MEMORANDUM OPINION
REGGIE
B. WALTON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
The
defendant, Darren Upshur, is currently serving a 188-month
term of imprisonment that was imposed by this Court following
his plea of guilty to one count of unlawful distribution of
fifty grams or more of cocaine base, also known as crack, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(ii)
(2006). See Plea Agreement at 1 (Nov. 9, 2011); Judgment in a
Criminal Case ("Judgment") at 2 (Feb. 15, 2012).
Currently pending before the Court are the defendant's
Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or
Correct Sentence ("Def.'s Mot.") and his
Supplemental Motion to Vacate Judgment Under 28 U.S.C. §
2255 ("Def.'s Supp. Mot."), which "move[]
this Court to vacate his sentence and enter an amended
judgment sentencing him to time-served, in light of the
Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. United
States, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015)."
Def.'s Supp. Mot. at 1. Upon consideration of the
parties' submissions, [1] the Court concludes that it must deny
the defendant's motion for the reasons explained below.
I.
BACKGROUND
After
the defendant entered his guilty plea, the United States
Probation Office (the "Probation Office") submitted
to the Court its final Presentence Investigation Report (the
"Report" or "PSR"), which included a
sentencing guidelines calculation pursuant to the United
States Sentencing Guidelines (the "Sentencing
Guidelines" or "USSG"). See PSR at 1 (Jan. 18,
2012). The Report reflected a total criminal history score of
six points based on two prior felony convictions: (1) a 1999
distribution of heroin conviction adjudicated in the Superior
Court of the District of Columbia ("Superior
Court"), see id. ¶ 36, and (2) a 2000
attempted robbery conviction also adjudicated in Superior
Court, see id. ¶ 37.[2] Based on these convictions,
the Probation Office determined that the defendant qualified
as a career offender pursuant to § 4B1.1(a) of the
Sentencing Guidelines. See id. ¶
24.[3]
Thus, although the Probation Office recognized that "a
criminal history score of six [would generally have]
establish[ed] a criminal history category of JH,"
Id. ¶ 39, because "[t]he defendant [wa]s a
career offender[, ] [ ] the criminal history category [wa]s
VI," id. ¶ 40. Accordingly, "[b]ased
upon a total offense level of 31 and a criminal history
category of VI," the Report calculated "the
[applicable] guideline imprisonment range [a]s 188 months to
235 months." JA ¶ 100.
The
Court sentenced the defendant on February 1, 2012. See
Judgment at 1. At the sentencing hearing, the Court
"accept[ed] the [Probation Office's final Report]
and [its] Guidelines [calculations] as accurate" without
any objection by defense counsel, Def.'s Supp. Mot.,
Exhibit ("Ex.") A (Transcript of Sentencing Before
the Honorable Reggie B. Walton (Feb. 1, 2012)
("Sentencing Tr.")) 3:8-10, 17-18, and, upon
"consider[ing] all the various factors in deciding [ ]
the appropriate sentence [ ], including the Guideline
sentence," it concluded that a sentence at "the
bottom end of the Guidelines" was appropriate,
Id. , Ex. A (Sentencing Tr.) 7:17- 21. Accordingly,
the Court sentenced the defendant to a 188-month term of
imprisonment. See Judgment at 2.
Subsequently,
on June 26, 2015, the Supreme Court issued its decision in
Johnson. See ___ U.S. at ___, 135 S. Q. at
2551. On June 21, 2016, the defendant filed an abridged
motion to vacate his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2255 (2012), see generally Def.'s Mot., in
accordance with the Standing Order issued by the Chief Judge
of this Court, see Standing Order at 2 (June 2, 2016)
(authorizing prisoners seeking post-conviction relief based
on Johnson "to file an abridged motion[]
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255[]... by June 26,
2016"). The defendant's motion, as supplemented on
October 31, 2017, see Def.'s Supp. Mot. at 1, is the
subject of this Memorandum Opinion.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (the
"AEDPA") permits a federal prisoner in custody
pursuant to a sentence imposed by a federal court to
"move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate,
set aside[, ] or correct the sentence" "upon the
ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court
was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the
sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or
is otherwise subject to collateral attack." 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255(a).
However,
it "limits the time in which a prisoner may bring such a
motion," United States v. Cicero, 214 F.3d 199,
200 (D.C. Cir. 2000), providing that
[a] [one]-year period of limitation shall apply to [any such]
motion . .. [, and t]he limitation period shall run from the
latest of-
(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes
final;
(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion
created by governmental action in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the
movant was prevented from making a motion by such
governmental action;
(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially
recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly
recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively
applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or
claims presented could have been discovered through the
exercise of due diligence.
28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)
III.
ANALYSIS
Under
the version of the Sentencing Guidelines in effect when the
defendant was sentenced,
[a] defendant [wa]s a career offender if (1) the defendant
was at least eighteen years old at the time the defendant
committed the instant offense of conviction; (2) the instant
offense of conviction is a felony that is either a crime of
violence or a controlled substance offense; and (3) the
defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of either
a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.
USSG
§ 4B1.1(a) (2011). The Sentencing Guidelines further
defined a ...