MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
TREVOR
N. MCFADDEN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Plaintiff
Elaine Arabaitzis seeks to recover benefits under the
Employee Retirement Insurance Security Act
(“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et
seq. The Court granted summary judgment for Defendant
Unum Life Insurance Company of America, the claims
administrator and insurer for her benefits plan. Before the
Court is Ms. Arabaitzis's motion for reconsideration of
that decision. Ms. Arabaitzis has not shown that she is
entitled to relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
59(e), particularly given the deferential standard of review
appropriate here. The Court will thus deny Ms.
Arabaitzis's motion.
I.
Ms.
Arabaitzis claims that she suffers from “pain,
discomfort, fatigue and other related impairments caused by
cervical and spinal injuries, carpal tunnel syndrome, among
other conditions and impairments.” Compl. ¶ 10,
ECF No. 1. As a former employee of a law firm, she
participated in an employee welfare benefits plan through her
employer. Id. ¶ 6. Unum was the claims
administrator and insurer for that plan. Id. ¶
7.
According
to Ms. Arabaitzis, Unum initially approved both her
short-term and long-term benefits but then terminated
long-term benefits. Id. ¶ 12. Under ERISA, Ms.
Arabaitzis seeks (1) reinstatement of benefits and payment of
“back benefits” with interest; (2) enforcement of
the rights under the plan; (3) clarification of rights to
future benefits under the plan; and (4) an award of
attorney's fees and costs. Id. ¶ 4.
The
Court referred the case to a Magistrate Judge for Report and
Recommendation. July 1, 2016 Minute Order. The parties agreed
that this case should be decided on cross-motions for summary
judgment. Joint Status Report and Proposed Briefing Schedule,
ECF No. 17.
After
extensive briefing, the Magistrate Judge issued her Report
and Recommendation. See Report and Recommendation
(“R. & R.”), ECF No. 57. The Magistrate Judge
recommended that Ms. Arabaitzis's cross-motion be denied
and that Unum's cross-motion be granted. Id. at
2. The Magistrate Judge applied a deferential standard of
review to the denial of benefits because the benefit plan
expressly gave the plan administrator discretionary authority
to make benefit determinations. Id. at 10. And the
Magistrate Judge determined that Unum's decision was
reasonable. Id. at 12.
Ms.
Arabaitzis did not object to the Report and Recommendation
within the 14 days provided by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 72(b)(2), and the Court adopted the Magistrate
Judge's Report and Recommendation as its own findings and
conclusions. Order Adopting Report and Recommendation, ECF
No. 58. Later that day, Ms. Arabaitzis moved for an extension
of time to file objections to the Magistrate Judge's
Report and Recommendation, but the Court denied it as moot
based on the Court's prior Order. See September
26, 2018 Minute Order. Now Ms. Arabaitzis moves for
reconsideration. See Pl.'s Mot. for
Reconsideration (“Mot.”), ECF No. 60. And Unum
opposes. Def.'s Obj. to Pl.'s Mot. for
Reconsideration (“Def.'s Obj.”), ECF No. 62.
II.
The
first issue is whether the Court should evaluate Ms.
Arabaitzis's motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
59(e) or 60(b). Rule 59(e) states that “[a] motion to
alter or amend a judgment must be filed no later than 28 days
after the entry of the judgment.” And Rule 60(b) gives
parties more time to file motions for relief from final
judgment based on, among others, “mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” Unum
argues that Ms. Arabaitzis's motion should be evaluated
under Rule 59(e)-not the “more lenient standard of Rule
60(b).” Def.'s Obj. at 1. Ms. Arabaitzis insists
that she filed a Rule 60(b)(1) motion, and then she correctly
argues that the “bar is higher for permitting a Rule
60(b)(1)” than a Rule 59(e) motion. Pl.'s Reply at
8-9, ECF No. 63.
Courts
treat motions for reconsideration filed within Rule
59(e)'s stricter timeframe- originally 10 days and now
amended to 28 days-as Rule 59(e) motions as opposed to Rule
60(b) motions. Owen-Williams v. BB & T Inv. Servs.,
Inc., 797 F.Supp.2d 118, 121-22 (D.D.C. 2011) (“As
a general matter, courts treat a motion for reconsideration
as originating under Rule 59(e) if it is filed within 28 days
of the entry of the order at issue and as originating under
Rule 60(b) if filed thereafter.”). So on this point,
Unum is correct.
But
this is to Ms. Arabaitzis's benefit. Relief under Rule
60(b) is more restrictive than under Rule 59(e). See
Taitz v. Obama, 754 F.Supp.2d 57, 58 (D.D.C. 2010). In
general, “the bar stands even higher for a party to
prevail on a Rule 60(b) motion” because a party must
show “fraud, mistake, extraordinary circumstances, or
other enumerated situations.” Uberoi v. EEOC,
271 F.Supp.2d 1, 2-3 (D.D.C. 2002). Of course, it would be
illogical to hold motions for reconsideration filed promptly
to a higher standard than stale motions; this would just
incentivize parties to sit on their grievances until after
the 28-day cut-off. So contrary to her self-harming
arguments, Ms. Arabaitzis is entitled to consideration under
Rule 59(e) and its more forgiving standard.
Even
Rule 59(e) has limits, though. “Rule 59(e) permits a
court to alter or amend a judgment, but it may not be used to
relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or present
evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of
judgment.” Leidos, Inc. v. Hellenic Republic,
881 F.3d 213, 217 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (quoting Exxon
Shipping v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 486 n.5 (2008)). Courts
may grant a Rule 59(e) motion only “(1) if there is an
‘intervening change of controlling law;' (2) if new
evidence becomes available; or (3) if the judgment should be
amended in order to ‘correct a clear error or prevent
manifest injustice'” Id. (quoting
Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C.
Cir. 1996)).
There
is no manifest injustice when “a party could have
easily avoided the outcome, but instead elected not to act
until after a final order had been entered.”
Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 665 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
And the moving party has the burden of proving that ...