United States District Court, District of Columbia
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
RANDOLPH D. MOSS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Nidia
Calderon, proceeding pro se, filed this action
against the Social Security Administration
(“SSA”), seeking the payment of certain
retirement benefits. The SSA has moved to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction on the grounds that Calderon
failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. Dkt. 22 at 5.
The SSA's motion addresses a different social security
claim than the ones asserted in the complaint and will,
therefore, be DENIED.
I.
BACKGROUND
Calderon
brought this Social Security action in D.C. Superior Court on
February 2, 2017. See Dkt. 1-1 at 1. Although the
precise nature of her claims is unclear, the Court must
construe her complaint liberally. See Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Based on the complaint
and other filings, it appears that Calderon believes that she
may be entitled to a larger share of her ex-husband's
retirement benefits, see Dkt. 1-1 at 17; Dkt. 16 at
2-3, 6-7, and that she also wants the SSA to delay payment of
her own benefits, see Id. at 1, 8. She also requests
an “earnings record” for her ex-husband so that
she can calculate the precise amount that she asserts she is
owed. Dkt. 1-1 at.1.
The SSA
removed the case to this Court, Dkt. 1, and moved to dismiss
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on
Calderon's failure to exhaust, Dkt. 12. Calderon opposed
dismissal. Dkt. 16. Although she did not address the
Department's exhaustion argument, she asserted that her
action concerned “a pending appeal case of fraudulent
retirement and benefits payment[s].” Id. at 1.
The Court denied the SSA's motion without prejudice
because the SSA had failed to file any of the exhibits
referenced in its motion and, as a result, Calderon did not
have the opportunity to respond to the SSA's factual
assertions in her opposition brief. See Minute Order
(Jan. 18, 2018).
The
Department then renewed its motion, again urging the Court to
dismiss Calderon's suit for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Dkt. 22. After the Court advised Calderon of
the potential consequences of failing to respond to the
SSA's motion to dismiss, Dkt. 23, Calderon filed a
response in which she faulted the SSA for not responding to
her “motion to settle [her] case involving her
[ex-]spousal share of his retirement” and expressed
frustration regarding the delay in resolving her case and her
request for a statement of her ex-husbands “life
earnings, ” her “share of his assets, ” and
her request to delay receipt of social security retirement
benefits until she turns seventy. Dkt. 27 at 1-2. To ensure
that Calderon received an adequate opportunity to address the
exhaustion defense raised in the SSA's motion to dismiss,
the Court extended Calderon's time to respond to the
SSA's motion to dismiss. Dkt. 26. Calderon submitted a
response to this order stating that she “ha[s] not
conceded, ” wants her “arguments to be
considered, ” and “do[es] not want [her] case and
claims dismissed.” Dkt. 30 at 1.
II.
ANALYSIS
The SSA
argues that Calderon has failed to exhaust her administrative
remedies with respect to “an application for
supplemental security income” that she filed on April
22, 2011. Dkt. 22 at 2; see Dkt. 22-1 at 2-3 (Levine
Decl. ¶ 3). The declaration attached to the SSA's
renewed motion states that the SSA determined that Calderon
was not disabled on July 22, 2011; that she requested
reconsideration on August 1, 2011; that the SSA affirmed its
determination on February 8, 2012; that Calderon requested a
hearing before an administrative law judge
(“ALJ”) on February 28, 2012; that the ALJ
dismissed the request for a hearing on September 27, 2012
“because [Calderon] did not appear . . . for the
hearing;” that Calderon requested review of the
dismissal by the Appeals Council on November 10, 2012; and,
finally, that the Appeals Council denied her request for
review on December 12, 2012. Id. The SSA concludes
that because “the Appeals Council's denial notice
did not include the right to court review of the ALJ's
dismissal action, ” Calderon has not “obtained a
judicially reviewable” final decision. Dkt. 22 at 5.
Having
reviewed the SSA's evidentiary submission, it appears
that the agency's motion to dismiss has nothing to do
with the claims that Calderon has brought. The SSA's
motion to dismiss asserts that Calderon has failed to exhaust
administrative remedies relating to a claim that she filed in
2011 for supplemental security income (“SSI”) on
the basis of an alleged disability. Id. at 2. That
claim for SSI benefits, however, is not the claim that
Calderon raises here. Rather, although admittedly not a
picture of clarity, Calderon's complaint seeks relief
relating to her and her ex-spouse's retirement benefits.
See, e.g., Dkt. 1-1 at 2 (“A retirement
payment is an investment . . . that accrue[s] interest . . .
every year[, ] [and the SSA] is suppose[d] to compound . . .
interest annually. . . . This has not been done . . . for
myself or my [ex-]spouse.”). The sole reference in the
complaint to anything that might even mistakenly be viewed as
seeking SSI disability benefits is Calderon's use of the
word “Blind.” But, taking a moment to read the
sentence in which that word appears reveals that Calderon
means no such thing. Rather, the point she is making is that
she just wants an accounting of her ex-spouse's earnings
to avoid agreeing “in the Blind” to the amount
she is due. Dkt. 1-1 at 5. Calderon's other filings in
this matter confirm that her complaint involves retirement
benefits, not a claim for SSI disability benefits, see,
e.g., Dkt. 16 at 1 (“I'm requesting . . .
delay of my personal retirement . . . and request[ing] . . .
one half . . . of my [ex]-husband[']s total . . .
retirement earnings.”), and, moreover, explicitly state
that she “is not filing for SSI because [she is] not
disabled, blind, or within 2 month of the age 65 or older,
” id. at 6. Finally, Calderon attaches
correspondence with the SSA to her filings, and those
documents bear dates that do not match the dates to which the
SSA's motion refers. See Dkt. 20 at 3 (notice of
an unfavorable decision dated June 22, 2016); id. at
4 (Calderon's request for reconsideration on her
“retirement claim” received on June 6, 2017).
Because
the SSA has now twice moved to dismiss a claim that Calderon
has not brought, the Court will deny the SSA's motion.
That said, the Court has two remaining concerns. First, as
Calderon has stressed, this case has been replete with
filings that have done nothing to advance the case to
conclusion. Second, although the SSA's motions to dismiss
have failed to advance the ball, Calderon's complaint
tests the limits of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a),
which requires “a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
The Court understands that Calderon is proceeding pro
se and that, as a result, her filings are held to a
“less stringent standard[] than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers.” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94
(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106
(1995)). There are limits, however, to that admonition and,
ultimately, the defendant and the Court must be able to
discern the factual and legal basis for the plaintiff's
claim.
As a
result, and cognizant of this Court's obligation to
manage the litigation in a manner that promotes “the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of [the] action,
” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 1, the Court will order that the
parties meet and confer regarding the nature of-and basis
for- Calderon's claims and any defenses the SSA may have
and that they file a joint status report setting forth their
respective factual and legal positions and proposing a
schedule for resolving this matter in an expeditious matter.
In addition, the Court will order that the parties appear for
a status conference to address how best to proceed towards a
prompt resolution of this case.
CONCLUSION
For the
reasons set forth above, the SSA's renewed motion to
dismiss for failure to exhaust is DENIED;
the parties are ORDERED to meet and confer
and to file a joint status report on or before September 7,
2018; and the parties are ORDERED to appear
for a status conference on September 14, 2018, at 11:30 am in
Courtroom 21.
SO
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