United States District Court, District of Columbia
REDACTED MEMORANDUM OPINION
COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Court has received the [54-1] Sealed Joint Status Report,
filed by Plaintiff Charnita Proctor and Defendants Capital
One, N.A. and Capital One Auto Finance, Inc. (collectively,
"Capital One"), in response to the Court's 
Order,  Memorandum Opinion, and that Memorandum
Opinion's  sealed equivalent.
consideration of their filing, the relevant legal
authorities, and the record as a whole, the Court shall
APPROVE a revised version of the settlement
agreement, as the Court shall herein modify, and Plaintiff
and Defendant Capital One shall execute that settlement
agreement by AUGUST 31, 2018.
Court finds no further need for adjudication of this case,
and accordingly shall DISMISS this action
WITHOUT PREJUDICE until AUGUST 31,
2018, when the matter shall, without further order,
stand dismissed WITH PREJUDICE.
Court shall briefly summarize the timeline of the
parties' settlement of this litigation.
November 8, 2017, Defendant orally discussed a settlement
with Plaintiff, who was unrepresented by counsel at that
time. There arose some dispute afterwards as to the finality
of that discussion. Defendant understood the parties to have
concluded their settlement, pending its memorization in
writing, which Defendant promptly did. That document
reflected what Defendant would later characterize as the
material terms of the parties' oral agreement, namely:
“(Xxxxx)," Am. Unredacted
Mem. Op., ECF No. 38 ("Apr. 3, 2018 Opinion"), at 3
(quoting Capital One's Sealed Mem. in Supp. of Their Mot.
to Enforce Settlement, ECF No. 18-1, at 6).
receiving Defendant's written version, however, Plaintiff
objected to one of the further terms calling for her to
provide Defendant with a (Xxxxx). She
did not otherwise object to Defendant's document. Once
defense counsel secured his client's approval to drop the
(Xxxxx), counsel pursued Plaintiffs
execution of the written agreement. Plaintiff, through
counsel she had by then retained, ultimately refused to
acknowledge the settlement.
January 12, 2018, Capital One filed its  Motion to
Enforce Settlement, and upon the conclusion of briefing, the
Court granted that motion in large part on April 3, 2018.
See Apr. 3, 2018 Opinion, The Court found that the
parties had indeed reached a settlement orally and that the
written agreement was an accurate reflection thereof, with
two exceptions. Id. at 2. First, the oral agreement
did not include the (Xxxxx) so the
written version needed to be revised to exclude it, as
Defendant had already agreed to do. Id. at 4-5.
Second, the Court dealt with Plaintiffs more recent objection
to the scope of the release contained in the written
agreement. Id. at 4. Plaintiff was concerned that
Defendant's broad language would require her to release
claims as to certain credit card accounts that Defendant
evidently had charged off, and potentially other claims as
well. See Id. at 3-4. The Court determined that the
record lacked any indication that the settlement would cover
"anything other than the specific car loan described in
the settlement agreement." Id. at 4,
Accordingly, the Court instructed the parties to revise the
written version to reflect that narrowed scope on which the
oral agreement was premised. Id. at 5.
parties' ensuing status reports demonstrated further
difficulties in confirming the language in the written
settlement agreement. On August 15, 2018, the Court ruled
that two out of the three disputes that had most recently
presented themselves could be promptly resolved. The Court
found first that Plaintiff had raised, and then dropped, an
objection to (Xxxxx) Unredacted Mem.
Op., ECF No. 52, at 2-3 ("Aug. 15, 20IB Opinion").
Second, the date that the parties "(Xxxxx)” agreement, for purposes of the
written version, was the date of the oral agreement on
November 8, 2017. Id. at 3. The date of execution of
the written agreement would necessarily be later, namely upon
the resolution of disputes as to the scope of the written
language. See Id. at 4. Third, and more thornily,
the parties again disagreed as to the appropriate language to
represent the scope of their oral agreement. Plaintiffs
representations raised questions about whether she had
intended to release any future claims regarding the 2010 auto
loan at issue, i.e., any claims other than those she had
raised in her Complaint. See Id. at 4-6. Because the
parties had already orally entered into a settlement, the
Court rejected Plaintiffs attempt to broaden the scope of
this lawsuit to claims outside of the 2010 auto loan at
issue. Id. at 5-6. The Court called for further
elucidation of any claims Plaintiff might have as to the 2010
auto loan, Id. at 6.
instructed by the Court, the parties dispute this issue
further in their [54-1] Sealed Joint Status Report, to which
the Court shall momentarily turn. Before doing so, the Court
observes sua sponte that, despite the
parties' ongoing disagreement in the pleading, it remains
unnecessary to hold an evidentiary hearing to resolve this
case. Defendant has "carried the burden of proving the
existence of a settlement agreement by clear and convincing
evidence." Apr. 3, 2018 Opinion at 2 (quoting Samra
v. Shaheen Bus. & Inv. Grp., Inc., 355 F.Supp.2d
483, 494 (D.D.C. 2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
This Sealed Joint Status Report supports a finding under
District of Columbia law that "an enforceable contract
exists [because] there is an agreement about all material
terms and an intention of the parties to be bound."
Id. (quoting United States v. Mahoney, 247
F.3d 279, 285 (D.C. Cir. 2001)) (internal quotation marks
argues not only that she has several additional claims
related to the 2010 auto loan, but that she should not be
required to release them in this settlement agreement. Sealed
Joint Status Report, ECF No. 54-1, at 1-3. For the first
time, Plaintiff raises "two additional claims stem[ming]
from Capital One's failure to properly respond to her
dispute letters from December 28, 2017 and June 2,
2018." Id. at 1. But the Court finds that
neither "claim" is distinct from the claims in her
underlying lawsuit, which she has agreed to settle.
indicates that the December 2017 dispute consisted of a
challenge to "the subject tradeline and a credit card
account with Capital One." Id. The latter is
outside the scope of this lawsuit, as the Court's April
3, 2018, and August 15, 2018, Opinions made clear. Turning to
the "subject tradeline," Plaintiff summarily
describes the dispute as consisting of her expectation that
the tradeline would be deleted sooner from her credit report.
See Id. at 1-2. But Plaintiff could have no
justifiable reason to expect that Defendant would have
requested back in December 2017 that the credit agencies
delete the tradeline. Defendant maintains that it has not
committed any wrongdoing-as the written settlement agreement
reflects-and so it only would proceed to give Plaintiff the
benefit of the November 2017 settlement upon her execution of
the written agreement, which Plaintiff continues to delay.
See Confidential Settlement Agreement and Release of
Claims, ECF No. 54-2, ¶ 6 (denying wrongdoing and
liability). Plaintiff draws from other jurisdictions for the
proposition that a fresh claim arises each time the plaintiff
has to dispute the same tradeline. See Sealed Joint
Status Report, ECF No. 54-1, at 13-14 (citing, e.g.,
Vasquez v. Bank of Am., N.A., Case No.
15-cv-04072-RS, 2015 WL 7075628 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2015);
Broccuto v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., Civil
Action No. 3:07CV782-HEH, 2008 WL 1969222, at *4 (E.D. Va.
May 6, 2008)). And she again cites out-of-circuit authority
to suggest that a settlement containing a release as to prior
conduct does not cover subsequent conduct. See Id.
at 14 (citing Orsini v. O/S SEABROOKE O.N., 247 F.3d
953, 965 ...