Searching over 5,500,000 cases.

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

American Bar Association v. United States Department of Education

United States District Court, District of Columbia

February 22, 2019




         In 2007, Congress established the Public Service Loan Forgiveness Program (“PSLF” or “PSLF Program”), which offers federal student loan forgiveness for those who make ten years, or 120 months, of monthly loan payments while employed in public service. At any time, federal student loan borrowers employed in public service may check their ongoing eligibility to participate in the program by submitting an Employment Certification Form (ECF). Upon receipt of that form, the Department of Education (the “Department”) determines whether the borrower's loan payments were made while employed at a qualifying “public service organization, ” such that they count towards the PSLF Program's requirements. This case concerns whether the Department's reversals of certain of those determinations, made before the borrower's completion of all 120 monthly loan payments, were lawful.

         Plaintiffs American Bar Association (ABA) and Michelle Quintero-Millan, Geoffrey Burkhart, Kate Voigt, and Jamie Rudert (collectively, the “Individual Plaintiffs”) filed this action against the Department and Betsy DeVos, in her official capacity as Secretary of Education (collectively, “Defendants”), challenging the Department's allegedly unlawful reversal of certain determinations under the PSLF Program. They bring five claims against Defendants. Counts I, II, III, and IV are brought under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 500 et seq. In Count I, Plaintiffs allege that the Department changed its interpretation of its regulations in an arbitrary and capricious manner by adopting new standards governing whether non-501(c)(3) not-for-profit organizations, such as the ABA and the Individual Plaintiffs' employers, qualify as “public service organizations” under the PSLF Program. ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 183-92. In Count II, Plaintiffs allege that the Department failed to follow the APA's notice requirements when it introduced those standards. Id. ¶¶ 193-200. In Count III, the ABA and Plaintiffs Burkhart, Rudert, and Voigt allege that the Department's retroactive application of the standards was arbitrary and capricious. Id. ¶¶ 201-08. And in Count IV, Plaintiffs allege that the Department's new standards were themselves inconsistent with the PSLF statute and regulation. Id. ¶¶ 209-16. In Count V, Plaintiffs allege that the Department's retroactive application of the standards violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. ¶¶ 217-20.

         Before the Court are the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. For the reasons explained below, the Court concludes that Defendants acted arbitrarily and capriciously when the Department changed its interpretation of the PSLF regulation in two ways without displaying awareness of its changed position, providing a reasoned explanation for that decision, and taking into account the serious reliance interests affected. Accordingly, summary judgment is appropriate on behalf of Quintero-Millan, Burkhart, and Voigt, on Count I, and the new standards on which the Department relied when it sent denial letters to them must be vacated. As a result, the Court need not reach their additional causes of action.

         In contrast, summary judgment is appropriate in favor of Defendants on all causes of action brought by Rudert and the ABA. The record does not support Rudert's assertion that the Department impermissibly changed its interpretation of the PSLF regulation, and then relied on that interpretation in determining that his employment failed to qualify for the PSLF Program. For this and other reasons explained below, Rudert has failed to demonstrate that the APA was violated in his case. And further, for the reasons explained below, the Department's representations to the ABA concerning whether it qualified as a public service organization for purposes of the PSLF Program were not final agency actions subject to challenge by the ABA through the APA. Finally, both the ABA's and Rudert's claims under the Due Process Clause fail because both lack the protected property interests required to succeed on their claims.

         Accordingly, the Court will grant in part and deny in part Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 17, and grant in part and deny in part Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 22. For the reasons explained below, the Court will also grant Plaintiffs' Supplemental Motions to Allow for Extra-Record Review. ECF Nos. 24, 35.[1]

         I. Background

         A. The PSLF Program

         1.The PSLF Statute

         In 2007, the College Cost Reduction and Access Act, Pub. L. No. 110-84, 121 Stat. 784, established the PSLF Program, under which the Department is required to forgive eligible loans of borrowers who make monthly loan payments for ten years while employed in public service. Under the statute, the Department must “cancel the balance of interest and principal” of qualifying student loans belonging to an individual who (1) is not in default on the loans, (2) makes 120 monthly payments after October 1, 2007, on the loans, and (3) is “employed in a public service job” at the time each payment is made and at the time of forgiveness. 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(m)(1). For a payment to qualify, the borrower must also be enrolled in an approved repayment plan, such as an “income-based repayment plan” (“IBR plan”), id., which permits a borrower facing financial hardship to make lower monthly payments capped at a percentage of her gross income, 20 U.S.C. § 1098e(a). A “public service job” is defined to cover “a full-time job in . . . government . . ., public education . . ., public interest law services (including prosecution or public defense or legal advocacy on behalf of low-income communities at a nonprofit organization) . . ., [and] public service for individuals with disabilities.” 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(m)(3)(B).

         2. The PSLF Regulation

         In October 2008, the Department promulgated a regulation setting forth the procedures through which a borrower may apply for loan forgiveness. See 34 C.F.R. § 685.219. The regulation defines the statutory term “employed in a public service job, ” 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(m)(1)(B), to require that an eligible borrower be “hired and paid by a public service organization, ” 34 C.F.R. § 685.219(b). Thus, a borrower's eligibility for the PSLF Program is not determined by her job responsibilities, but rather by whether her employer qualifies as a “public service organization.” Id. Under the regulation, “public service organization” includes any government organization, not-for-profit organization classified under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, or not-for-profit private organization that is not classified under Section 501(c)(3) so long as it “provides [qualifying] public services” and does not engage in certain disqualifying activities. 34 C.F.R. § 685.219(b). The qualifying “public services” include, among many others, “public interest law services, ” “public education, ” and “public service for individuals with disabilities and the elderly.” Id.

         During the negotiated rulemaking process leading to the promulgation of the regulation, the Department agreed to develop a form with “an employer certification section and instructions regarding supporting documentation that the Department [needs] to determine the borrower's eligibility for the forgiveness benefit.” Federal Perkins Loan Program, Federal Family Education Loan Program, and William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program, 73 Fed. Reg. 63, 232, 63, 241- 42 (Oct. 23, 2008); AR 45-46. The Department affirmed that the form would permit a borrower “to collect a certification from his or her employer either annually or at the close of the 120-payment qualifying period.” 73 Fed. Reg. at 63, 242; AR 46. Based on these commitments undertaken during the negotiated rulemaking, the Department developed a process through which a borrower may certify the eligibility of payments made during a particular period of employment at any time, long before she submits a loan forgiveness application upon completion of all 120 qualifying payments (the “ECF Process”). Oral Arg. Tr. at 25:1-11.

         3. The ECF Process

         According to the Department, the ECF Process allows borrowers to certify that their “employment and payments qualify for [the PSLF Program].” AR 178. Through the submission of an ECF, borrowers and their employers certify that the borrower was employed full-time for a qualifying public service organization when making monthly loan payments. See AR 152-53. In order to receive loan forgiveness under the program, borrowers must submit valid ECFs covering their “full-time public service employment while making the required 120 separate, qualifying monthly payments.” AR 154. But, as noted above, borrowers may also submit ECFs before they are eligible to apply for loan forgiveness in order to “receive feedback on the eligibility of [a borrower's] employment and payments, ” AR 178, and to “verify that [a borrower's] employer qualifies as a public service organization, ” AR 152. The Department recommends that borrowers submit ECFs either annually or whenever the borrower changes employers. AR 154. A single ECF may cover loan payments made over any length of time, but the Department requires borrowers to submit separate ECFs for each employer. See AR 152-53. The ECF application must be signed by an authorized official from the relevant organization to verify that the borrower was a full-time employee during the relevant time period. Id.

         The Department relies on PSLF servicers, primarily “FedLoan Servicing, ” to process ECFs prior to a borrower submitting a loan forgiveness application at the conclusion of making 120 qualifying monthly payments. AR 178. ECFs are processed in several steps. First, FedLoan Servicing conducts an “initial review” in which it “check[s] that the borrower provided all required information” and followed the form instructions. AR 143. Once the check is complete, Fedloan Servicing “determine[s] whether an employer is a qualifying public service organization” by confirming that the organization is listed in one of the Department's “searchable databases, based on the type of public service organization.” Id. If FedLoan Servicing cannot determine whether an employer qualifies as a public service organization-and in all cases where a borrower submits an ECF based on her employment at a private, non-501(c)(3) not-for-profit organization-it is required to escalate the decision to the Department. AR 143, 160-61.

         After determining that the borrower's employer is a qualifying public service organization, FedLoan Servicing will “determine whether the borrower has met the full-time requirement . . . while employed [there].” AR 143. If FedLoan Servicing confirms that the borrower made loan payments while employed full-time at a qualifying employer, then, after approving the first ECF received by the borrower, it will “request the transfer of all federally-held loans” to FedLoan Servicing from the borrower's original loan servicer. AR 144. Once the transfer is made, FedLoan Servicing will “track the number of PSLF qualifying payments made after the loans [were] transferred from the original servicer.” Id.

         After completing 120 eligible monthly payments, borrowers may apply for loan forgiveness through a separate application. AR 179. If a borrower submitted ECFs covering the entire period during which she made 120 qualifying payments, then she must submit “one additional” ECF to verify that she is employed full-time with a qualifying public service organization at the time she submits the application. Id. If a borrower did not submit ECFs prior to completing her loan forgiveness application, or only submitted a portion of them, then she must provide all the remaining ECFs upon her application for loan forgiveness. Id.

         B. Plaintiffs

         The ABA is an organization for legal professionals that asserts that the Department unlawfully stripped it of its status as a qualifying public service organization for purposes of the PSLF Program. Compl. ¶¶ 21, 208. The Individual Plaintiffs are law school graduates who contend that they made qualifying loan payments under the PSLF Program while employed by public service organizations, including the ABA, over varying periods since 2011-but have since been informed that, to the contrary, because their employers are not public service organizations, their payments do not qualify. See Id. ¶¶ 107-77.

         1. ABA

         The ABA is a private, not-for-profit 501(c)(6) organization that, among other activities, conducts legal education initiatives, administers the accreditation of law schools and other projects for the legal profession, and provides public interest law services. Pls.' MSJ Br., Ex. A ¶¶ 5-11. The ABA operates several public interest legal divisions, including the South Texas Pro Bono Asylum Representative Project (“ProBAR”), the Commission on Homelessness and Poverty, and the Center on Children and the Law. Id., Ex. A ¶¶ 12, 14, 18. According to Plaintiffs, ProBAR serves as the nation's “largest provider . . . of legal services and legal-rights education for detained unaccompanied immigrant children.” Id., Ex. A ¶ 12.

         Following the establishment of the ECF Process in January 2012, the ABA asserts that several of its employees submitted ECFs to the Department and received letters in response confirming that their “employment with the ABA qualified” for participation in the PSLF program. Id., Ex. A ¶ 22. Based on these determinations, the ABA informed several prospective employees that “it was a qualifying employer under the PSLF program.” Id., Ex. A ¶ 23. Beginning in 2015, ABA employees began to receive letters from the Department that denied their eligibility for the PSLF Program on the basis that the Department “could find no evidence of [the ABA] being a not-for-profit organization that also provides a qualifying service for the PSLF program.” Id., Ex. A ¶ 22; AR 185. Around April 2016, the ABA's then-Executive Director and Chief Operating Officer contacted the Department about the ABA's status. Pls.' MSJ Br., Ex. A ¶ 28. In June 2016, the Department informed the ABA that, even after reviewing the additional information the ABA had submitted, the Department concluded that the ABA did not qualify “as a public service organization for . . . PSLF purposes” because it did not demonstrate “that the primary purpose of the ABA is to provide ‘public interest law services' [as] the term is defined in the PSLF regulations.” AR 190-91. After an additional exchange of letters and a meeting with Department officials, in December 2016 the Department reaffirmed to the ABA that it was not a qualifying public service organization “for the reasons outlined” in its June 2016 letter. AR 192-93.

         2. Michelle Quintero-Millan

         After graduating from the Sturm College of Law at the University of Denver in 2012, Quintero-Millan joined ProBAR in June 2012 as a Staff Attorney. See Pls.' MSJ Br., Ex. E ¶¶ 1, 4. She departed in May 2015 with the title of Supervising Attorney. Id., Ex. E ¶ 7. During her time at ProBAR, Quintero-Millan provided pro bono legal services to undocumented and unaccompanied immigrant children in southern Texas. Id., Ex. E ¶¶ 4-5. In November 2015, Quintero-Millan submitted her first ECF to FedLoan Servicing. Id., Ex. E ¶ 10; AR 218. In November 2016, FedLoan Servicing informed Quintero-Millan, without explanation, that her employment at ProBAR did not qualify under the PSLF program. Pls.' MSJ Br., Ex. E ¶ 13; AR 237-38. Quintero-Millan asserts that she had accepted the position at ProBAR “with the understanding, based on [her] inquiries during the application process[, ] that [her] employment would qualify for PSLF.” Pls.' MSJ Br., Ex. E ¶ 9. Since January 2013, Quintero-Millan has been enrolled in an IBR plan, which caps her loan payments as a percentage of her income and, as a result, has caused her monthly payments to be less than the interest on her loans. Id., Ex. E ¶ 16. Accordingly, Quintero-Millan's total federal student debt has increased from approximately $340, 000 when she entered repayment to $430, 446.48 as of May 2017. Id., Ex. E ¶ 17.

         3. Geoffrey Burkhart

         In June 2014, Burkhart-a 2008 graduate of DePaul University College of Law-joined the ABA as Attorney and Project Director for the Division for Legal Services. Pls.' MSJ Br., Ex. D ¶¶ 1, 4. He remained in the position until December 21, 2016, when he became the Deputy Director of the ABA's Center for Innovation. Id., Ex. D ¶ 4. While employed at the Division for Legal Services, Burkhart worked “to improve civil legal services and criminal justice for poor individuals through technological and process innovations.” Id. His work included, among other responsibilities, drafting amicus briefs, conducting workload studies of public-defender offices, and launching a news service for public-defense leaders. Id., Ex. D ¶ 5.

         Prior to joining the ABA, Burkhart asserts that he received confirmation (though he does not specify how) from both the ABA and FedLoan Servicing that his prospective position there was eligible for the PSLF Program. Id., Ex. D ¶ 7. Burkhart claims that he accepted the job in reliance on those representations. Id. In July 2014, Burkhart submitted an ECF to FedLoan Servicing and, that same month, received a letter confirming the eligibility of his loan payments. AR 208-11. Burkhart continued to submit ECFs in order to track his eligibility and received, as recently as June 28, 2016, verifications that his payments counted toward those necessary for loan forgiveness. Pls.' MSJ Br., Ex. D ¶ 8. On October 12, 2016, Burkhart received a letter from FedLoan Servicing informing him that upon its “further research and after consulting with the Department, ” it had reversed its previous determinations because the ABA does not “provide a qualifying service.” AR 214-15. During his employment with the ABA, Burkhart has been enrolled in an IBR plan, which has caused his monthly payments to be lower than the accruing interest on his student loans. Pls.' MSJ Br., Ex. D ¶ 9. As a result, Burkhart estimates that the total balance of his “federal student loans has grown from $155, 899.95 in October 2009 to over $200, 000 as of May 17, 2017.” Id., Ex. D ¶ 11. Burkhart asserts that the Department's reversal has caused him and his family “great concern” and may force him to seek alternative employment. Id., Ex. D ¶ 12.

         4. Kate Voigt

         Voigt graduated from Boston College Law School in 2011. Pls.' MSJ Br., Ex. C ¶ 1. In December 2011, she accepted a position in the Liaison Department of the American Immigration Lawyers Association (“AILA”), a 501(c)(6) organization that provides a variety of services for immigrants, as well as educational services on the topic of immigration. Id., Ex. C ¶¶ 4-5. Shortly after starting at AILA, Voigt contacted the Department seeking clarification as to whether her position there qualified for the PSLF Program. Id., Ex. C ¶ 6. In June 2012, the Department informed Voigt that her employment at AILA qualified. Id. As a result, Voigt claims, she continued to work at AILA. Id., Ex. C ¶ 7.

         In June 2014, Voigt contacted the Department about a letter received by her coworker that stated, to the contrary, that employment at AILA did not qualify under the PSLF Program. Id., Ex. C ¶ 9. In response, the Department sent Voigt a letter in December 2014 informing her that, although it previously recognized employment with AILA as qualifying for the PSLF Program, it had reversed its position. AR 335. The letter was emailed to her by Ian Foss, a Department employee. AR 334. The Department had done so, the letter explained, because AILA's services did not fit within its definition of “public education services, ” defined by the Department as “services that provide educational enrichment or support directly to students or their families in a school or a school-like setting.” AR 335-36. Voigt followed up to the letter by emailing Foss, expressing her disagreement with the decision. Pls.' MSJ Br., Ex. C ¶ 13. Voigt never received a response to the email. Id.

         In November 2016, almost two years later, Voigt received a letter from FedLoan Servicing confirming that the Department had reversed its position as to whether employment at AILA qualified for the PSLF Program. Id., Ex. C ¶ 17. Voigt asserts that, based on the Department's original confirmation, she chose to remain enrolled in an IBR plan that capped her monthly loan payments at an amount lower than the monthly interest charges of her student debt. Id., Ex. C ¶ 8. Accordingly, Voigt estimates that, from October 2011 to May 2017, her federal student loan balance grew from $205, 546 to $247, 638.55. Id., Ex. C ¶ 18. She asserts that the Department's decision to rescind her employment's eligibility has caused her great concern and has affected her ability to plan her finances. Id., Ex. C ¶ 19.

         5. Jamie Rudert

         In April 2012, Rudert began working at Vietnam Veterans of America (“VVA”), a 501(c)(19) organization that provides advocacy and support services to Vietnam veterans, including representing veterans seeking government benefits and services. Id., Ex. B ¶ 4; AR 315. Rudert, a 2010 graduate of the American University Washington College of Law, asserts that he first learned of the PSLF Program while in law school. Pls.' MSJ Br., Ex. B ¶¶ 1-2. Upon joining VVA, Rudert worked as an Appellate Attorney from April 2012 to May 2013, where he represented veterans with service-connected disability claims before the Board of Veterans' Appeals. Id., Ex. B ¶ 6. In May 2013, he was promoted to Deputy Director. Id., Ex. B ¶ 7. As Deputy Director, he continued to represent veterans in their appeals while also supervising other attorneys. Id. He remained in this position until September 2015, when he left VVA for Paralyzed Veterans of America (“PVA”), a 501(c)(3) organization, where he continued to represent veterans in disability-benefit appeals. Id., Ex. B ¶ 11.

         In July 2012, Rudert submitted an ECF and received a letter from FedLoan Servicing (which was not his loan servicer at the time but receives all ECF applications regardless of whether it is a borrower's servicer) indicating that his work at VVA from April 1, 2012, to June 18, 2012, qualified for the PSLF Program. Id., Ex. B ¶ 8. On August 1, 2012, he received another letter from FedLoan Servicing, this one informing him that his loans were being transferred to FedLoan Servicing from his original loan servicer due to his qualifying payments. Id., Ex. B ¶ 9. On October 30, 2014, he received a letter, in response to a second ECF submission, confirming that his employment at VVA qualified for the PSLF Program. Id., Ex. B ¶ 10. FedLoan Servicing later informed Rudert that, as of January 2015, he had made 30 qualifying payments. Id.

         In early 2016, after his departure from VVA, Rudert submitted another ECF, while employed at PVA, which covered loan payments during his final year at VVA. Id., Ex. B ¶ 12. In April 2016, he received a letter from FedLoan Servicing informing him that, based on its “further research and after consulting with the Department, ” it “reversed [his] previously approved employment period” because VVA “does not provide a qualifying service.” AR 282-83. Rudert asserts that, if he had known that his employment at VVA did not qualify for the PSLF Program, he would have departed earlier for another employer. Pls.' MSJ Br., Ex. B ¶ 14. During his participation in the PSLF Program, Rudert has been enrolled in an IBR plan, which has decreased his required monthly loan payments to an amount lower than the monthly interest charges on his total student debt. Id., Ex. B ¶ 3. Consequently, Rudert estimates that his federal student loan balance has grown from $134, 8087.16 in August 2012 to $161, 985.02 in May 2017. Id., Ex. B ¶¶ 9, 18.

         II. The Parties' Motions for Summary Judgment

         A. Legal Standard

         Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), this Court must grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” “Summary judgment is appropriately granted when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movants and drawing all reasonable inferences accordingly, no reasonable jury could reach a verdict in their favor.” Lopez v. Council on Am.-Islamic Relations Action Network, Inc., 826 F.3d 492, 496 (D.C. Cir. 2016). However, in a case involving review of an agency action under the APA, “the district judge sits as an appellate tribunal” and “[t]he ‘entire case' on review is a question of law.” Am. Biosci. Inc. v. Thompson, 269 F.3d 1077, 1083 (D.C. Cir. 2001). In such circumstances, the district court “is to determine whether or not as a matter of law the evidence in the administrative record permitted the agency to make the decision it did.” Sierra Club v. Mainella, 459 F.Supp.2d 76, 90 (D.D.C. 2006) (quoting Occidental Eng'g Co. v. INS, 753 F.2d 766, 769 (9th Cir. 1985)). Accordingly, the Court's review “is normally confined to the administrative record, ” Amfac Resorts, L.L.C v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 143 F.Supp.2d 7, 10 (D.D.C. 2001), except within a “narrow set of exceptions, ” where a court may consult extra-record evidence due to “gross procedural deficiencies-such as where the administrative record itself is so deficient as to preclude effective review, ” Hill Dermaceuticals, Inc. v. FDA, 709 F.3d 44, 47 (D.C. Cir. 2013).

         B. Analysis

         Defendants assert two threshold challenges to Plaintiffs' APA claims. First, they assert that the ABA does not have a cause of action because its interests do not fall within the “zone of interests” protected by the PSLF statute. The Court concludes that the zone-of-interests test does not bar the ABA's claims. Second, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs do not have a cause of action because the Department's actions at issue are not final agency actions subject to judicial review. The Court concludes that the letters sent to the Individual Plaintiffs determining that their employment did not qualify for the PSLF Program-and thus that their loan payments made while working for those employers did not count toward the total needed for loan forgiveness- are final agency actions. Therefore, the Individual Plaintiffs may assert causes of action challenging them under the APA. On the other hand, the Department's letters to the ABA concerning its status as a qualifying “public service organization” under the PSLF regulation are not final agency actions. Therefore, the ABA may not assert APA claims directed at those letters.

         Turning to the merits of the Individual Plaintiffs' APA claims, the Court concludes that the Department changed the standards by which it assessed whether non-501(c)(3) not-for-profit organizations qualified as public service organizations under the PSLF Program. Moreover, these changes were arbitrary and capricious because, in adopting the new standards, the Department failed to display awareness of its changed position, provide a reasoned analysis for that decision, and take into account the serious reliance interests affected. Because summary judgment is appropriate in favor of Quintero-Millan, Burkhart, and Voigt on Count I on that basis, the Court need not reach their other challenges under the APA, or their argument that the Department violated their due process rights under the Fifth Amendment.

         On the other hand, the Court concludes that summary judgment is appropriate in Defendants' favor on Rudert's APA claims. It does so because it cannot conclude that the Department based its determination that his employment failed to qualify for the PSLF Program on a new interpretation of the PSLF regulation, and for other reasons explained below. Finally, the Court concludes that the ABA and Rudert's due process claims under the Fifth Amendment fail, as well. As a result, summary judgment is appropriate in Defendants' favor as to all causes of action brought by the ABA and Rudert.

         1. Whether the ABA's Injuries Fall Within the Zone of Interests of the PSLF Statute

         Defendants assert that the ABA's alleged injuries do not fall within the zone of interests of the PSLF statute and regulation, [2] which are “intended to provide student debt relief to borrowers, ” not public service organizations. Dfs.' Opp. at 21. The ...

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.