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Garza v. U.S. Marshal Service

United States District Court, District of Columbia

September 28, 2018

U.S. MARSHALS SERVICE, et al., Defendants.



         This case brought under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552, and the Privacy Act (“Privacy Act” and “PA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552(a), is before the Court on defendants' amended motion for summary judgment (“Defs.' Mot.”) [ECF No. 34], memorandum (“Defs.' Mem.”) [ECF No. 34], statement of material facts (“Defs.' Stmt.”) [ECF No. 34-1], and declarations (“Decls.”) and exhibits in support (“Defs.' Exs.”) [collectively, ECF Nos. 30-1, 2, 3, 4]. Also before the Court is plaintiff's motion for entry of default and judicial notice (“Mot. for Dflt.”) [ECF No. 36], motion for status of case and judicial notice (“Mot. for Jud. Not.”) [ECF No. 44], and second motion for judicial notice (“Sec. Mot. for Jud. Not.”) [ECF No. 46]. For the reasons stated herein, defendants' amended motion for summary judgment will be granted as to defendants, the United States Marshals Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Drug Enforcement Administration.[1] Plaintiff's motion for entry of default and judicial notice will be denied and his motions for status/judicial notice will also be denied.

         I. BACKGROUND

         Plaintiff, Jorge Luis Garza (“plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, is a federal prisoner designated to Hazelton Federal Correctional Institution, located in Bruceton Mills, North West Virginia. Complaint (“USMS Compl.”) [ECF No. 1] at caption. Defendants report that plaintiff was charged with various crimes including, among others, conspiracy to launder monetary instruments and conspiracy to distribute cocaine, in the Southern District of Texas. Declaration of David M. Hardy (“Hardy Decl.”) at ¶ 6. The public record corroborates this account. See USA v. Vallejo, et. al, no. 4:99-cr-00455-2 (S.D. TX Aug. 29, 1999). Plaintiff was declared a fugitive from the law in August 1999. Hardy Decl. at ¶ 6. Defendants further attest that USMS was tasked with apprehending plaintiff, which was accomplished on July 6, 2001. Id.; USA v. Vallejo, et. al, no. 4:99-cr-00455-2 (S.D. TX Aug. 29, 1999) at Arrest Warrant [ECF No. 192]. He was convicted on January 23, 2003. Hardy Decl. at ¶ 6; USA v. Vallejo, et. al, no. 4:99-cr-00455-2 (S.D. TX Aug. 29, 1999) at Court Verdict [ECF No. 281]. Plaintiff was sentenced on June 10, 2013 to four life sentences, and 240 months to be served concurrently. Plaintiff's Opposition to Summary Judgment (“Pl.'s Opp.”) [ECF No. 37] at 2 ¶ 3. USA v. Vallejo, et. al, no. 4:99-cr-00455-2 (S.D. TX Aug. 29, 1999) at Sentencing [ECF No. 299].

         Here, plaintiff initially filed three separate complaints in three separate matters, see Garza v. FBI, No. 16-0980 at Complaint (“FBI Compl.”) [ECF No. 1], Garza v. DEA, No. 16-0985 at Complaint (“DEA Compl.”) [ECF No. 1], and Garza v. USMS, No. 16-0985 at USMS Compl. These cases have since been consolidated in full under Case No. 16-0976. Plaintiff sues the United States Marshals Service (“USMS”), the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”). See FBI Compl. at caption; DEA Compl. at caption; USMS Compl. at caption.

         Plaintiff seeks any and all materials relating to his Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Information System (“NADDIS”) number 3944994. DEA Compl. at 1 ¶ 1. He also specifically requests any photographs, surveillance, and fingerprint class/pattern class, used and/or collected in the process of charging him with a “violation of probation” in his underlying criminal matter, USA v. Vallejo, et. al, no. 4:99-cr-00455-2 (S.D. TX Aug. 29, 1999), and/or relating to his arrest, which occurred in North Carolina. Pl.'s Opp. at 2 ¶ 3; Hardy Decl. at ¶ 7; Hardy Ex. A; USA v. Vallejo, et. al, no. 4:99-cr-00455-2 (S.D. TX Aug. 29, 1999) at Arrest Warrant [ECF No. 192]. Plaintiff requests copies of any warrant relating to a probation violation, based on a reference to such a charge (“no. 1-5012”) on his National Crime Information Center (“NCIC”) report and/or affiliated with his NADDIS number. USMS Compl. at 1, 3, 6; FBI Compl. at 1, 3; USMS Compl. Ex. B. Plaintiff contests the idea that he was ever a “probation violator” and objects to such characterization on his personal background reports and with his current NADDIS number. Plaintiff's Surreply (“Pl.'s Surreply”) [ECF No. 43] at 1-2. Defendants have apparently recently corrected a particular portion of plaintiff's record at his request and in this regard. Id.; Defendants' Reply to Opposition (“Defs.' Reply”) [ECF No. 40] at 2 ¶ 2, 2 n.1; Pl.'s Mot. for Dflt. Ex. A. The exact nature of the correction is not entirely clear from the record, nor does it appear to be material to this FOIA/PA action. See Id. Plaintiff continues to allege that defendants have either failed to conduct an adequate search and/or are improperly withholding his requested records. USMS Compl. at 1-3, 5-6; FBI Compl. at 1-4; DEA Compl. at 1-3, 5; Pl.'s Opp. at 2 ¶ 3.

         On March 31, 2010, plaintiff sent a FOIA/PA request regarding his person to USMS. Declaration of William E. Bordley (“Bordley Decl.”) at ¶ 2; Bordley Ex. A. By letter dated June 27, 2011, USMS acknowledged plaintiff's FOIA request (“First USMS Request” and “First USMS Request No. 2011-USMS-16960”) and indicated that a search for responsive records would be conducted. Bordley ¶ 3; Bordley Ex. B.

         On December 27, 2010, plaintiff submitted another FOIA/PA request, this time directed to the Executive Office of United States Attorneys (“EOUSA”). Hardy Decl. at ¶ 7; Hardy Ex. A. After review, and very shortly thereafter, EOUSA determined that the request was appropriate for the FBI, and referred it for handling and direct response to plaintiff. Id. Plaintiff specifically requested: (1) case number for probation violation and original case, (2) personal identifiers of arrestee (such as any available descriptions and photographs), and (3) fingerprint class and pattern class. Id.

         By letter dated February 10, 2011, the FBI acknowledged receipt of plaintiff's request (“FBI Request” and “FBI Request No. 1161297-000”). Hardy Decl. at ¶ 8; Hardy Ex. B. In the letter, the FBI advised plaintiff that it required additional identifying information in order to conduct a search within the Central Records System (“CRS”). Id. The FBI also enclosed a Certification of Identity Form (“DOJ-361 form”), to be completed by plaintiff. Id.

         On March 3, 2011, plaintiff returned the executed the DOJ-361 form. Plaintiff provided his full legal name as, “Guillermo Huertas Sanchez, ” as well as other personal identifiers such as his current address, date of birth, and place of birth. Hardy Decl. at ¶ 9; Hardy Ex. C. Plaintiff also included a copy of his Criminal Information Report (“CIR”). Id. On March 22, 2011, the FBI acknowledged receipt of the additional requested information, and advised plaintiff that it would be undertaking a search of CRS for information responsive to his FBI Request. Hardy Decl. at ¶ 10; Hardy Ex. C. On May 23, 2011, plaintiff inquired regarding the status of his FBI Request. Hardy Decl. at ¶ 11; Hardy Ex. E.

         By letter dated June 24, 2011, the FBI responded to FBI Request No. 1161297-000. It reviewed 137 pages and released 81 pages, in full or in part. Hardy Decl. at ¶ 12; Hardy Ex. F. The FBI cited Privacy Act Exemption, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j)(2) (“Exemption (j)(2)”), as well as FOIA Exemptions 5 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) (“Exemption 1”), 5 U.S.C. § 522(b)(6) (“Exemption 6”), 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (“Exemption 7(C)”), and 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(D) (“Exemption 7(D)”). Id. FBI also referred seven documents, totaling 52 pages, to DEA. Id. at ¶ 12; Hardy Ex. F; Declaration of Katherine L. Myrick (“Myrick Decl.”) at ¶ 5; Myrick Ex. A. Additionally, it sent a “one-page” FBI-originating document for consultative review by DEA, with instructions to return it to the FBI after such review. Id.

         On July 6, 2011, plaintiff appealed the response to FBI Request No. 1161297-000 to OIP. Hardy Decl. at ¶ 13; Hardy Ex. G. In a letter dated July 27, 2011, OIP acknowledged receipt of plaintiff's appeal (“FBI Appeal” and “FBI Appeal No. AP-2011-02517”). Hardy Decl. at ¶ 14; Hardy Ex. H. On September 30, 2011, OIP determined that the FBI properly withheld information pursuant to Exemptions 6, 7(C), and 7(D). Hardy Decl. at 15; Hardy Ex. I. OIP referred the information withheld pursuant to Exemption 1 to DOJ's Review Committee (“DRC”) to determine if the information should remain classified under Executive Order No. 13526. Id.

         By letter dated July 21, 2011, USMS responded to First USMS Request No. 2011-USMS-16960. Bordley Decl. at ¶ 7; Bordley Ex. C. USMS searched its files and found 77 pages indexed to plaintiff's name and personal identifiers. Id. USMS released the 77 pages to plaintiff, 29 in full, and 48 with redactions. Id. USMS cited Exemption 7(C) for its withholdings. Id. By letter dated July 27, 2011, plaintiff filed an administrative appeal (“First USMS Appeal” and “USMS Appeal No. AP-2011-02817”) with OIP regarding the response to his First USMS Request. Bordley Decl. at ¶ 8; Bordley Exs. D, E.

         On October 18, 2011, plaintiff submitted a second FOIA/PA request (“Second USMS Request” and “Second USMS Request No. 2011-USMS-16960”) to USMS. Bordley Decl. at ¶ 10; Bordley Ex. F. Approximately three months before making this Second USMS Request, and following the indictment in the Southern District of Texas, plaintiff was arrested by the USMS and placed within its custody. Pl.'s Opp. at 2 ¶ 3; Hardy Decl. at ¶ 7; Hardy Ex. A; Bordley Decl. at ¶¶ 10, 11; Bordley Ex. F; Id; USA v. Vallejo, et. al, no. 4:99-cr-00455-2 (S.D. TX Aug. 29, 1999) at Arrest Warrant [ECF No. 192]. Plaintiff's Second USMS Request sought the release of any arrest warrant relating to a violation of probation, prompting this arrest. Bordley Decl. at ¶¶ 10, 11; Bordley Ex. F. In response to the Second USMS Request, USMS conducted a supplemental search of the Eastern District of North Carolina and Southern District of Texas to determine whether those districts maintained the requested warrant. Id. This search did not render any responsive documents. Bordley Decl. at ¶ 12; Bordley Ex. G.

         By letter dated October 26, 2011, USMS notified plaintiff that no records were found pursuant to the Second USMS Request No. 2011-USMS-16960. Id. Plaintiff appealed (“Second USMS Appeal” and “USMS Appeal No. AP-2012-00657”) this USMS response on November 7, 2011. Bordley Decl. at ¶ 14; Bordley Ex. I.

         On, November 7, 2011, OIP rendered a decision regarding plaintiff's First USMS Appeal (USMS Appeal No. AP-2011-02817). Bordley Decl. ¶ 13; Bordley Ex. H. As a result, OIP released three additional pages in full, and one page in part. Exemption (7)(C) was invoked for the partial withholdings. Id.

         Meanwhile, by letter dated November 14, 2011, DEA released portions of one page to plaintiff. Myrick Decl. at ¶¶ 6, 13; Myrick Ex. B. DEA withheld eight pages in their entirety. Id. DEA relied upon Exemptions (7)(C), (7)(D), 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E) (“Exemption 7(E)”), and 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(F) (“Exemption 7(F)”). Id. DEA also determined that 43 of the referred pages were non-responsive to plaintiff's Request parameters, and those pages were later returned to the FBI. Myrick Decl. at ¶¶ 6, 8; Myrick Exs. B, D. Lastly, DEA determined that the “one-page” FBI document, for which FBI requested consult, was appropriate for release and returned it to the FBI accordingly. Myrick Decl. at ¶ 7; Myrick Ex. B.

         On May 7, 2012, OIP affirmed USMS's determinations regarding plaintiff's Second USMS Request, and closed the Second USMS Appeal (USMS Appeal No. AP-2012-00657). Bordley Decl. at ¶ 15; Bordley Ex. J.

         On February 21, 2013, the FBI responded by letter to plaintiff regarding its supplemental findings to OIP's referral to the DRC. Hardy Decl. at ¶ 16; Hardy Ex. J. With the letter, FBI provided plaintiff with one re-processed document page. Id. The FBI advised plaintiff that the information previously withheld as classified pursuant to Exemption 1 had since been declassified. Id. However, FBI further explained this declassified information was also exempt from disclosure pursuant to Privacy Act Exemption (j)(2) and FOIA Exemptions 6, 7(C), and (7)(D).[2] Id. The FBI attempted to send this letter twice, but it was returned both times as “not deliverable as addressed and unable to forward, ” as apparently plaintiff's P.O. Box had been closed. Hardy Decl. at ¶¶ 16, 17; Hardy Exs. J, K.

         On May 24, 2016, plaintiff initiated litigation in this Court. Hardy Decl. at ¶ 18; see generally, USMS Compl.; FBI Compl.; DEA Compl. On September 6, 2016, FBI resent its 2013 determination letter, regarding FBI Request No. 1161297-000, to the new address provided in the district court complaints. Hardy Decl. at 19; Hardy Ex. L. As a result of the litigation, FBI re- reviewed the documents responsive to the FBI Request No. 1161297-000. Hardy Decl. at ¶ 20; Hardy Ex. M. By letter dated February 15, 2017, the FBI advised plaintiff that it was releasing 81 pages, in full or in part, again citing Privacy Act Exemption (j)(2) and FOIA Exemptions 6, 7(C), and (7)(D) for the withholdings. Id. The FBI also informed plaintiff that 52 pages were referred to DEA, where the particular documents originated. Hardy Decl. at ¶ 20, nn.3, 4; Hardy Ex. M.


         In a FOIA case, a district court reviews the agency's decisions de novo and “the burden is on the agency to sustain its action.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B); Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1981). “[T]he vast majority of FOIA cases can be resolved on summary judgment.” Brayton v. Office of U.S. Trade Rep., 641 F.3d 521, 527 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Defenders of Wildlife v. 77 U.S. Border Patrol, 623 F.Supp.2d 83, 87 (D.D.C. 2009).

         Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The party seeking summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). To defeat summary judgment, the non-moving party must “designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 324 (internal quotation marks omitted).

         The mere existence of a factual dispute is insufficient to preclude summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). A dispute is “genuine” only if a reasonable fact-finder could find for the non-moving party; a fact is “material” only if it can affect the outcome of the litigation. Id. at 248; Laningham v. U.S. Navy, 813 F.2d 1236, 1241 (D.C. Cir. 1987). In the FOIA context, “the sufficiency of the agency's identification or retrieval procedure” must be “genuinely in issue” in order for summary judgment to be inappropriate. Weisberg v. DOJ, 627 F.2d 365, 371 n.54 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (internal quotation marks omitted). In assessing a defendant's motion, a court must “view the facts and draw reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to plaintiff.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007).

         In FOIA cases, “[s]ummary judgment may be granted on the basis of agency affidavit [, ]” when those affidavits “contain reasonable specificity of detail rather than merely conclusory statements, ” and when “they are not called into question by contradictory evidence in the record or by evidence of agency bad faith.” Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv., 726 F.3d 208, 215 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (quoting Consumer Fed'n of Am. v. Dep't of Agric., 455 F.3d 283, 287 (D.C. Cir. 2006)); see also Peavey v. Holder, 657 F.Supp.2d 180, 188 (D.D.C. 2009) (quoting Schrecker v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 217 F.Supp.2d 29, 33 (D.D.C. 2002)). Agency declarations are afforded a “presumption of good faith” and can be rebutted only with evidence that the agency did not act in good faith. Defenders of Wildlife v. Dep't of Interior, 314 F.Supp.2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2004). However, a plaintiff cannot rebut the good faith presumption afforded to an agency's supporting affidavits through “purely speculative claims . . . .” Safe Card Servs., Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (quoting Ground Saucer Watch, Inc. v. CIA, 692 F.2d 770, 771 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).

         In a Privacy Act case, a court may similarly rely on agency affidavits or declarations to enter summary judgment. See Chambers v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 568 F.3d 998, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 2009). At the summary judgment stage, where the agency has the burden to show that it acted in accordance with the statute, a court may rely on a reasonably detailed affidavit, setting forth the search terms and the type of search performed, and averring that all files likely to contain responsive materials (if such records exist) were searched. Jimenez v. Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, 764 F.Supp.2d 174, 179-80 (D.D.C. 2001) (citing Chambers, 568 F.3d at 1003). Even if the nonmoving party fails to respond to the motion for summary judgment, or portions thereof, a court cannot grant the motion for the reason that it was conceded. Winston & Strawn, LLP v. McLean, 843 F.3d 503, 505 (D.C. Cir. 2016). The burden is always on the movant to demonstrate why summary judgment is warranted. Id. A district court “must determine for itself that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and then ‘should state on the record the reasons for granting or denying the motion.' ” Id. at 508-09 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a)).


         A. Adequacy of Searches

         Plaintiff disputes the adequacy of defendants' searches. USMS Compl. at 5, 6; FBI Compl. at 5; DEA Compl. at 5; Pl.'s Opp. at 3-4, 6; Pl.'s Surreply at 2-3. A defendant bears the initial burden of showing that its searches were adequate. Weisberg, 745 F.2d at 1485. Government agencies must demonstrate that they conducted searches reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents. Peavey, 657 F.Supp.2d at 187 (citing Weisberg, 745 F.2d at 1485). “[A]n agency could demonstrate appropriate, reasonable search methods by demonstrating a ‘systematic approach to document location.' ” Nance v. U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 845 F.Supp.2d 197, 202 (D.D.C. 2012) (quoting Oglesby v. U.S. Dep't of Army, 920 F.2d 57, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).

         The adequacy of an agency's search is measured by a standard of reasonableness under the attendant circumstances. Truitt v. U.S. Dep't of State, 897 F.2d 540, 542 (D.C. Cir. 1990). To satisfy its burden, the agency must show that it “has conducted a search reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents.” Elliott v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 596 F.3d 842, 851 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting Weisberg, 705 F.2d at 1344). It may base its showing on affidavits or declarations submitted in good faith, see Truitt, 897 F.2d at 542, provided that these affidavits or declarations explain in reasonable detail the scope and method of the search, see Morley v. CIA, 508 F.3d 1108, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). “In the absence of contrary evidence, such affidavits or declarations are sufficient to demonstrate an agency's compliance . . . .” North v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 774 F.Supp.2d 217, 222 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing Perry v. Block, 684 F.2d 121, 127 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). Agencies must show that their searches for responsive records “us[ed] methods which can be reasonably expected to produce the information requested.” Oglesby, 920 F.2d at 68; see also Campbell v. Dep't of Justice, 164 F.3d 20, 27 (D.C. Cir. 1998).

         “A search does not have to be exhaustive, and whether a search is adequate is determined by methods, not results . . . [and an] agency's failure to locate a specific responsive document will not, on its own, render an otherwise reasonable search inadequate.” Nance, 845 F.Supp.2d at 201 (citing Brown v. FBI, 675 F.Supp.2d 122, 125-26 (D.D.C. 2009)). There is no requirement that an agency search every record system in response to a request; rather, it may limit its search to those locations where responsive documents are likely maintained. Porter v. CIA, 778 F.Supp.2d 60, 69 (D.D.C. 2011). However, if the record “leaves substantial doubt as to the sufficiency of the search, summary judgment for the agency is not proper.” Beltranena v. Clinton, 770 F.Supp.2d 175, 183 (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting Truitt, 897 F.2d at 542); see also Valencia-Lucena v. U.S. Coast Guard, 180 F.3d 321, 326 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (stating that summary judgment is inappropriate “if a review of the record raises substantial doubt” about the adequacy of the search (citation omitted)). Here, there is no substantial doubt raised.

         In support of their request for summary judgment, defendants have submitted the declaration of William Bordley, an Associate General Counsel and FOIA/PA officer of USMS. Bordley Decl. at ¶ 1. Bordley avers that USMS conducted a systematic and comprehensive search of its records in response to plaintiff's Requests. Id. at 2-4. Plaintiff's First USMS Request sought all records regarding his person. Id. at ¶ 2; Bordley Ex. A. In response to the First USMS Request, it searched the Justice Detainee Information System Prisoner Processing and Population Management/Prisoner Tracking System (“PPM/PTS”), JUSTICE/USM 005, and the Warrant Information Network (“WIN”), JUSTICE/USM-007. Bordley Decl. at ¶ 4. These systems of records store both electronic and paper records pertaining to the custody of USMS prisoners and individuals who USMS investigated pursuant to a state or federal arrest warrant or other judicial process. Id.

         Bordley states that any records responsive to plaintiff's First USMS Request would be maintained in the USMS PPM/PTS and/or WIN. Id.; see also 72 F.R. 33515, 33519 (June 18, 2007); 28 U.S.C. § 566; 28 C.F.R. § 0.111(a), (j), (k), and (q)). These systems of records are exempt from the access provisions of the Privacy Act pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552a (j)(2). Id. at ¶ 5; see also 28 C.F.R. § 16.101(a), (b), (q), (r). Therefore, to ensure maximum access, plaintiff's records were further processed under FOIA. Bordley Decl. at ¶ 5. USMS used the following search terms: (1) plaintiff's name(s), (2) date of birth, and (3) his USMS registration number. Id. This search identified the Eastern District of North Carolina, Southern District of Texas, and the Justice Prisoner and Alien Transportation System, as the districts where plaintiff was arrested, held, and/or transported by the USMS. Id. at ¶ 6. Thereafter, personnel in all of the aforementioned districts were contacted and asked to conduct respective searches by use of plaintiff's name(s) and personal identifiers. Id. As a result of these searches, 77 responsive pages were found. Id. at ¶ 7; Bordley Ex. C.

         Plaintiff's Second USMS Request sought a copy of an arrest warrant for a probation violation he believes was served upon him by the USMS. Bordley Decl. at ¶ 10; Bordley Ex. F. USMS then a conducted responsive search of the Eastern District of North Carolina and Southern District of Texas to determine whether those Districts maintained any such warrant. Bordley Decl. at ¶ 11. A search by the districts' personnel located no records responsive to plaintiff's Second USMS Request. Bordley Decl. at 12; Bordley Ex. G. On November ...

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