MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
JOHN
D. BATES UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
On
February 1, 2019, the Metropolitan Police Department
(“MPD”) received an anonymous complaint
concerning Orlando Louallen, an eighteen-year-old resident of
Washington, D.C. See Statement of Facts, Ex. 1 to
Criminal Compl. [ECF No. 1-1]. Approximately two weeks later,
MPD executed a court-authorized search warrant of
Louallen's residence and, after finding a firearm,
arrested Louallen on one count of being a felon in possession
of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
See id.; Arrest [Dkt. Entry of Feb. 13, 2019]. The
grand jury returned an indictment, and the government moved
for pretrial detention on the ground that defendant poses a
danger to the community. Indictment [ECF No. 4];
Gov't's Mem. in Supp. of Pre-Trial Detention [ECF No.
5] at 2.
At a
detention hearing held on February 21, 2019, Magistrate Judge
G. Michael Harvey orally denied the government's motion
and ordered defendant's release into the High Intensity
Supervision Program (“HISP”). See Min.
Entry Feb. 21, 2019. Judge Harvey explained that
defendant's age, his limited criminal record, and his
employment status counseled in favor of release, and that the
conditions of release-including inter alia a curfew
requiring him to remain in his uncle's residence in Fort
Washington, Maryland from 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. each day-sufficed
to establish that defendant will appear in court and poses no
danger to the community. See Order Setting
Conditions of Release [ECF No. 7] at 3. The government moved
for revocation of the magistrate judge's release order.
See Mot. for Review and Appeal of Release Order
(“Gov't's Mot.”) [ECF No. 6]; 18 U.S.C.
§ 3145(a)(1). For the reasons stated below, and for the
reasons explained at the detention hearing held before this
Court on February 22, 2019, the Court denies the
government's motion and orders defendant released into
HISP subject to the conditions set forth in the magistrate
judge's order. See Min. Entry Feb. 22, 2019;
Order Setting Conditions of Release.
LEGAL
STANDARD
The
Court must release a defendant pending trial if, after a
detention hearing, the Court finds that the government has
carried its burden of establishing that “no condition
or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the
appearance of the person as required and the safety of any
other person and the community.” 18 U.S.C. §
3142(e); see also United States v. Simpkins, 826
F.2d 94, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Where detention is sought based
only on a defendant's purported danger to the community,
as here, a clear and convincing standard applies. See
Simpkins, 826 F.2d at 96; 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f). To
make that determination, the Court must consider: (1) the
nature and circumstances of the offense charged; (2) the
weight of the evidence against defendant; (3) defendant's
history and characteristics; and (4) the nature and
seriousness of the danger to other people or the community
that would be posed by defendant's release. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3142(g). Courts in this district review a magistrate
judge's release order de novo. See United
States v. Beauchamp- Perez, 822 F.Supp.2d 7, 9 (D.D.C.
2011) (citing United States v. Hudspeth, 143
F.Supp.2d 32, 35- 36 (D.D.C. 2001) (citing cases)).
ANALYSIS
In
arguing for pretrial detention, the government emphasizes
that defendant was arrested only two months into a period of
supervised probation stemming from a prior state conviction
for Carrying a Pistol Without a License. See
Gov't's Mem. in Supp. of Pre-Trial Detention [ECF No.
5] at 4; Gov't's Mot. at 4-5. The government also
contends that the evidence defendant unlawfully possessed a
firearm is overwhelming, and that the anonymous complaint
leading to the search of his residence alleged he was
distributing narcotics and recklessly discharging a
firearm-activities that are self-evidently dangerous to the
community. See id. For his part, defendant argues
that his young age favors an additional chance to avoid
detention, close monitoring under HISP will help prevent
future violations, the Court should not rely on an anonymous
complaint that defendant recklessly discharged a firearm, and
the release conditions imposed by Judge Harvey will
sufficiently protect the community because they require him
to adhere to a curfew and to live under the close supervision
of his aunt and uncle at their home in Fort Washington,
Maryland, rather than at his normal residence in Washington
D.C.[*]
The
Court finds that the government has not met its burden to
show by clear and convincing evidence that no condition or
combination of conditions of release can reasonably assure
the safety of the community. As an initial matter, the Court
finds that the first and second section 3142(g) factors-the
nature and circumstances of the offense charged and the
weight of the evidence against defendant-generally weigh in
favor of detention. See 18 U.S.C. §
3142(g)(1)-(2). Defendant is charged with being a felon in
possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(1). While that offense is not a crime of violence
triggering the presumption in favor of detention, see
United States v. Singleton, 182 F.3d 7, 13-14 (D.C. Cir.
1999), the offense is serious, involves the unlawful
possession of dangerous firearms and ammunition, and is
punishable by up to 10 years in prison. And the
government's proffered evidence-that the gun was located
hidden between the mattress and box spring of defendant's
bed, in his room, while he was sleeping on his bed-is strong
evidence in favor of defendant's guilt. See
Gov't's Mot. at 2-3. The Court further finds it
troubling that defendant was arrested for this violation only
two months into his supervised probation on a prior offense
involving firearms.
Nevertheless,
the Court finds that the second and third section 3142(g)
factors- defendant's history and characteristics and the
nature and seriousness of the danger to other people or the
community that would be posed by defendant's release-tip
the scales against detention. See 18 U.S.C. §
3142(g)(3)-(4). As for defendant's characteristics, as
Judge Harvey noted, defendant is eighteen years old, has a
limited criminal record, and steadily has maintained his
employment. The Court also has no evidence before it that
defendant has ever engaged in any overtly violent behavior.
Although the government cites the anonymous complaint
alleging defendant recklessly discharged a firearm, defendant
is not charged with a crime related to that conduct, the
Court has no evidence concerning the reliability of the
anonymous tip, and the government itself conceded at the
February 22 detention hearing that the Court should not rely
on the veracity of the tip when considering detention.
Finally, the Court finds that defendant's release will
pose little danger to the community. Defendant's release
conditions are stringent. Not only will he be monitored under
HISP, which involves close monitoring by the probation
office, but defendant will also be required to live with his
aunt and uncle in Fort Washington, Maryland, to remain
outside the D.C. area, and to comply with a curfew.
Defendant's uncle also stated at the detention hearing
that defendant's movements and behavior will be
supervised closely. The Court is satisfied that
defendant's change of location and the combined
monitoring of his family and the probation office under HISP
will limit the likelihood he will violate his release
conditions or will engage in other dangerous or criminal
conduct. Taken together, defendant's history and
characteristics and the limited danger he poses to the
community if released outweigh the seriousness of the offense
and the weight of the evidence against him.
Hence,
the Court finds that the government failed to meet its burden
to establish that no combination of release conditions
imposed on defendant will reasonably assure his appearance in
court and the safety of the community.
CONCLUSION
Upon
consideration of the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. §
3142(g), and the entire record herein, and for the reasons
articulated above and at the February 22 detention hearing,
the Court finds that the government failed to meet its burden
to establish that defendant's release conditions will not
reasonably assure defendant's appearance and the safety
of the community.
Accordingly,
[6] the government's motion for revocation and appeal of
the magistrate judge's release order is
DENIED. Defendant shall be released pending
trial subject to the conditions set forth in [7] the
magistrate judge's release order.
SO
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