United States District Court, District of Columbia
ROBERT A. MCNEIL, et al., Plaintiffs,
JANICE R. BROWN, et al., Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO
STRIKE; GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS; SUA
SPONTE DISMISSING CLAIMS AGAINST REMAINING DEFENDANTS;
DENYING AS MOOT REMAINING MOTIONS
RUDOLPH CONTRERAS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
se Plaintiffs are on a mission to prove a years-long,
multi-agency conspiracy to falsify tax records in order to
wrongfully fine and incarcerate Plaintiffs. They now claim
that three judges and one employee of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit are in on the
case, Plaintiffs seek a seven-part declaratory judgment
against three D.C. Circuit judges and one unknown government
employee for violations of their First and Fifth Amendment
rights. Plaintiffs' interactions with Defendants stem
from their refusal to pay income taxes, which has resulted in
Plaintiffs' pursuit by the Internal Revenue Service
(“IRS”). Plaintiffs allege that the IRS has been
pretending to file substitute income tax returns on their
behalf and that through this “record falsification
program, ” the IRS has subjected them to harsh
penalties such as monetary fines and incarceration. In
response, Plaintiffs filed numerous lawsuits against the
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the IRS.
Defendants in this case are three of the D.C. Circuit judges
who presided over the appeals of eight of these cases after
they were dismissed as barred by the Anti-Injunction Act, as
well as one unknown court employee who Plaintiffs believe
actually wrote the D.C. Circuit orders affirming each
case's dismissal. Plaintiffs now seek a declaratory
judgment against Defendants acknowledging that Defendants
failed to properly adjudicate their appeals, as Plaintiffs
believe they were constitutionally required to do.
only defendant to be served in this case, Judge Brown, has
moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' case on six grounds, arguing
that (1) the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear a
Bivens action seeking equitable relief because
Bivens does not authorize suits seeking equitable
relief; (2) the Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiffs'
Declaratory Judgment Act claims because there is no case or
controversy to resolve; (3) the Court should exercise its
discretion to dismiss the case; (4) Plaintiffs lack standing;
(5) Plaintiffs had other remedies available to them; and (6)
Plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. Because Plaintiffs have failed to establish that
they have Article III standing, the Court grants Judge
Brown's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Additionally, the Court dismisses
Plaintiffs' claims against Judge Ginsburg, Judge Wilkins,
and the unknown government employee, for failure to prosecute
those claims. Further, because the Court dismisses the
case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the remaining
motions pending in this case are denied as moot.
case stems from a series of suits filed by Plaintiffs against
the IRS and DOJ.Plaintiffs allege that IRS employees used
falsified digital records to pretend to prepare substitute
income tax returns on their behalf. Compl. ¶¶ 2-3,
ECF No. 1. In order to challenge this alleged practice,
Plaintiffs filed ten lawsuits in the federal courts in the
District of Columbia and California claiming that “A.)
IRS has repeatedly conceded it has no authority to prepare
substitute income tax returns, that B.) IRS does NOT prepare
substitute income tax returns on any date concerning targeted
nontaxpayers, and that C.) IRS systematically falsifies its
internal software to conceal that failure/inability to
prepare substitute income tax returns.” Id.
¶ 1 (footnotes omitted). Plaintiffs believe that the
federal government “outrageously use[s] the fruit of
the IRS record falsification program to justify incarcerating
and/or stealing the property of those who don't
voluntarily comply with the federal bar's income tax
fraud.” Id. ¶ 4.
claim that, in pursuing the underlying cases, one of the
three core factual contentions they sought to have confirmed
was whether the IRS “never actually prepares
substitutes for [income tax] returns, but rather inputs
computer codes to make it appear as though a substitute
[income tax] return has been filed.” Compl. ¶ 6
(quoting Gov't Mot. Consolidate Cases, Stanley v.
Lynch, No. 17-cv-22, ECF No. 11 (D.D.C. Mar. 8, 2017)).
Citing Long v. Rasmussen, Plaintiffs contend that
[t]he revenue laws are a code or system in regulation of tax
assessment and collection. They relate to taxpayers, and not
to nontaxpayers. The latter are without their scope. No.
procedure is prescribed for nontaxpayers, and no attempt is
made to annul any of their rights and remedies in due course
of the law. With them Congress does not assume to deal, and
they are neither of the subject nor of the object of the
Compl. ¶ 1, n.3. In essence, Plaintiffs' underlying
cases revolved around a belief that the Internal Revenue Code
does not apply to them.
Plaintiffs' underlying cases were dismissed as barred by
the Anti-Injunction Act. Id. ¶ 11. Plaintiffs
sued the judges who dismissed those cases, claiming that they
were dismissed for fraudulent reasons. McNeil v.
Harvey, No. 17-cv-1720 (D.D.C.). Now Plaintiffs have
also sued the D.C. Circuit judges who affirmed the dismissals
of the underlying cases. As to Judge Brown, they allege that
“in multiple appeals, her name was used to provide a
parody of justice without the power thereof; over her name
the rights of fellow Americans to meaningful appellate
remedy were gutted, and in her name, orders were issued
viciously suppressing the screams of victims while creating
the fraudulent appearance of pretended ‘precedent'.
Rights-raped, robbed, wrongly incarcerated Americans object
to the farce.” Compl. at 11.
now seek a seven-part declaratory judgment answering the
following questions in regard to each of the four appellate
1. Was appellate relief denied in EIGHT appeals filed by
Class Plaintiffs, (see Exhibits B, C, D and E), without
clearly identifying the standard of review used, without
providing any explanation how the Anti-Injunction Act
supposedly applied to the actual allegations and relief the
litigants sought below, and without explaining how the
equitable exception to the AIA supposedly did not apply to
those allegations and relief sought?
2. From the four unpublished denial “orders”
presented on pretty Circuit letterhead, is it possible that a
single source who is NOT a United States Circuit Judge
3. Is it possible that the author of the “orders”
concealed the standard of review utilized because he used the
“clearly erroneous” standard, despite the fact
the trial court judges resolved no contested issues of fact,
but instead fabricated, then attributed to plaintiffs,
allegations they did not make, and relief they did not seek?
4. Based on the orders before the Court, since a clear error
standard is repeatedly inferred, (“Appellant has not
shown that . . .”) is it possible that the author
applied the Anti-Injunction Act to the allegations and relief
fabricated by attorneys in the district court, then
attributed to Plaintiffs, in utter derogation of the
appellants' complaint on appeal of those fabrications?
5. Based on the four unsigned, unpublished Orders now before
this Court, did the author resolve de novo the contested
dispositive legal controversy whether 28 U.S.C. §6020(b)
grants power to create substitute returns in income tax
matters, despite the ...