In re Chris C. Yum, Petitioner.
Argued
May 23, 2017
A
Disbarred Member of the Bar of the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals (Bar Registration No. 424602)
On
Report and Recommendation of the Board of Professional
Responsibility (BDN 67-15)
Chris
C. Yum, pro se.
William R. Ross, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, Hamilton P.
Fox, III, Disciplinary Counsel, Jelani Lowery and Jennifer P.
Lyman, Senior Assistant Disciplinary Counsels, were on the
brief, for respondent.
Before
Glickman and Beckwith, Associate Judges, and Nebeker, Senior
Judge.
PER
CURIAM
On May
12, 2011, petitioner Christopher C. Yum was disbarred by
consent following his 2006 conviction for making a false
statement in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1001.
In re Yum, 19 A.3d 367 (D.C. 2011) (per curiam). On
June 14, 2015, he filed a petition for reinstatement, which
Disciplinary Counsel opposed. The parties appeared before an
Ad Hoc Hearing Committee ("Hearing Committee"),
which recommended reinstatement. Disciplinary Counsel took
exception to the recommendation, and brought the matter
before this court. Following oral argument, we referred the
matter to the Board on Professional Responsibility
("Board") for its recommendation as to whether
petitioner should be reinstated, and as to evidentiary issues
related to Board Rule 9.8. On December 22, 2017, the Board
issued a report recommending denial of the petition. For the
reasons that follow, we deny the petition.
"Although
we place great weight on the recommendations of the Board and
Hearing Committee, this court has the ultimate authority to
decide whether to grant a petition for reinstatement."
In re Sabo, 49 A.3d 1219, 1224 (D.C. 2012)
(quotation and citation omitted). A petitioner seeking
reinstatement must prove by clear and convincing evidence
"(a) [t]hat the attorney has the moral qualifications,
competency, and learning in law required for readmission[, ]
and (b) [t]hat the resumption of the practice of law by the
attorney will not be detrimental to the integrity and
standing of the Bar, or to the administration of justice, or
subversive to the public interest." D.C. Bar R. XI,
§ 16 (d)(1); In re Mance, 171 A.3d 1133, 1136
(D.C. 2017). We consider the following
"Roundtree factors" in determining whether
a petitioner has made these required showings: (1) the nature
and circumstances of the misconduct for which the attorney
was disciplined; (2) whether the attorney recognizes the
seriousness of the misconduct; (3) the attorney's conduct
since discipline was imposed, including the steps taken to
remedy past wrongs and prevent future ones; (4) the
attorney's present character; and (5) the attorney's
present qualifications and competence to practice law. In
re Roundtree, 503 A.2d 1215, 1217 (D.C. 1985).
The
first Roundtree factor is "of primary
importance in considering the petition for
reinstatement." In re Bettis, 644 A.2d 1023,
1028 (D.C. 1994). Here, petitioner acknowledges the
seriousness of remaining willfully blind to a false statement
in an INS application submitted on behalf of a client. We
apply "heightened scrutiny" to the other
Roundtree factors where, as here, petitioner's
misconduct "is so closely bound up with [his] role and
responsibilities as an attorney." See Sabo, 49
A.3d at 1224; In re Borders, 665 A.2d 1381, 1382
(D.C. 1995) (quotation omitted). Because the Hearing
Committee heard petitioner testify, we, like the Board,
accept its conclusion that he is genuinely remorseful and
recognizes the seriousness of his misconduct. Nevertheless,
when viewed with heightened scrutiny, the fourth and fifth
Roundtree factors counsel against reinstatement and
lead us to conclude that petitioner has failed to prove his
fitness.[1]
"Under
the fourth Roundtree factor, a petitioner is
required to prove that those traits that led to disbarment no
longer exist and, indeed, that he is a changed individual
having full appreciation of the wrongfulness of his conduct
and a new determination to adhere to the high standards of
integrity and legal competence which the Court
requires." Sabo, 49 A.3d at 1232 (quotation
omitted). In support of this factor, petitioner testified to
his reflections about his misconduct and presented two
character witnesses. The Hearing Committee viewed
petitioner's testimony as "demonstrat[ing] that he
is a changed individual," but accorded little weight to
the character witnesses, finding that neither witness knew
the details of his misconduct. The Board found the evidence
on this factor to be lacking, citing the witnesses'
unfamiliarity with the misconduct. In his brief, petitioner
contends that the witnesses' testimony demonstrates their
familiarity with his misconduct, and therefore deserves
significant weight.
A
petitioner is "expected to put on live witnesses
familiar with the underlying misconduct who can provide
credible evidence of petitioner's present good
character." Sabo, 49 A.3d at 1232 (quotation
and alteration omitted). We concur with the Hearing Committee
and Board that petitioner's witnesses were unfamiliar
with the details of his misconduct.[2] Although petitioner provided
assurances of his new character, he offered no examples of
post-discipline conduct from which his personal growth can be
reasonably inferred. Applying heightened scrutiny, we deem
the lack of evidence regarding petitioner's present
character to weigh against reinstatement. See, e.g., In
re Tinsley, 668 A.2d 833, 838 (D.C. 1995) (per curiam)
(appending Board report) (petitioner failed to prove his
present good character where his two character witnesses
lacked substantial knowledge regarding his misconduct).
As to
the fifth Roundtree factor, the Hearing Committee
found that petitioner established his present qualifications
and competence to practice law because he attended a D.C. Bar
course, adequately represented himself in these reinstatement
proceedings, and worked as a law clerk, translator, and
document reviewer after his disbarment. The Board cited
petitioner's failure to explain whether his work required
legal analysis or call witnesses who could testify to his
competence in the work he described.
A
petitioner's post-disbarment legal work may demonstrate
his competence to practice. See, e.g., Bettis, 644
A.2d at 1030 (petitioner established his competence where he
"worked as a law clerk . . . and improved his legal
research and writing skills"). However, like the Board,
we deem significant petitioner's failure to explain
whether his post-disbarment work required legal analysis or
otherwise improved his legal knowledge or skills. See,
e.g., Tinsley, 668 A.2d at 838 (appending Board report)
(petitioner failed to demonstrate his competence where he
provided no details concerning his legal teaching
experiences). Nor did petitioner call witnesses who could
testify to the quality or nature of his work. See, e.g.,
In re Stanton, 589 A.2d 425, 427 (D.C. 1991) (per
curiam) (petitioner failed to prove his competence where no
supervisory lawyer ...