United States District Court, District of Columbia
D. BATES UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Xiu Jian Sun, identifying as "the spiritual Adam"
and as a representative of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints, filed this pro se action on
September 12, 2017. Listed as defendants are "Secret
gang organization: OBAMA-BARACK-Dog," and various
federal employees and judges. Plaintiff has paid the
statutory filing fee to commence this action. Defendants
respond that this Court lacks jurisdiction and that nothing
in plaintiffs complaint states a claim upon which relief can
be granted. For the following reasons,  defendants'
motion to dismiss will be granted.
prefatory matter, the Court notes that plaintiff has filed at
least eight similar complaints in other state and federal
courts. See, e.g., Xiu Jian Sun v. N.Y. Office
of Att'y Gen., No. 17-CV-5916, 2017 WL 4740811, at
*l-*3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2017) (dismissing complaint as
frivolous and listing other cases filed by plaintiff in New
York state and federal courts); Xiu Jian Sun v. United
States, 130 Fed.Cl. 569, 570 (2016) (dismissing
complaint). In the instant case, plaintiff alleges that,
"[i]n the night between March 7th and 8th, 2016, the
Lord god of host Jehovah sent the messenger said to servant
(Plaintiff) through the angel: 'Secret
Compl. [ECF No. 1] at 4 (emphasis in original) (omitting
footnote and Chinese language). Plaintiff asserts, among
other things, that the "Lord god of host sent the
messenger through angel said to spiritual Adam:
'take him (her) to the law to confront
it.'" Id. at 3-4 (emphasis in
original) (omitting Chinese language). Plaintiff also quotes
from the Book of Revelations, Id. at 4-5 (quoting
Revelations 17:1-10), and the Doctrine and Covenants of the
Church of the Latter-Day Saints, Id. at 6-7(quoting
The Doctrine and Covenants § 42, LDS.org,
these quotations, the complaint lists the names of various
former presidents and other officials as "kings,"
including a note that "the Lord god of host
sent the messenger said to servant in heart, 'They are
like this in their previous life."'
Id. at 5 (emphasis in original). Plaintiff requests
a "[t]rial with god's law" with a "jury to
prevent insult and unfair behavior," as well as a
Mandarin Chinese court interpreter. Id. at 7.
Defendants move to dismiss the complaint for failure to state
a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), as
well as for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule
12(b)(1). Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss PL's Compl. [ECF No.
6] at 1.
motion-to-dismiss stage, a court must "treat the
complaint's factual allegations as true and grant
plaintiff 'the benefit of all inferences that can be
derived from the facts alleged.'" Elec. Privacy
Info. Ctr. v. IRS, 261 F.Supp.3d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2017)
(citing Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d
1111, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000)). "The sole exception to
this rule lies with allegations that are sufficiently
fantastic to defy reality as we know it: claims about little
green men, or the plaintiffs recent trip to Pluto, or
experiences in time travel." Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 696 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting). On a Rule
12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction, courts may dismiss complaints which are
'"patently insubstantial,' presenting no federal
question suitable for decision." Tooley v.
Napolitano, 586 F.3d 1006, 1009 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(citation omitted). On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim, a complaint "must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'"
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570(2007)).
federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, "even
a pro se plaintiff bears the burden of establishing
that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction."
Newby v. Obama, 681 F.Supp. 2d. 53, 55 (D.D.C. 2010)
(citation omitted) (dismissing case for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction because it appeared to be
"the sort of 'bizarre conspiracy theory' that
warrant[s] dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1)"). The standard
for this kind of dismissal is high: the claims must "be
flimsier than 'doubtful or questionable'-they must be
'essentially fictitious.'" Best v.
Kelly, 39 F.3d 328, 330 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (quoting
Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 537-38 (1974))
(finding that the claims of pro se prisoners who
asserted that the prison had violated their constitutional
rights were not "patently insubstantial," but noted
that "any sort of supernatural intervention" would
meet the standard for Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal).
instant case, Plaintiff claims that a divine messenger
provided inspiration for the suit. Compl. at 4. This is
similar to other "patently insubstantial" claims
meriting dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1). See, e.g.,
Odemns v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 14-cv-1790 (KBJ),
2015 WL 2120634, at *2 (D.D.C. May 6, 2015) (dismissing as
"patently insubstantial" claim "that
defendants have implanted a 'multifunctional'
nano-chip that acts as 'a recorder' and a
'transmitter' in order to 'record Plaintiffs
thoughts'"); In re New York ex rel. Unger,
990 F.Supp.2d 6, 6 (D.D.C. 2013) (dismissing as frivolous a
case where plaintiff sought relief for "an ongoing state
of insurrection and judicial anarchy directed against the
supreme court for the fourth judicial district of New
York"); Baszak v. FBI, 816 F.Supp.2d 66, 69
(D.D.C. 2011) (dismissing as patently insubstantial claims of
"video and mental surveillance"). Plaintiffs claims
here are "patently insubstantial," and
defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction will therefore be granted.
courts must construe the complaints of pro se
plaintiffs "liberally," a plaintiffs "pro
se status does not render him immune from pleading facts
upon which a valid claim can rest." In re
Watson, 910 F.Supp.2d 142, 148 (D.D.C. 2012) (citation
omitted); see Hamilton v. Acosta, 688 Fed.Appx. 16,
17 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (unpublished) (holding that, "[e]ven
if construed liberally, appellant's pro se
complaint [did] not assert a colorable . . . claim").
Even after a liberal construction and careful examination of
plaintiff s complaint, this Court is unable to identify any
colorable claims. See Urban v. United Nations, 768
F.2d 1497, 1499 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("[T]he court is unable
to hazard even the most elementary guess as to the relief
[plaintiff] seeks, at a loss to decipher the nature of the
claims pursued, and unable to discern a plausible nexus
between the complaint and the named defendants.").
Eastern District of New York noted in Xiu Jian Sun v. New
York Office of the Attorney General, a case brought by
plaintiff, "th[is] plaintiff has made a practice of
suing any judge, court personnel, government official, or
person with whom he has ever interacted. In addition, the
allegations consist. . . of religious pronouncements."
2017 WL 4740811, at *2. This complaint seems to follow the
same pattern, naming as defendants multiple current and
former Department of Justice employees, judges and clerks at
the Court of Federal Claims and Federal Circuit, current
Supreme Court employees, and the former Acting Solicitor
General of the United States. As in plaintiffs prior cases,
he has not asserted any causes of action or sought any
specific relief other than the appointment of an interpreter
for court appearances. Compl. at 7; see Xiu Jian
Sun v. Asiello, No. 1:17-cv-63, 2017 WL 4350566, at
*2 (N.D.N.Y. July 17, 2017) ("Plaintiff has not stated a
claim, much less a claim upon which relief could be
granted."). Because plaintiff has once again not stated
a claim upon which relief can be granted, defendants'
motion to dismiss will be granted.
these reasons, defendants' motion to dismiss will be
granted and this case dismissed with prejudice. A ...