MEMORANDUM OPINION
ROSEMARY M. COLLYER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Galen
Pendergrass sues the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit
Authority (WMATA), claiming discrimination and retaliation in
hiring practices due to his race and previous lawsuit related
to WMATA's Criminal Background Check Policy. Mr.
Pendergrass alleges violations of multiple federal statutes,
as well as the District of Columbia Human Rights Act. WMATA
moves to dismiss all but Mr. Pendergrass's Title VII
claims for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim.
The Court will grant WMATA's motion.
I.
FACTS
Mr.
Pendergrass is an African-American male. He applied for a
position as a Bus Operator with WMATA in the fall of 2017 and
received a contingent offer of employment from WMATA on
October 6, 2017. Pl. Resp. to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss
Compl. in Part (Opp'n) [Dkt. 9] at 2. In October 2017,
Mr. Pendergrass communicated with First Choice Background
Company to complete his background check. On November 17,
2017, WMATA notified Mr. Pendergrass that he was ineligible
for employment due to his prior conviction for a non-violent
offense. Compl. [Dkt. 1] ¶ 4. The November 17 letter
contained a description of the individualized assessment
process that Mr. Pendergrass could initiate to request that
WMATA reevaluate his denial of employment. Id. Mr.
Pendergrass submitted a request for an individualized
assessment on November 29, 2017, which included
“approximately 50 pages of documents that showed why he
should not be permanently excluded” from employment
with WMATA. Id. ¶ 5. Mr. Pendergrass alleges
that WMATA's Criminal Background Check Policy has a
disparate impact on African-American candidates due to the
historically higher rate of criminal convictions of African
Americans. See Id. ¶¶ 14-16.
A.
Background of WMATA's Criminal Background Check Policy
WMATA
was created by an Interstate Compact among Washington, D.C.,
Virginia, and Maryland, and approved by Congress, to be the
primary public transit agency for the D.C. metropolitan
region. Id. ¶ 2. “The Compact confers
broad powers on WMATA to ‘create and abolish offices,
employments and positions provide for the qualification,
appointment, and removal of its employees, and establish, in
its discretion, a personnel system based on merit and
fitness.'” Beebe v. Washington Metro. Area
Transit Auth., 129 F.3d 1283, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(quoting D.C. Code Ann. § 1-2431(12)(g) and (h)).
WMATA
adopted a revised Criminal Background Check Policy (Policy
7.2.3) in December 2011, which took effect on February 23,
2012. Policy 7.2.3 applies to all external candidates for
positions with WMATA. If WMATA learned a candidate has a
disqualifying conviction, it mailed a letter to the candidate
explaining the results and stating that s/he had ten days to
dispute the results. Under Policy 7.2.3, candidates could
dispute the accuracy of the background check, but a candidate
could not ask for an exception to Policy 7.2.3.
WMATA
further revised policy 7.2.3 and adopted Policy 7.2.3/2 in
July 2017. Opp'n at 1. Policy 7.2.3/2 added a procedure
for individuals to request an individualized assessment of
their convictions to determine if the applicant should not be
disqualified from employment based on the conviction. See
Compl. ¶ 6
B.
Procedural Posture
Mr.
Pendergrass filed a Charge of Discrimination with the United
States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) on
December 4, 2017 and received a Notice of Right to Sue letter
on December 7, 2017. Id. ¶¶ 7-8. Mr.
Pendergrass filed the immediate Complaint on March 7, 2018,
alleging claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., the
District of Columbia Human Rights Act (DCHRA), D.C. Code
§ 12-1401 et seq., and the “Washington
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Background Screening
Policy/Instruction (PI) 7.2.32 et seq.” Id. at
1. WMATA moved to dismiss all claims except those arising
under Title VII.[1] The motion is ripe for
review.[2]
C.
Jurisdiction and Venue
The
Court has jurisdiction over Mr. Pendergrass's Title VII
and FCRA claims under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and
1342.[3] See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c); 15
U.S.C. § 1681p. Title VII and the FCRA are laws of the
United States, which gives original jurisdiction to the
federal district courts. The Court has supplemental
jurisdiction over Mr. Pendergrass's DCHRA claims under 28
U.S.C. § 1367(a). Venue is proper in this Court because
the events took place in Washington, D.C. and the WMATA
Compact specifies the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia as the proper venue for litigating
disputes with WMATA. See WMATA Compact, D.C. Code §
9-1107.01(81).
II.
LEGAL STANDARDS
A.
Motion to Dismiss - ...