United States District Court, District of Columbia
ROSEMARY M. COLLYER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Mitchell is a prisoner who seeks a writ of habeas corpus.
Because he challenges a long expired “punitive”
detention, Mr. Mitchell was ordered to explain why the
petition is not moot. See June 25, 2018 Order to Show Cause
(OTSC) [Dkt. 20]. Having carefully considered the responses
of Mr. Mitchell and the government, and for the reasons
explained below, the Court will dismiss the petition as moot.
Mitchell was convicted of murder in the District of Columbia
and is serving a life sentence at the federal Bureau of
Prisons. In 2016, while detained in the District by virtue of
a writ issued by the D.C. Superior Court, Mr. Mitchell was
put in segregative detention at the D.C. Jail for sixteen
(16) days due to some misconduct. His immediate petition
seeks relief from that detention.
III of the U.S. Constitution limits federal courts to
deciding “actual, ongoing controversies.”
Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 317 (1988). A court must
refrain from deciding a case if events have transpired such
that the decision will neither “presently affect the
parties' rights nor have a more-than-speculative chance
of affecting them in the future.” Clarke v. United
States, 915 F.2d 699, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). Because the
“constitutional case-or-controversy requirement
subsists through all stages of federal judicial proceedings,
” the parties “must continue to have a personal
stake in the outcome of the lawsuit.” Anyanwutaku
v. Moore, 151 F.3d 1053, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “This
means that, throughout the litigation, the plaintiff
‘must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual
injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed
by a favorable judicial decision.'” Spencer v.
Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998) (quoting Lewis v.
Cont'l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990)).
is moot when (1) interim relief or events have completely and
irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation
and (2) there is no reasonable expectation that the alleged
wrong(s) will be repeated. Doe v. Harris, 696 F.2d
109, 111 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (citing Cty. of Los Angeles v.
Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979)). When both conditions
are satisfied, the case is moot because neither party has a
legally cognizable interest in the final determination of the
underlying facts and law. See Id. A prisoner
“seeking injunctive or declaratory relief” must
show “continuing adverse consequences” from the
challenged action. Anyanwutaku, 151 F.3d at 1057.
Although the Supreme Court “has established a
presumption of collateral consequences from a wrongful
criminal conviction, ” it “has not extended this
presumption to prison disciplinary sanctions.”
Cochran v. Buss, 381 F.3d 637, 641 (7th Cir. 2004)
(citing Spencer) (other citation omitted)). Therefore, Mr.
Mitchell must demonstrate actual “collateral
consequences adequate to meet Article III's
injury-in-fact requirement.” Spencer, 523 U.S. at 14.
Mitchell filed this action ten months after the denial of his
second administrative appeal, which was well beyond the
sixteen days he allegedly spent in punitive
segregation. See Pet. [Dkt. 1] ¶ 8. On its face,
then, the petition was moot when it was filed. See
Medberry v. Crosby, 351 F.3d 1049, 1053 (11th Cir.
2003) (agreeing that “[w]here . . . a prisoner has
completed an imposed term of administrative segregation
before he files his petition, . . . the ‘petition[ is]
moot when filed and cannot be revived by collateral
consequences'”) (quoting McCollum v.
Miller, 695 F.2d 1044, 1048 (7th Cir. 1982)). Mr.
Mitchell argues, however, that “this case presents a
classic issue that is capable of repetition yet evading
review.” Resp. to OTSC at 3. He mistakes the scope of
capable-of-repetition doctrine applies only in exceptional
situations, . . . where the following two circumstances are
simultaneously present: (1) the challenged action is in its
duration too short to be fully litigated prior to cessation
or expiration, and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that
the same complaining party will be subject to the same action
again.” Spencer, 523 U.S. at 17 (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted). “By evading review, the
Supreme Court has meant evading Supreme Court review.”
Del Monte Fresh Produce Co. v. United States, 570
F.3d 316, 322 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). The “capable of repetition
prong involves a determination of whether there is a
‘reasonable expectation' that the ‘same
party' will again be subjected to the challenged legal
wrong, which is an inquiry that requires the court to assess
the degree of probability of recurrence.” Jeong
Seon Han v. Lynch, 223 F.Supp.3d 95, 106 (D.D.C. 2016)
(citation omitted). The inquiry “is not ‘whether
the precise historical facts that spawned the plaintiff's
claims are likely to recur,' but rather ‘whether
the legal wrong complained of by the plaintiff is reasonably
likely to recur.'” Id. (quoting Del Monte,
570 F.3d at 324). A “speculative possibility [of
recurrence] is not a basis for retaining jurisdiction over a
moot case.” Id. at 107 (quoting In re
Operation of the Mo. River Sys. Litig., 421 F.3d 618,
631-32 (8th Cir. 2005)). Mr. Mitchell has the burden of
satisfying the requirements to bring this case within the
mootness exception. Southern Co. Servs. v. FERC, 416
F.3d 39, 43 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
short duration of the challenged detention satisfies the
first requirement. But see Spencer, 523 U.S. at 18 (noting
that petitioner “has not shown . . . that the time
between [the expired] parole revocation [term of
imprisonment] and [the] expiration of [his] sentence is
always so short as to evade review”). Mr. Mitchell has
not met the second requirement of likely recurrence. The
Court “must first determine exactly what must be
repeatable in order to save [the] case from mootness.”
Id. Mr. Mitchell identifies as “clearly
repetitive” his “punitive segregation placement .
. . forfeiture of good time credits . . . and the impounding
of property, as a consequence of disciplinary action, ”
all “without due process.” Resp. to OTSC at 3.
Oddly enough, the prospect that Mr. Mitchell will be denied
due process in future disciplinary proceedings presupposes
that he will misbehave again. See Jeong Seon Han,
223 F.Supp.3d at 107 (distinguishing “the purportedly
criminal character of Han's conduct . . . from any prior
pronouncement by the D.C. Circuit suggesting that a plaintiff
may satisfy the capable of repetition exception by alleging
an intention to act similarly in the future” and
expressing court's unwillingness “‘to assume
that Han will repeat the type of misconduct that would again
place him . . . at risk' of another detention”)
(quoting McBryde v. Comm. to Review Circuit Council
Conduct, 264 F.3d 52, 56 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (other
citations omitted)); see also Spencer, 523 U.S. at 15
(rejecting injury-in-fact claim “contingent upon
respondents' violating the law, getting caught and being
convicted, ” insofar as “[r]espondents themselves
are able-and indeed required by law-to prevent such a
possibility from occurring”) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)). Prison disciplinary actions are by
necessity “highly fact-dependent.” Del
Monte, 570 F.3d at 323 (discussing People for the
Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Gittens, 396 F.3d
416 (D.C. Cir. 2005)); see also Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539, 564 (1974) (holding “that there must be a
written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence
relied on and reasons for the disciplinary action”)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Therefore,
it is reasonably safe to conclude that any legal
“wrong” Mr. Mitchell may have
“suffered” as a result of the challenged
proceeding is “unlikely to recur.” Del Monte, 570
F.3d at 323; see accord Nat'l Ass'n of Home
Builders v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 264 Fed.Appx.
10, 13 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (dismissing as moot where subsequent
proceeding would “require review of a different
[factual] record . . . containing new explanations, analyses
foregoing reasons, Mr. Mitchell's habeas petition will be
dismissed as moot. A memorializing Order accompanies this
 Mr. Mitchell argues that he has lost
good-time credit but, as noted in the OTSC, Mr. Mitchell has
no constitutional right to good-time credit because he is a
District of Columbia prisoner sentenced to a life sentence
for first-degree murder. See Mitchell v. U.S., 629
A.2d 10, 11 n.2 (D.C. 1993); see also Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974) (“[T]he
Constitution itself does not guarantee good-time credit for
satisfactory behavior while in prison.”); Poole v.
Kelly, 954 F.2d 760 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (per curiam)
(rejecting claim of entitlement to statutory good-time credit
advanced by D.C. Code offenders sentenced for first-degree
murder). But even if Mr. Mitchell were deprived of good-time
credits, as he claims, he has no recourse against the
District because the loss of good-time credits affects the
calculation of Mr. Mitchell's sentence, over which
neither Respondent Johnson nor his employer D.C. Department
of Corrections has any authority. In 2016, Mr. Mitchell was
detained in the District by virtue of a writ issued by the
Superior Court to compel his appearance at a hearing.
Nonetheless, matters pertaining to the duration of his
sentence remain the exclusive province of the United States.
See D.C. Code § 24-101 (transferring authority over D.C.
Code felony offenders to the U.S. Bureau of Prisons); cf.
United States v. Bailey, 585 F.2d 1087, 1103-04
(D.C. Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 444 U.S. 394
(1980) (noting in context of escape charge that a
“prisoner who has been committed to the custody of the
Attorney General by virtue of a conviction is still in the
custody of the Attorney General by virtue of that conviction
. . . when he is transferred pursuant to a writ of habeas
corpus ad testificandum”).
 Mr. Mitchell states that he “is
currently in punitive segregation, ” Resp. to OTSC
[Dkt. 24] at 1, but he cannot plausibly ascribe his current
detention to the 2016 disciplinary decision giving rise to
this action. Mr. Mitchell also argues that the Supreme Court
“has said a habeas petition cannot be made moot, even
if the petition is transferred out of the jurisdiction,
especially when declaratory and injunctive relief is sought,
as is here.” Id. at 2. That argument is