3d at 39. The Court's
consideration is limited to “the facts alleged in the
complaint [and] documents either attached to or incorporated
in the complaint, ” EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier
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