United States District Court, District of Columbia
BERMAN JACKSON United States District Judge
December 3, 2018, defendant Levy Foodservice Limited
Partnership (“Levy Foodservice”) filed a motion
to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). (ECF No. 6.) On December 4, 2018, the
Court issued an order (ECF No. 7) advising the pro
se plaintiff of her obligation under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and the Local Civil Rules of this Court to
file an opposition to Levy Foodservice's motion, and of
the consequences of her failure to oppose the motion. The
order set a deadline of January 3, 2019 for plaintiff's
response, and the Clerk of Court sent the order to plaintiff
at her address of record. To date, plaintiff has neither
responded nor moved for an extension of time. Because
plaintiff has not filed a timely response, the Court rules on
Levy Foodservice's motion without the benefit of
plaintiff need only provide a “short and plain
statement of [her] claim showing that [she] is entitled to
relief, ” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), that “give[s] the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted). To survive a
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). This
plaintiff is proceeding pro se, and the Court holds
her complaint to a less stringent standard than would be
applied to a complaint prepared by a lawyer. See Erickson
v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam). Even
judged by this relaxed standard, plaintiff's complaint
entirety, the complaint states:
I was wrongful [sic] Termination [sic] from my job[.] I had
medical excuse I have my paper work from my doctor telling I
needed breaks not to stand on my foot for 6 hr. a day the
medical prombles [sic] to be set down in a chair in the stand
but I told I had go down in the break room.
(Compl. (ECF No. 1-2) at 3 (page number designated by ECF)).
The Court construes the complaint as one raising a claim
under the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”), which generally “prohibits
discrimination against qualified individuals on the basis of
disability.” U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Comm'n v. Wal-Mart Stores, East, LP, No. 18-cv-1314,
2018 WL 5297814, at *2 (D.D.C. Oct. 25, 2018) (citing 42
U.S.C. § 12112(a)).
employer can discriminate by “not making reasonable
accommodations to the known physical . . . limitations of an
otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an .
. . employee [.]” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). A
plaintiff adequately states a claim for failure to
accommodate by “alleg[ing] facts sufficient to show
that: (1) [she] had a disability within the meaning of the
ADA; (2) [her] employer had notice of [her] disability; (3)
[she] could perform the essential functions of the position
with or without reasonable accommodation; and (4) [her]
employer refused to make such accommodation.” U.S.
Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Wal-Mart Stores,
East, LP, 2018 WL 5297814, at *2 (citing Gordon v.
District of Columbia, 480 F.Supp.2d 112, 115 (D.D.C.
2007)); see Perez v. District of Columbia Dep't of
Employment Servs., 305 F.Supp.3d 51, 57 (D.D.C. 2018).
Court must construe the complaint in favor of the plaintiff
and grant her the benefit of all inferences that can be
derived from the facts. See Hettinga v. United
States, 677 F.3d 471, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2012). But this
complaint alleges so few facts, with such a lack of clarity,
that the Court must conclude that it does not state an ADA
claim. Plaintiff does not identify the nature of any alleged
disability, and she fails to point to any accommodation that
was sought or denied. Nor does she indicate what it was that
made her termination “wrongful” or even, when it
occurred. Therefore, the unopposed motion to dismiss will be
Order is issued separately.
 For purposes of this Memorandum
Opinion, the Court presumes without deciding that service of
process properly has been effected on Levy Foodservice, and
denies its motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(5). In addition, the Court denies Levy
Foodservice's motion for a more ...