United States District Court, District of Columbia
DR. ROBERT LEE, Plaintiff,
N.E.C.A., et al., Defendants.
RUDOLPH CONTRERAS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
initially filed this civil action on August 6, 2018 in the
Superior Court of the District of Columbia against National
Electrical Contractors Association (“NECA”),
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
(“IBEW”), IBEW Local 26, and J.E. Richards
Electrical (“J.E. Richards”). NECA removed the
action on August 30, 2018. This matter has come before the
Court on the defendants' motions to dismiss. For the
reasons discussed below, the Court grants their motions and
dismisses the case.
to plaintiff, defendants are a part of a “130 billion
dollars [sic] industry, which controls the D.C. MD. & VA.
tri-state area, there [sic] political action committees,
organized crimes unions, members, judges, police, F.O.P. and
others, ” Compl. ¶ 2, who are conspiring to cause
plaintiff harm, see id. ¶ 3. Defendants
allegedly violate “the Constitution, Bill of Rights,
“Equal Protection”, federal and state code, rules
and regulations, has [sic] established it's [sic] own set
of rules and regulations, to violate the rights protecting
the plaintiff, in enjoying that industry controlled by the
defendants and engaged in violations of the racketeering and
corrupt organization act . . ., the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
the Americans with Disability Act and the 1974 Vietnam Era
Veterans Act.” Id. ¶ 4. Plaintiff demands
“$7 billion dollar$, in damage, pain, suffering, [and]
business and property injury[.]” Id. ¶ 3.
have filed motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that plaintiff's complaint
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Generally, a complaint need only contain “a short and
plain statement of the claim” in order to give each
defendant fair notice of the claim and the grounds upon which
it rests. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2); accord Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam). A complaint
survives a Rule 12(b)(6) motion if it “contain[s]
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.'”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). A claim is facially plausible when the pleaded
factual content “allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. When
considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court presumes that
the complaint's factual allegations are true and
construes them liberally in the plaintiff's favor.
See Kowal v. MCI Commc'ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271,
1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994). But, “the [C]ourt need not
accept inferences drawn by plaintiff[ ] if such inferences
are unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint.”
Id. Nor must the Court accept “a legal
conclusion couched as a factual allegation, ” nor
“naked assertions devoid of further factual
enhancement.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Even though the Court
holds a pro se complaint to a “less stringent
standard” than would be applied to a complaint
drafted by a lawyer, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.
89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted), the complaint “must plead
‘factual matter' that permits the court to infer
‘more than the mere possibility of misconduct,
'” Atherton v. District of Columbia Office of
the Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681-82 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(quoting Iqbal 556 U.S. at 678-79), by the
Court has reviewed the complaint carefully and does not
identify facts to support a cognizable legal claim. Plaintiff
asserts violations of the United States Constitution and
assorted federal statutes, yet his complaint fails to set
forth facts sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief.
Rather, the complaint consists almost entirely of conclusory
statements, and it is so lacking in factual allegations that
it must be dismissed. See Leisure v. Hogan, 21
Fed.Appx. 277, 278 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he less
stringent standard for pro se plaintiffs does not
compel courts to conjure up unpleaded facts to support
conclusory allegations.”); Poblete v.
Goldberg, 680 F.Supp.2d 18, 20 (D.D.C. 2009) (dismissing
“incomprehensible” complaint “lack[ing]
both factual allegations and cohesive arguments”).
Order is issued separately.
 In addition, the Court denies
plaintiff's Motion for Temporary or Permanent Injunction,
Motion to Remove [ECF No. 15] and Emergency Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment [ECF No. 18] as moot and failure ...