United States District Court, District of Columbia
G. SULLIVAN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
case brought under the Freedom of Information Act
(“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552, and the Privacy
Act (“Privacy Act” and “PA”), 5
U.S.C. § 552(a), is before the Court on defendants'
amended motion for summary judgment (“Defs.'
Mot.”) [ECF No. 34], memorandum (“Defs.'
Mem.”) [ECF No. 34], statement of material facts
(“Defs.' Stmt.”) [ECF No. 34-1], and
declarations (“Decls.”) and exhibits in support
(“Defs.' Exs.”) [collectively, ECF Nos. 30-1,
2, 3, 4]. Also before the Court is plaintiff's motion for
entry of default and judicial notice (“Mot. for
Dflt.”) [ECF No. 36], motion for status of case and
judicial notice (“Mot. for Jud. Not.”) [ECF No.
44], and second motion for judicial notice (“Sec. Mot.
for Jud. Not.”) [ECF No. 46]. For the reasons stated
herein, defendants' amended motion for summary judgment
will be granted as to defendants, the United States Marshals
Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Drug
Enforcement Administration. Plaintiff's motion for entry
of default and judicial notice will be denied and his motions
for status/judicial notice will also be denied.
Jorge Luis Garza (“plaintiff”), proceeding
pro se, is a federal prisoner designated to Hazelton
Federal Correctional Institution, located in Bruceton Mills,
North West Virginia. Complaint (“USMS Compl.”)
[ECF No. 1] at caption. Defendants report that plaintiff was
charged with various crimes including, among others,
conspiracy to launder monetary instruments and conspiracy to
distribute cocaine, in the Southern District of Texas.
Declaration of David M. Hardy (“Hardy Decl.”) at
¶ 6. The public record corroborates this account.
See USA v. Vallejo, et. al, no. 4:99-cr-00455-2
(S.D. TX Aug. 29, 1999). Plaintiff was declared a fugitive
from the law in August 1999. Hardy Decl. at ¶ 6.
Defendants further attest that USMS was tasked with
apprehending plaintiff, which was accomplished on July 6,
2001. Id.; USA v. Vallejo, et. al, no.
4:99-cr-00455-2 (S.D. TX Aug. 29, 1999) at Arrest Warrant
[ECF No. 192]. He was convicted on January 23, 2003. Hardy
Decl. at ¶ 6; USA v. Vallejo, et. al, no.
4:99-cr-00455-2 (S.D. TX Aug. 29, 1999) at Court Verdict [ECF
No. 281]. Plaintiff was sentenced on June 10, 2013 to four
life sentences, and 240 months to be served concurrently.
Plaintiff's Opposition to Summary Judgment
(“Pl.'s Opp.”) [ECF No. 37] at 2 ¶ 3.
USA v. Vallejo, et. al, no. 4:99-cr-00455-2 (S.D. TX
Aug. 29, 1999) at Sentencing [ECF No. 299].
plaintiff initially filed three separate complaints in three
separate matters, see Garza v. FBI, No. 16-0980 at
Complaint (“FBI Compl.”) [ECF No. 1], Garza
v. DEA, No. 16-0985 at Complaint (“DEA
Compl.”) [ECF No. 1], and Garza v. USMS, No.
16-0985 at USMS Compl. These cases have since been
consolidated in full under Case No. 16-0976. Plaintiff sues
the United States Marshals Service (“USMS”), the
Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”), and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”).
See FBI Compl. at caption; DEA Compl. at caption;
USMS Compl. at caption.
seeks any and all materials relating to his Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs Information System (“NADDIS”)
number 3944994. DEA Compl. at 1 ¶ 1. He also
specifically requests any photographs, surveillance, and
fingerprint class/pattern class, used and/or collected in the
process of charging him with a “violation of
probation” in his underlying criminal matter, USA
v. Vallejo, et. al, no. 4:99-cr-00455-2 (S.D. TX Aug.
29, 1999), and/or relating to his arrest, which occurred in
North Carolina. Pl.'s Opp. at 2 ¶ 3; Hardy Decl. at
¶ 7; Hardy Ex. A; USA v. Vallejo, et. al, no.
4:99-cr-00455-2 (S.D. TX Aug. 29, 1999) at Arrest Warrant
[ECF No. 192]. Plaintiff requests copies of any warrant
relating to a probation violation, based on a reference to
such a charge (“no. 1-5012”) on his National
Crime Information Center (“NCIC”) report and/or
affiliated with his NADDIS number. USMS Compl. at 1, 3, 6;
FBI Compl. at 1, 3; USMS Compl. Ex. B. Plaintiff contests the
idea that he was ever a “probation violator” and
objects to such characterization on his personal background
reports and with his current NADDIS number. Plaintiff's
Surreply (“Pl.'s Surreply”) [ECF No. 43] at
1-2. Defendants have apparently recently corrected a
particular portion of plaintiff's record at his request
and in this regard. Id.; Defendants' Reply to
Opposition (“Defs.' Reply”) [ECF No. 40] at 2
¶ 2, 2 n.1; Pl.'s Mot. for Dflt. Ex. A. The exact
nature of the correction is not entirely clear from the
record, nor does it appear to be material to this FOIA/PA
action. See Id. Plaintiff continues to allege that
defendants have either failed to conduct an adequate search
and/or are improperly withholding his requested records. USMS
Compl. at 1-3, 5-6; FBI Compl. at 1-4; DEA Compl. at 1-3, 5;
Pl.'s Opp. at 2 ¶ 3.
March 31, 2010, plaintiff sent a FOIA/PA request regarding
his person to USMS. Declaration of William E. Bordley
(“Bordley Decl.”) at ¶ 2; Bordley Ex. A. By
letter dated June 27, 2011, USMS acknowledged plaintiff's
FOIA request (“First USMS Request” and
“First USMS Request No. 2011-USMS-16960”) and
indicated that a search for responsive records would be
conducted. Bordley Decl.at ¶ 3; Bordley Ex. B.
December 27, 2010, plaintiff submitted another FOIA/PA
request, this time directed to the Executive Office of United
States Attorneys (“EOUSA”). Hardy Decl. at ¶
7; Hardy Ex. A. After review, and very shortly thereafter,
EOUSA determined that the request was appropriate for the
FBI, and referred it for handling and direct response to
plaintiff. Id. Plaintiff specifically requested: (1)
case number for probation violation and original case, (2)
personal identifiers of arrestee (such as any available
descriptions and photographs), and (3) fingerprint class and
pattern class. Id.
letter dated February 10, 2011, the FBI acknowledged receipt
of plaintiff's request (“FBI Request” and
“FBI Request No. 1161297-000”). Hardy Decl. at
¶ 8; Hardy Ex. B. In the letter, the FBI advised
plaintiff that it required additional identifying information
in order to conduct a search within the Central Records
System (“CRS”). Id. The FBI also
enclosed a Certification of Identity Form (“DOJ-361
form”), to be completed by plaintiff. Id.
March 3, 2011, plaintiff returned the executed the DOJ-361
form. Plaintiff provided his full legal name as,
“Guillermo Huertas Sanchez, ” as well as other
personal identifiers such as his current address, date of
birth, and place of birth. Hardy Decl. at ¶ 9; Hardy Ex.
C. Plaintiff also included a copy of his Criminal Information
Report (“CIR”). Id. On March 22, 2011,
the FBI acknowledged receipt of the additional requested
information, and advised plaintiff that it would be
undertaking a search of CRS for information responsive to his
FBI Request. Hardy Decl. at ¶ 10; Hardy Ex. C. On May
23, 2011, plaintiff inquired regarding the status of his FBI
Request. Hardy Decl. at ¶ 11; Hardy Ex. E.
letter dated June 24, 2011, the FBI responded to FBI Request
No. 1161297-000. It reviewed 137 pages and released 81 pages,
in full or in part. Hardy Decl. at ¶ 12; Hardy Ex. F.
The FBI cited Privacy Act Exemption, 5 U.S.C. §
552a(j)(2) (“Exemption (j)(2)”), as well as FOIA
Exemptions 5 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) (“Exemption
1”), 5 U.S.C. § 522(b)(6) (“Exemption
6”), 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (“Exemption
7(C)”), and 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(D)
(“Exemption 7(D)”). Id. FBI also
referred seven documents, totaling 52 pages, to DEA.
Id. at ¶ 12; Hardy Ex. F; Declaration of
Katherine L. Myrick (“Myrick Decl.”) at ¶ 5;
Myrick Ex. A. Additionally, it sent a “one-page”
FBI-originating document for consultative review by DEA, with
instructions to return it to the FBI after such review.
6, 2011, plaintiff appealed the response to FBI Request No.
1161297-000 to OIP. Hardy Decl. at ¶ 13; Hardy Ex. G. In
a letter dated July 27, 2011, OIP acknowledged receipt of
plaintiff's appeal (“FBI Appeal” and
“FBI Appeal No. AP-2011-02517”). Hardy Decl. at
¶ 14; Hardy Ex. H. On September 30, 2011, OIP determined
that the FBI properly withheld information pursuant to
Exemptions 6, 7(C), and 7(D). Hardy Decl. at 15; Hardy Ex. I.
OIP referred the information withheld pursuant to Exemption 1
to DOJ's Review Committee (“DRC”) to
determine if the information should remain classified under
Executive Order No. 13526. Id.
letter dated July 21, 2011, USMS responded to First USMS
Request No. 2011-USMS-16960. Bordley Decl. at ¶ 7;
Bordley Ex. C. USMS searched its files and found 77 pages
indexed to plaintiff's name and personal identifiers.
Id. USMS released the 77 pages to plaintiff, 29 in
full, and 48 with redactions. Id. USMS cited
Exemption 7(C) for its withholdings. Id. By letter
dated July 27, 2011, plaintiff filed an administrative appeal
(“First USMS Appeal” and “USMS Appeal No.
AP-2011-02817”) with OIP regarding the response to his
First USMS Request. Bordley Decl. at ¶ 8; Bordley Exs.
October 18, 2011, plaintiff submitted a second FOIA/PA
request (“Second USMS Request” and “Second
USMS Request No. 2011-USMS-16960”) to USMS. Bordley
Decl. at ¶ 10; Bordley Ex. F. Approximately three months
before making this Second USMS Request, and following the
indictment in the Southern District of Texas, plaintiff was
arrested by the USMS and placed within its custody. Pl.'s
Opp. at 2 ¶ 3; Hardy Decl. at ¶ 7; Hardy Ex. A;
Bordley Decl. at ¶¶ 10, 11; Bordley Ex. F; Id;
USA v. Vallejo, et. al, no. 4:99-cr-00455-2 (S.D. TX
Aug. 29, 1999) at Arrest Warrant [ECF No. 192].
Plaintiff's Second USMS Request sought the release of any
arrest warrant relating to a violation of probation,
prompting this arrest. Bordley Decl. at ¶¶ 10, 11;
Bordley Ex. F. In response to the Second USMS Request, USMS
conducted a supplemental search of the Eastern District of
North Carolina and Southern District of Texas to determine
whether those districts maintained the requested warrant.
Id. This search did not render any responsive
documents. Bordley Decl. at ¶ 12; Bordley Ex. G.
letter dated October 26, 2011, USMS notified plaintiff that
no records were found pursuant to the Second USMS Request No.
2011-USMS-16960. Id. Plaintiff appealed
(“Second USMS Appeal” and “USMS Appeal No.
AP-2012-00657”) this USMS response on November 7, 2011.
Bordley Decl. at ¶ 14; Bordley Ex. I.
November 7, 2011, OIP rendered a decision regarding
plaintiff's First USMS Appeal (USMS Appeal No.
AP-2011-02817). Bordley Decl. ¶ 13; Bordley Ex. H. As a
result, OIP released three additional pages in full, and one
page in part. Exemption (7)(C) was invoked for the partial
by letter dated November 14, 2011, DEA released portions of
one page to plaintiff. Myrick Decl. at ¶¶ 6, 13;
Myrick Ex. B. DEA withheld eight pages in their entirety.
Id. DEA relied upon Exemptions (7)(C), (7)(D), 5
U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E) (“Exemption 7(E)”),
and 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(F) (“Exemption
7(F)”). Id. DEA also determined that 43 of the
referred pages were non-responsive to plaintiff's Request
parameters, and those pages were later returned to the FBI.
Myrick Decl. at ¶¶ 6, 8; Myrick Exs. B, D. Lastly,
DEA determined that the “one-page” FBI document,
for which FBI requested consult, was appropriate for release
and returned it to the FBI accordingly. Myrick Decl. at
¶ 7; Myrick Ex. B.
7, 2012, OIP affirmed USMS's determinations regarding
plaintiff's Second USMS Request, and closed the Second
USMS Appeal (USMS Appeal No. AP-2012-00657). Bordley Decl. at
¶ 15; Bordley Ex. J.
February 21, 2013, the FBI responded by letter to plaintiff
regarding its supplemental findings to OIP's referral to
the DRC. Hardy Decl. at ¶ 16; Hardy Ex. J. With the
letter, FBI provided plaintiff with one re-processed document
page. Id. The FBI advised plaintiff that the
information previously withheld as classified pursuant to
Exemption 1 had since been declassified. Id.
However, FBI further explained this declassified information
was also exempt from disclosure pursuant to Privacy Act
Exemption (j)(2) and FOIA Exemptions 6, 7(C), and
(7)(D). Id. The FBI attempted to send
this letter twice, but it was returned both times as
“not deliverable as addressed and unable to forward,
” as apparently plaintiff's P.O. Box had been
closed. Hardy Decl. at ¶¶ 16, 17; Hardy Exs. J, K.
24, 2016, plaintiff initiated litigation in this Court. Hardy
Decl. at ¶ 18; see generally, USMS Compl.; FBI
Compl.; DEA Compl. On September 6, 2016, FBI resent its 2013
determination letter, regarding FBI Request No. 1161297-000,
to the new address provided in the district court complaints.
Hardy Decl. at 19; Hardy Ex. L. As a result of the
litigation, FBI re- reviewed the documents responsive to the
FBI Request No. 1161297-000. Hardy Decl. at ¶ 20; Hardy
Ex. M. By letter dated February 15, 2017, the FBI advised
plaintiff that it was releasing 81 pages, in full or in part,
again citing Privacy Act Exemption (j)(2) and FOIA Exemptions
6, 7(C), and (7)(D) for the withholdings. Id. The
FBI also informed plaintiff that 52 pages were referred to
DEA, where the particular documents originated. Hardy Decl.
at ¶ 20, nn.3, 4; Hardy Ex. M.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
FOIA case, a district court reviews the agency's
decisions de novo and “the burden is on the
agency to sustain its action.” 5 U.S.C. §
552(a)(4)(B); Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656
F.2d 724, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1981). “[T]he vast majority of
FOIA cases can be resolved on summary judgment.”
Brayton v. Office of U.S. Trade Rep., 641 F.3d 521,
527 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Defenders of Wildlife v. 77 U.S.
Border Patrol, 623 F.Supp.2d 83, 87 (D.D.C. 2009).
judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The party seeking summary judgment
“bears the initial responsibility of informing the
district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying
those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence
of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (internal quotation
marks omitted). To defeat summary judgment, the non-moving
party must “designate specific facts showing that there
is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 324
(internal quotation marks omitted).
mere existence of a factual dispute is insufficient to
preclude summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). A dispute is
“genuine” only if a reasonable fact-finder could
find for the non-moving party; a fact is
“material” only if it can affect the outcome of
the litigation. Id. at 248; Laningham v. U.S.
Navy, 813 F.2d 1236, 1241 (D.C. Cir. 1987). In the FOIA
context, “the sufficiency of the agency's
identification or retrieval procedure” must be
“genuinely in issue” in order for summary
judgment to be inappropriate. Weisberg v. DOJ, 627
F.2d 365, 371 n.54 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (internal quotation marks
omitted). In assessing a defendant's motion, a court must
“view the facts and draw reasonable inferences in the
light most favorable to plaintiff.” Scott v.
Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007).
cases, “[s]ummary judgment may be granted on the basis
of agency affidavit [, ]” when those affidavits
“contain reasonable specificity of detail rather than
merely conclusory statements, ” and when “they
are not called into question by contradictory evidence in the
record or by evidence of agency bad faith.”
Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv., 726 F.3d
208, 215 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (quoting Consumer Fed'n of
Am. v. Dep't of Agric., 455 F.3d 283, 287 (D.C. Cir.
2006)); see also Peavey v. Holder, 657 F.Supp.2d
180, 188 (D.D.C. 2009) (quoting Schrecker v. U.S.
Dep't of Justice, 217 F.Supp.2d 29, 33 (D.D.C.
2002)). Agency declarations are afforded a “presumption
of good faith” and can be rebutted only with evidence
that the agency did not act in good faith. Defenders of
Wildlife v. Dep't of Interior, 314 F.Supp.2d 1, 8
(D.D.C. 2004). However, a plaintiff cannot rebut the good
faith presumption afforded to an agency's supporting
affidavits through “purely speculative claims . . .
.” Safe Card Servs., Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d
1197, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (quoting Ground Saucer Watch,
Inc. v. CIA, 692 F.2d 770, 771 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
Privacy Act case, a court may similarly rely on agency
affidavits or declarations to enter summary judgment. See
Chambers v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 568 F.3d
998, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 2009). At the summary judgment stage,
where the agency has the burden to show that it acted in
accordance with the statute, a court may rely on a reasonably
detailed affidavit, setting forth the search terms and the
type of search performed, and averring that all files likely
to contain responsive materials (if such records exist) were
searched. Jimenez v. Executive Office for U.S.
Attorneys, 764 F.Supp.2d 174, 179-80 (D.D.C. 2001)
(citing Chambers, 568 F.3d at 1003). Even if the
nonmoving party fails to respond to the motion for summary
judgment, or portions thereof, a court cannot grant the
motion for the reason that it was conceded. Winston &
Strawn, LLP v. McLean, 843 F.3d 503, 505 (D.C. Cir.
2016). The burden is always on the movant to demonstrate why
summary judgment is warranted. Id. A district court
“must determine for itself that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and then
‘should state on the record the reasons for granting or
denying the motion.' ” Id. at 508-09
(quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a)).
Adequacy of Searches
disputes the adequacy of defendants' searches. USMS
Compl. at 5, 6; FBI Compl. at 5; DEA Compl. at 5; Pl.'s
Opp. at 3-4, 6; Pl.'s Surreply at 2-3. A defendant bears
the initial burden of showing that its searches were
adequate. Weisberg, 745 F.2d at 1485. Government
agencies must demonstrate that they conducted searches
reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents.
Peavey, 657 F.Supp.2d at 187 (citing
Weisberg, 745 F.2d at 1485). “[A]n agency
could demonstrate appropriate, reasonable search methods by
demonstrating a ‘systematic approach to document
location.' ” Nance v. U.S. Federal Bureau of
Investigation, 845 F.Supp.2d 197, 202 (D.D.C. 2012)
(quoting Oglesby v. U.S. Dep't of Army, 920 F.2d
57, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
adequacy of an agency's search is measured by a standard
of reasonableness under the attendant circumstances.
Truitt v. U.S. Dep't of State, 897 F.2d 540, 542
(D.C. Cir. 1990). To satisfy its burden, the agency must show
that it “has conducted a search reasonably calculated
to uncover all relevant documents.” Elliott v. U.S.
Dep't of Agric., 596 F.3d 842, 851 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(quoting Weisberg, 705 F.2d at 1344). It may base
its showing on affidavits or declarations submitted in good
faith, see Truitt, 897 F.2d at 542, provided that
these affidavits or declarations explain in reasonable detail
the scope and method of the search, see Morley v.
CIA, 508 F.3d 1108, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (citations
omitted). “In the absence of contrary evidence, such
affidavits or declarations are sufficient to demonstrate an
agency's compliance . . . .” North v. U.S.
Dep't of Justice, 774 F.Supp.2d 217, 222 (D.D.C.
2011) (citing Perry v. Block, 684 F.2d 121, 127
(D.C. Cir. 1982)). Agencies must show that their searches for
responsive records “us[ed] methods which can be
reasonably expected to produce the information
requested.” Oglesby, 920 F.2d at 68; see
also Campbell v. Dep't of Justice, 164 F.3d 20, 27
(D.C. Cir. 1998).
search does not have to be exhaustive, and whether a search
is adequate is determined by methods, not results . . . [and
an] agency's failure to locate a specific responsive
document will not, on its own, render an otherwise reasonable
search inadequate.” Nance, 845 F.Supp.2d at
201 (citing Brown v. FBI, 675 F.Supp.2d 122, 125-26
(D.D.C. 2009)). There is no requirement that an agency search
every record system in response to a request; rather, it may
limit its search to those locations where responsive
documents are likely maintained. Porter v. CIA, 778
F.Supp.2d 60, 69 (D.D.C. 2011). However, if the record
“leaves substantial doubt as to the sufficiency of the
search, summary judgment for the agency is not proper.”
Beltranena v. Clinton, 770 F.Supp.2d 175, 183
(D.D.C. 2011) (quoting Truitt, 897 F.2d at 542);
see also Valencia-Lucena v. U.S. Coast Guard, 180
F.3d 321, 326 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (stating that summary judgment
is inappropriate “if a review of the record raises
substantial doubt” about the adequacy of the search
(citation omitted)). Here, there is no substantial doubt
support of their request for summary judgment, defendants
have submitted the declaration of William Bordley, an
Associate General Counsel and FOIA/PA officer of USMS.
Bordley Decl. at ¶ 1. Bordley avers that USMS conducted
a systematic and comprehensive search of its records in
response to plaintiff's Requests. Id. at 2-4.
Plaintiff's First USMS Request sought all records
regarding his person. Id. at ¶ 2; Bordley Ex.
A. In response to the First USMS Request, it searched the
Justice Detainee Information System Prisoner Processing and
Population Management/Prisoner Tracking System
(“PPM/PTS”), JUSTICE/USM 005, and the Warrant
Information Network (“WIN”), JUSTICE/USM-007.
Bordley Decl. at ¶ 4. These systems of records store
both electronic and paper records pertaining to the custody
of USMS prisoners and individuals who USMS investigated
pursuant to a state or federal arrest warrant or other
judicial process. Id.
states that any records responsive to plaintiff's First
USMS Request would be maintained in the USMS PPM/PTS and/or
WIN. Id.; see also 72 F.R. 33515, 33519
(June 18, 2007); 28 U.S.C. § 566; 28 C.F.R. §
0.111(a), (j), (k), and (q)). These systems of records are
exempt from the access provisions of the Privacy Act pursuant
to 5 U.S.C. § 552a (j)(2). Id. at ¶ 5;
see also 28 C.F.R. § 16.101(a), (b), (q), (r).
Therefore, to ensure maximum access, plaintiff's records
were further processed under FOIA. Bordley Decl. at ¶ 5.
USMS used the following search terms: (1) plaintiff's
name(s), (2) date of birth, and (3) his USMS registration
number. Id. This search identified the Eastern
District of North Carolina, Southern District of Texas, and
the Justice Prisoner and Alien Transportation System, as the
districts where plaintiff was arrested, held, and/or
transported by the USMS. Id. at ¶ 6.
Thereafter, personnel in all of the aforementioned districts
were contacted and asked to conduct respective searches by
use of plaintiff's name(s) and personal identifiers.
Id. As a result of these searches, 77 responsive
pages were found. Id. at ¶ 7; Bordley Ex. C.
Second USMS Request sought a copy of an arrest warrant for a
probation violation he believes was served upon him by the
USMS. Bordley Decl. at ¶ 10; Bordley Ex. F. USMS then a
conducted responsive search of the Eastern District of North
Carolina and Southern District of Texas to determine whether
those Districts maintained any such warrant. Bordley Decl. at
¶ 11. A search by the districts' personnel located
no records responsive to plaintiff's Second USMS Request.
Bordley Decl. at 12; Bordley Ex. G. On November ...