MEMORANDUM ORDER
TREVOR
N. MCFADDEN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
The
Court allowed Vantage to file an amended complaint in this
case. See Vantage Commodities Fin. Servs. I, LLC v.
Assured Risk Transfer PCC, LLC (“Vantage
II”), No. 1:17-CV-01451, 2018 WL 6025774, at *6
(D.D.C. Nov. 16, 2018). The Reinsurer Defendants now ask the
Court to reconsider this Order or alternatively to certify it
for interlocutory appeal. For the reasons given below, the
Court will deny their motion.
I.
BACKGROUND[1]
In
Vantage II, the Court granted in part and denied in
part Vantage's motion for leave to amend its Complaint.
Id. at *1. First, it held that Vantage had not
stated a claim for breach of contract because Vantage had
failed to allege facts showing that the Credit Insurance
Binders created a contractual relationship. Id. at
*2. But it determined that Vantage adequately stated claims
for (1) breach of implied contract; (2) promissory estoppel;
and (3) unjust enrichment. Id. at *2-*5. The Court
also gave Vantage more time to attempt to serve the Reinsurer
Defendants with its Amended Complaint. Id. at *5.
The
Reinsurer Defendants moved for reconsideration or in the
alternative certification of interlocutory appeal. Defs.
Syndicate 4472, Syndicate 2001, Syndicate 1206, and Catlin Re
Switzerland's Mot. for Reconsideration or in the
Alternative for Certification of Interlocutory Appeal
(“Mot.”); ECF No. 94; Defs. Hannover
Rückversicherung AG, Partner Reinsurance Europe PLC, and
Caisse Centrale de Reassurance's Joinder in Mot. for
Reconsideration (“Joinder”), ECF No. 95. Vantage
opposes. Opp. to Mot. for Reconsideration or in the
Alternative for Certification of Interlocutory Appeal
(“Opp.”), ECF No. 98.[2]
II.
LEGAL STANDARDS
The
Court may revise interlocutory orders “at any time
before the entry of judgment adjudicating the claims and all
the parties' rights and liabilities.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
54(b). This rule “recognizes [a court's] inherent
power to reconsider an interlocutory order ‘as justice
requires.'” Capitol Sprinkler Inspection, Inc.
v. Guest Servs., Inc., 630 F.3d 217, 227 (D.C. Cir.
2011) (citation omitted). “While the phrase, ‘as
justice requires,' is somewhat abstract, it is a
shorthand for more concrete considerations.” Singh
v. George Washington Univ., 383 F.Supp.2d 99, 101
(D.D.C. 2005) (quoting Cobell v. Norton, 224 F.R.D.
266, 272 (D.D.C. 2004)). Those considerations include
“whether the court ‘patently' misunderstood a
party, made a decision beyond the adversarial issues
presented to the court, made an error in failing to consider
controlling decisions or data, or whether a controlling or
significant change in the law or facts has occurred since the
submission of the issue to the Court.” Youssef v.
Holder, 62 F.Supp.3d 96, 98 (D.D.C. 2014) (citation
omitted).
Whether
to allow an interlocutory appeal of a non-final order is left
to the discretion of the district court. Swint v.
Chambers County Comm'n, 514 U.S. 35, 47 (1995).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), the court may certify an
order for interlocutory appeal when “(1) the order
involves a controlling question of law; (2) a substantial
ground for difference of opinion concerning the ruling
exists; and (3) an immediate appeal would materially advance
the litigation.” APCC Servs., Inc. v. Sprint
Commc'ns Co., 297 F.Supp.2d 90, 95 (D.D.C. 2003);
see also 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The party seeking
interlocutory review has the burden of persuading the court
to depart from the general policy of postponing appellate
review until after the entry of a final judgment. See
id.
III.
ANALYSIS
A.
The Court Will Deny the Reinsurer Defendants' Motion for
Reconsideration.
The
Reinsurer Defendants claim that the Court's Order in
Vantage II “departs from established
reinsurance law and creates new rights for Vantage under
relevant contracts.” Mot. at 4. First, the Court did
not create new law about “which entitles have the
ability to bind a reinsurer or have standing in a litigation
to enforce a contract in violation of an arbitration
provision.” Mot. at 5. Far from it. Rather, the Court
made a narrow determination: given that the Court must
“draw all reasonable inferences . . . in the
plaintiff's favor, ” at this early stage,
the Court determined that Vantage had pled enough facts to
survive a motion to dismiss on three equitable claims.
See Banneker Ventures, LLC v. Graham, 798 F.3d 1119,
1129 (D.C. Cir. 2015). Such a determination was limited to
the specific allegations in Vantage's Amended Complaint.
In any event, the Reinsurer Defendants offer no authority for
their claim that the Court is breaking ground in agency
jurisprudence.[3]
The
Reinsurer Defendants vehemently insist that Willis did not
act as their agent. Mot. at 5. Indeed, the evidence may
reveal that they are correct. But as the Court has explained,
“[w]hether Vantage can prove that ART and the Willis
Defendants acted as agents for the Reinsurer Defendants is
yet to be seen, but Vantage has alleged sufficient facts in
support of its allegation of agency at this early
stage.” Vantage II, 2018 WL 6025774, at *3.
After
the Court granted leave for Vantage to file an amended
complaint, the Reinsurer Defendants started arbitration
against ART on the terms of the Reinsurance Agreement. Mot.
at 7-8. And now the Reinsurer Defendants insist that the
Court should reconsider its Order because now Vantage can
stand in ART's shoes in this arbitration. Id.
This allegedly parallel arbitration-started only now by the
Reinsurer Defendants-hardly shows that the Court's
earlier Order was incorrect. In any ...