United States District Court, District of Columbia
COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Harry Lee Franklin, Jr., proceeding pro se, brings
this action against his former employer, Defendant, Capitol
Hilton Hotel. See second amended complaint
(“Sec. Am. Compl.”) (ECF No. 4 at 16-20), at
caption. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant discriminated
against him in violation of the Americans with Disabilities
Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. ch. 126 § 12101
et seq. See EEOC complaint (“EEOC
Compl.”) (ECF No. 4 at 29, Ex. 3); see
generally, complaint (“Compl.”) (ECF No. 4
at 38-43); first amended complaint (“First Am.
Compl.”) (ECF No. 4 at 21-29); Sec. Am. Compl.
moves to dismiss the second amended complaint pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted. Defendant's
motion to dismiss (“Mot.”) (ECF No. 5) at 1
¶ 1; Defendant's memorandum (“Mem.”)
(ECF No. 5) at 1 ¶ 1. Defendant argues that
Plaintiff's pleadings, and the allegations therein, fail
to establish a prima facie case for disability
discrimination. Mem. at 3-4. Plaintiff opposes
Defendant's motion to dismiss. See generally,
Plaintiff's memorandum in opposition (“Opp.”)
(ECF No. 9).
Court finds that Plaintiff has stated a claim for relief, and
therefore, Defendant's motion to dismiss is denied
without prejudice, for reasons discussed herein.
October 17, 2017, Plaintiff filed his initial complaint in
the Superior Court for the District of Columbia. See
docket, Harry Lee Franklin v. Capitol Hilton Hotel
(No. 2017 CA 006944); Compl. He filed an amended complaint on
November 8, 2017. See First Am. Compl. He filed a
second amended complaint on November 14, 2017. See
Sec. Am. Compl. Defendant was served on or about November 16,
2017. See Service Notice (ECF No. 4 at 15).
then removed the matter to this Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1331, 1441, and 1446. See Notice of
Removal (ECF No. 1). On November 28, 2017, Defendant filed
its motion to dismiss. See generally, Mot. Plaintiff
filed a timely opposition to Defendant's motion on
December 5, 2017. See generally, Opp. Defendant
filed a reply to opposition (ECF No. 10) on December 14,
2017. Plaintiff was granted leave to file a surreply (ECF No.
14) on February 1, 2018.
puts forth allegations that he was improperly terminated from
employment based on his disability. Sec. Am. Compl. at 1
¶ 1. He alleges that suffers from diabetes ketoacidosis.
Id. He claims that he was fired for “job
abandonment;” however, he further alleges that he was
in the hospital, and that Defendant was aware of his
circumstances and condition. Compl. at 1 ¶ 1; Sec. Am.
Compl. at 1 ¶ 1, Ex. 1. He posits that he was informed
that he could return to work, though he was still
experiencing some health complications. Plaintiff alleges
that he was unfairly removed from his position under the
guise of lack of attendance when it was, in fact, solely
related to his disability. Id.
indicates in each of his complaints that he filed a grievance
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”). Compl. at 1 ¶ 1; First Am. Compl.
at 1 ¶ 1, Ex. 3; Sec. Am. Compl. at 1 ¶ 1.
Plaintiff attaches the relevant EEOC complaint and decision
to his first amended complaint. First Am. Compl. at Ex. 3.
The EEOC dismissed the claim on September 7, 2017.
Id. In the EEOC filing, Plaintiff states:
I began working for Respondent in December 2014. In 2015[, ]
I notified Respondent of my disability. They gave me special
accommodations for my disability. On January 20, 2017, I was
discharged after not showing up for work for two days. I was
terminated for symptoms of my disability. I believe I was
discriminated against due to my disability, in violation of
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended. I
would like to sue for monetary and punitive damages in the
amount of $50, 000 and to get my employment back.
Id. at 2 (“particulars”).
Plaintiff's second amended complaint attaches the initial
complaint, as well as medical records documenting his
referenced hospital stay, as exhibits. Sec. Am. Compl. at
Exs. 1-2. He again indicates that he previously filed with
the EEOC. Sec. Am. Compl. at 1 ¶ 1. He also realleges
that he provided notice to Defendant regarding his medical
condition and that he was nonetheless terminated, a few days
after his hospital release. Plaintiff again seeks monetary
damages in the amount of $50, 000 and requests to be
reinstated to his job position. Id.
allegations throughout the complaints are consistent. The
attachments to the complaints vary, however, it appears that
Plaintiff intended the attachments to the complaints to serve
as supplements, rather than to supplant one another.
See Sec. Am. Compl. at Exs. 1-2. Furthermore, all of
the pleadings are part of the public record in both D.C.
Superior Court and/or in this Court.
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a complaint
contain “ ‘a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in
order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the .
. . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'
” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,
47 (1957)); accord Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
93 (2007) (per curiam). Although “detailed factual
allegations” are not necessary to withstand a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, to provide the
“grounds” of “entitle[ment] to relief,
” a plaintiff must furnish “more than labels and
conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action.” Id. at
1964-65; see also Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265,
286 (1986). Instead, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at ...