MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
TIMOTHY J. KELLY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Defendant
Samuel Aka is charged in a superseding indictment with two
counts of unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition.
Count One charges Aka with violating 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(1), which prohibits the possession of any firearm or
ammunition by a person who has been convicted of a crime
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, and Count
Two charges him with violating D.C. Code §
22-4503(a)(1), the District of Columbia's comparable
felon-in-possession statute.
Pending
before the Court is Aka's motion to dismiss Count One of
the superseding indictment, on the ground that Aka does not
have a prior felony conviction as defined under §
922(g)(1).[1] The underlying conviction supporting both
charges against him-a 2011 conviction in D.C. Superior Court
for fleeing law enforcement-was set aside in 2012 under the
District of Columbia's Youth Rehabilitation Amendment Act
(“YRA”). See D.C. Code § 24-906(e). And
under the federal felon-in-possession statute, a prior felony
conviction that has been expunged or set aside does not
qualify as a prior felony conviction for purposes of §
922(g)(1) unless the expungement “expressly
provides” that the individual cannot possess firearms.
See 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20). The certificate Aka
received setting aside his conviction made no mention of
firearms. But the specific section of the YRA pursuant to
which his conviction was set aside does make clear that he
remains subject to the District of Columbia's restriction
on felons possessing them. See D.C. Code
§§ 22-4503, 24-906(f)(8). The Court concludes that
because the source of Aka's set-aside-§ 24-906 of
the YRA-“expressly provide[d]” that he cannot
possess firearms, his District of Columbia conviction may
serve as a predicate offense for a charge under §
922(g)(1). Accordingly, and for the reasons explained below,
his motion is DENIED
I.
Background
A.
Statutory Framework
Section
922(g)(1) provides that any person “who has been
convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment
for a term exceeding one year” may not ship, transport,
possess, or receive any firearm in or affecting interstate
commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). For purposes of that
statute, “[w]hat constitutes a conviction of such a
crime” is “determined in accordance with the law
of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were
held.” Id. § 921(a)(20). However,
“[a]ny conviction which has been expunged, or set aside
or for which a person has been pardoned or has had civil
rights restored shall not be considered a conviction for
purposes of this chapter, unless such pardon, expungement, or
restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the
person may not ship, transport, possess, or receive
firearms.” Id.
The
District of Columbia has enacted a process under the YRA for
setting aside the convictions of youth offenders, either
automatically upon discharge from the defendant's
sentence or otherwise at the discretion of the sentencing
court. See D.C. Code § 24-906. Specifically,
§ 24-906(e) provides that a court may, in its
discretion, discharge a youth offender from probation before
the end of the probation period, upon which the
offender's conviction will be automatically set aside. In
any case where a youth offender's conviction is set
aside, the YRA requires that the court issue a certificate to
the offender to that effect. See id.
Under
the YRA, a conviction set aside pursuant to § 24-906 may
nonetheless be used for a set of enumerated purposes. See
Id. § 24-906(f). In particular, and relevant
here, such a conviction may be used to determine whether an
individual has unlawfully possessed a firearm in violation of
D.C. Code § 22-4503, which prohibits any individual who
has been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for
more than one year from possessing a firearm. Id.
§ 24-906(f)(8). That is, an individual whose conviction
has been set aside under § 24-906 is still subject to
the District of Columbia's restrictions on felons
possessing firearms.
B.
Factual and Procedural Background
On
December 8, 2011, Aka pleaded guilty in D.C. Superior Court
to one count of fleeing law enforcement and one count of
reckless driving, the former carrying a maximum sentence of
five years' imprisonment. See Def.'s Ex. A at 1; D.C.
Code § 50-2201.05b(b)(2). He was sentenced to a
suspended term of six months' incarceration and one year
of supervised probation. Def.'s Ex. A at 1. On October
15, 2012, the court, finding that Aka had successfully
completed the conditions of his sentence prior to the
expiration of probation, discharged Aka from his sentence
pursuant to § 24-906(e) of the YRA. Id. at 3-4.
As required by that statute, the court ordered that his
conviction be set aside, and it issued an “Order of
Discharge and Certificate Setting Aside Conviction”
(the “Certificate”) to that effect. Id.
at 4.
The
Certificate read in relevant part as follows:
The offender has successfully completed the conditions of
his/her sentence prior to the expiration of the maximum
period previously imposed by the Court.
Therefore, it is hereby ORDERED that the offender be
unconditionally discharged from the imposed sentence and,
It is further ORDERED that by this discharge the conviction
shall be set aside, and the Court shall issue a copy of this
order and Certificate to the offender, and all appropriate
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