United States District Court, District of Columbia
P. MEHTA UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Julius Wayne Miller has sued the District of Columbia, the
Warden of the District of Columbia Jail (collectively,
“the D.C. Defendants”), the United States Parole
Commission (“Commission”), and the United States
Attorney General (collectively, “the Federal
Defendants”) for monetary damages based on a 32-month
delay in the Commission's execution of a parole violator
warrant. Liberally construed, Plaintiff brings this action
for money damages under (1) the Federal Tort Claims Act
(“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671
et seq., and (2) 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming
that the delay violated his due process rights. This case is
before the court on the D.C. Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss, ECF No. 11, and the Federal Defendants' Motion
to Dismiss, ECF No. 22. The D.C. Defendants assert that no
claim has been stated because they lack authority over such
matters. The Federal Defendants assert several grounds for
dismissal, including sovereign immunity. For the reasons
explained below, both motions are granted.
was on supervised release from a sentence imposed by the
Superior Court of the District of Co lumbia when, on October
13, 2014, he was indicted in Maryland state court for armed
carjacking and related crimes. See Compl., ECF No.
1, at 1-3. Shortly thereafter, on October 22, 2014, the U.S.
Parole Commission “issued and lodged as a detainer a
warrant against [Plaintiff] for violation of the release
conditions.” Id. at 1. On August 21, 2015,
Plaintiff pleaded guilty to robbery in the Circuit Court for
Prince George's County, Maryland, and was subsequently
sentenced “to a [prison] term of 10 years with all but
4 years to be suspended, with 5 years of probation to follow
upon his release.” Id. at 2; see also
Fed. Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 22, Mem. in Supp.
[hereinafter Fed. Defs.' Mem.], at 2. Plaintiff
“was transferred to the State of Maryland Department of
Corrections” to serve that sentence. Compl. at 2. In
October 2015, Plaintiff allegedly requested “that the
U.S. Parole Commission conduct a revocation hearing for which
the parole violator warrant was issued and lodged as a
detainer, ” and in September 2016, he requested
“a dispositional interview” with regard to the
was released from Maryland's custody on June 19, 2017,
and the Commission's warrant was executed on June 21,
2017, resulting in Plaintiff's transfer to the District
of Columbia jail. See Compl. at 3; Fed. Defs.'
Mem. at 2. On August 5, 2017, Plaintiff was
“transported from the D.C. D.O.C. to the Federal
Detention Center” in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
Pl.'s Opp'n to D.C. Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss, ECF
No. 14, at 2, where he received a parole revocation hearing
on August 22, 2017. See Fed. Defs.' Reply, ECF
No. 29, Ex. 1 (Notice of Action), ECF No. 29-1. Following the
hearing, the Commission, citing the Maryland conviction,
revoked Plaintiff's D.C. supervised release term and
ordered him to “serve a new term of imprisonment of 9
month(s) from June 21 2017, the date the warrant was
executed.” Id. at 1. The Commission noted that
with that new term and “a credit of 32 month(s) . . .
for time served, ” Plaintiff would serve “41
months toward [his] guidelines of 60-72 months.”
Id. The Commission explained that it was imposing a
sentence “below the guidelines . . . because the
maximum authorized term of imprisonment limit[ed] the time
[he] [would] serve to less than the bottom of the guideline
range.” Id. In other words, the remaining time
left on Plaintiff's D.C. sentence, i.e., nine months, was
less than the low end of the guideline range for the
supervised release revocation, resulting in a
less-than-guideline-range sentence. The Commission did not
impose “an additional term of supervised release as
part of [the] revocation decision, ” but noted that
once released from his D.C. sentence Plaintiff would have
“a new 5 year term of supervised release as imposed by
the Circuit Court” in Maryland. Id.
National Appeals Board affirmed the Commission's decision
on November 13, 2017. Fed. Defs.' Reply, Ex. 2, ECF No.
29-2. On appeal, Plaintiff asserted, among other things, that
the Commission had violated his due process rights by
delaying his revocation hearing until after the end of his
Maryland sentence. Id. at 1. The Board rejected that
contention, explaining that the Commission “is not
required to begin the revocation procedure until [its]
warrant has been executed, ” and that, in
Plaintiff's case, the “revocation hearing was held
within 90 days of the warrant's execution as required by
Commission rules.” Id.
Federal Defendants have moved to dismiss under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,
” possessing “only that power authorized by
Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. Guardian
Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994).
“It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this
limited jurisdiction, ” which cannot “be expanded
by judicial decree.” Id.; see also Gen.
Motors Corp. v. EPA, 363 F.3d 442, 448 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(“As a court of limited jurisdiction, we begin, and
end, with an examination of our jurisdiction.”).
“If the court determines at any time that it lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction, [it] must dismiss the
action.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3).
deciding a motion under Rule 12(b)(1), a court must accept
all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as
true. See Jerome Stevens Pharm., Inc. v. Food & Drug
Admin., 402 F.3d 1249, 1253-54 (D.C. Cir. 2005). In
addition, the court may consider “such materials
outside the pleadings as it deems appropriate to resolve the
question whether it has jurisdiction to hear the case.”
Scolaro v. D.C. Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 104
F.Supp.2d 18, 22 (D.D.C. 2000); see Herbert v. Nat'l
Acad. of Scis., 974 F.2d 192, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
Specifically, when it is necessary to look beyond the face of
the complaint to determine whether the court has
subject-matter jurisdiction, the court may consider
“the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts
evidenced in the record, or the complaint supplemented by
undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed
facts.” See Coal. for Underground Expansion v.
Mineta, 333 F.3d 193, 198 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (internal
quotation mark omitted). The plaintiff bears the burden of
establishing the court's subject-matter jurisdiction.
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561
D.C. Defendants have moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for
“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to
dismiss brought under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible when
“the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The
factual allegations in the complaint need not be
“detailed, ” but Rule 8's pleading standard
“demands more than an unadorned,
Id. (internal quotation mark omitted).
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice.” Id. If the facts as alleged fail to
establish that a plaintiff has stated a claim upon which
relief can be granted, a court must grant the defendant's
Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Am. Chemistry Council, Inc. v.
U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 922
F.Supp.2d 56, 61 (D.D.C. 2013).
evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court
must accept a plaintiff's “factual allegations . .
. as true, ” Harris v. D.C. Water & Sewer
Auth., 791 F.3d 65, 67 (D.C. Cir. 2015), and
“construe the complaint ‘in favor of the
plaintiff, who must be granted the benefit of all inferences
that can be derived from the facts alleged, '”
Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471, 476 (D.C.
Cir. 2012) (quoting Schuler v. United States, 617
F.2d 605, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1979)). The court need not accept as
true, however, “a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation, ” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. ...