United States District Court, District of Columbia
Document Nos. 19, 23, 29, 33, 37, 41, 57
RUDOLPH CONTRERAS United States District Judge
Defendants' Motions to Dismiss, Sua Sponte
Dismissing All Claims Against All Remaining Defendants,
Denying Motion for Sanctions, and Denying
All Other Pending Motions as Moot
over half a decade of litigation surrounding the foreclosure
of her home, Plaintiff Gloria Sun Jung brought this case in
April 2018, alleging a wide range of civil and criminal acts
by Defendants, all individuals and entities involved at some
level in the loan and foreclosure process. Most defendants
have now moved to dismiss Jung's claims on a number of
grounds, including, as relevant here, lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Several defendants have also moved for
sanctions, while Jung has moved to strike multiple motions
and for default judgment. Because this Court finds that it
has no subject matter jurisdiction over any of Jung's
claims, it grants the motions to dismiss and sua
sponte dismisses all claims against all remaining
defendants. The Court denies the motion for sanctions because
it finds that Jung's first-time filing in this Court is
not sufficient to warrant the imposition of sanctions. All
other pending motions are denied as moot.
February 2008, Plaintiff Gloria Sun Jung (“Jung”)
obtained a $697, 000 loan from Defendant Countrywide Bank FSB
(“Countrywide”) and executed a promissory note
and mortgage with Countrywide, identifying property located
at 16 Rising Meadow Way, East Stroudsburg, Pennsylvania (the
“East Stroudsburg property”) as the collateral
securing the loan. See BANA's Mem. Supp. Mot.
Dismiss at 1, ECF No. 19; February 11, 2008 Note, Am. Compl.
Ex. 1 at 23-24, ECF No. 6-1; February 11, 2008 Mortgage,
BANA's Mot. Dismiss Ex. B, ECF No. 19-2. Jung contends
that she was “not aware that she was getting into the
contract with ‘security'” by executing the
note and mortgage with Countrywide. Am. Compl. at 10, ECF No.
6. Following Countrywide's bankruptcy in 2008, the note
and mortgage were assigned to Defendant Bank of America
(“BANA”). See Id. at 7.
Jung defaulted on her mortgage, BANA began a foreclosure
action in June 2012. See BANA's Mem. Supp. at 2.
Jung also contends she had no knowledge of what
“foreclosure” meant at the time of signing the
note. Am. Compl. at 10. On April 17, 2015, the Court of
Common Pleas of Monroe County, Pennsylvania entered a Default
Judgment in BANA's favor. See BANA's Mem.
Supp. at 2; Am. Compl. at 11. After Defendant Wilmington
Savings Fund Society, FSB (“Wilmington”)
substituted in as BANA's successor in interest to the
East Stroudsburg property, a Sheriff's deed was recorded
against the property in Wilmington's favor on August 26,
2016. See BANA's Mem. Supp. at 2; Sheriff's
Deed, Am. Compl. Ex. 1 at 27-30.
the default judgment and Sheriff's sale, but before
Wilmington took possession of the property, Jung appealed
directly to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, asking for an
injunction against her eviction. See Am. Compl. at
12; BANA's Mem. Supp. at 2. The Supreme Court denied the
appeal and transferred the case to the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania. See Am. Compl. at 12; BANA's Mem.
Supp. at 2-3. The Superior court denied the injunction and
allowed the eviction proceedings to continue. See
Am. Compl. at 12. On September 1, 2017, the Court of Common
Pleas issued a Writ of Possession in Wilmington's favor.
See BANA's Mem. Supp. at 2; Writ of Possession,
Am. Compl. Ex. 1 at 36-38.
then declared bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, and initiated
an adversary proceeding to challenge the Default Judgment and
Sheriff's Sale. See Am. Compl. at 12; BANA's
Mem. Supp. at 3. The bankruptcy and related adversary
proceeding were subsequently dismissed, see
BANA's Mem. Supp. at 3, with the Bankruptcy Court
granting relief from the automatic bankruptcy stay on March
20, 2018, see Bankruptcy Order, Am. Compl. Ex. 1 at
parallel to the formal foreclosure and eviction process, Jung
filed a number of proceedings challenging the foreclosure,
both in state and in federal court. Between 2015 and 2018,
she initiated six lawsuits challenging the foreclosure in the
U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania.
See Wilmington Mem. Supp. Mot. Sanctions at 3-5, ECF
No. 41-2 (listing cases). All federal lawsuits were dismissed
or otherwise closed. See id. In 2017, Jung also sued 10
defendants in state court in Pike County for wrongful
foreclosure. See Id. And on April 19, 2018, Jung
filed another complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of
Monroe County, seeking quiet title to the property and asking
for the prior judgments to be voided. See Am. Compl.
at 14; BANA's Mem. Supp. at 3. That lawsuit was resolved
on June 12, 2018 with Jung being barred from pursuing any
further pro se litigation against related defendants
and for related claims without first obtaining leave of
court. See Wilmington Mem. Supp. Mot. Sanctions at
2; June 12, 2018 Order, Wilmington Mot. Sanctions Ex. 1 at
332-33, ECF No. 41-1.
April 24, 2018, Jung was evicted. See Am. Compl. at
15. Just two days after the eviction on April 26, 2018, Jung
filed the present case in this Court. See Compl.,
ECF No. 1. On May 2, 2018, Jung filed an amended complaint.
See Am. Compl. In the amended complaint, Jung brings
claims against Countrywide; BANA; Wilmington; the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; Pennsylvania judges and
judicial employees who presided over her legal
proceedings; the Sheriff's office that conducted
her eviction and several of its employees; as well as
multiple other Defendants who at one point or another were
involved in the loan generation, loan servicing, or legal
proceedings surrounding the East Stroudsburg
property. See Id. Jung reasserts claims
previously litigated and brings various additional
allegations for constitutional violations, fraud, criminal
acts, and violations of several civil statutes. See
BANA, Shauna Morie Smith, Mortgage Electronic Registration
Systems, Inc., and Reed Smith LLP filed a Motion to Dismiss
on May 24, 2018. See BANA's Mot. Dismiss at 1,
ECF No. 19. Wilmington, Selene Financial LP, and Stern &
Eisenberg, P.C. (the “Wilmington Defendants”)
filed their own Motion to Dismiss on May 25, 2018.
See Wilmington Mot. Dismiss at 1, ECF No. 23. Most
of the Pennsylvania judicial defendants moved to dismiss
shortly thereafter, see Pennsylvania Judicial Defs.
Mot. Dismiss at 1, ECF No. 29, followed by Ocwen Loan
Servicing, LLC and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
see Ocwen Mot. Dismiss at 1, ECF No. 33;
Commonwealth Mot. Dismiss at 1, EFC No. 37. On December 4,
2018, U.S. Bankruptcy Court Judge John Thomas moved to
dismiss. See Thomas Mot. Dismiss at 1, ECF No. 57. A
number of defendants also moved for sanctions pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 and demanded the withdrawal of Jung's
complaint. See Wilmington Mot. Sanctions at 1, ECF
No. 41. Jung has moved for default judgment and has sought a
variety of additional relief, including striking most of the
Defendants' briefs. See generally Docket,
Jung v. Bank of America, No. 18-cv-962-RC (D.D.C.).
October 17, 2018, Jung filed a “Notice of Separate
Claim” described as an “Affidavit for Stolen
items by Defendants[.]” Pl's Notice of Separate
Claim, ECF No. 50. In the notice, Jung again relays the facts
surrounding the seizure of the East Stroudsburg property and
lists furniture and belongings that were inside of the
property and that she alleges the Defendants stole from her
upon the foreclosure and her eviction. See Id. at
8-16. Jung requests over $3, 500, 000 in supplemental relief,
which she explicitly states is separate from the relief
sought in her amended complaint. See Id. at 17. On
October 22, 2018, the Notice of Separate Claim was followed
by a “Notice of Joinders[, ]” in which Jung
purports to add additional defendants to the litigation.
Pl.'s Amended Notice of Joinders, ECF No. 53.
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) provides for the dismissal
of an action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Federal
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and it is
generally presumed that “a cause lies outside this
limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life
Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Accordingly,
it is the plaintiff's burden to establish that the court
has subject matter jurisdiction over his or her claims.
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561
(1992). In determining whether the plaintiff has met this
burden, a court must accept “the allegations of the
complaint as true, ” Banneker Ventures, LLC v.
Graham, 798 F.3d 1119, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 2015), and
“construe the complaint liberally, granting the
plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived
from the facts alleged[, ]” Barr v. Clinton,
370 F.3d 1196, 1199 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (internal quotation
marks omitted). However, “the plaintiff's factual
allegations in the complaint . . . will bear closer scrutiny
in resolving a 12(b)(1) motion than in resolving a 12(b)(6)
motion for failure to state a claim.” Grand Lodge
of Fraternal Order of Police v. Ashcroft, 185 F.Supp.2d
9, 13-14 (D.D.C. 2001).
federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it cannot
reach the merits of the case, and must either dismiss it or
transfer it to another court. Amerijet Int'l Inc. v.
U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 43 F.Supp.3d 4, 20
(D.D.C. 2014). As a court of limited jurisdiction, it is
imperative that this Court “begin, and end, ”
with an examination of its jurisdiction. Gen. Motors
Corp. v. EPA, 363 F.3d 442, 448 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The
Court has a continuing duty to examine its subject matter
jurisdiction and must raise the issue sua sponte