MEMORANDUM OPINION
TIMOTHY J. KELLY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Plaintiff
Ifeanyichukwu Abakporo, a federal prisoner proceeding pro
se and in forma pauperis, filed this lawsuit
under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. §
552, seeking certain records from Defendant Executive Office
of United States Attorneys (EOUSA). Specifically, he requests
records about the dates on which the term of the grand jury
that returned an indictment against him was extended, as well
as any court orders relating to those extensions. EOUSA, for
its part, has not undertaken a search for responsive records,
since in its view, the records are subject to FOIA's
Exemption 3, which covers “matters specifically
exempted from disclosure by statute, ” including
grand-jury information. Both Abakporo, ECF No. 12, and EOUSA,
ECF No. 17, have moved for summary judgment. For the reasons
explained below, the Court will grant summary judgment for
Abakporo.[1]
I.
Factual and Procedural Background
Abakporo
alleges that he was indicted by a grand jury sitting in the
Southern District of New York on April 26, 2012, and that the
government secured three superseding indictments against him,
with the last being returned on May 2, 2013. ECF No. 12 at 2.
Subsequently, he claims, the government convicted him of
three counts of mortgage fraud for which he is serving a
72-month sentence. Id. During his post-conviction
proceedings, the government apparently represented to the
District Court, [2] and the Second Circuit, [3] that the
“records of the U.S. Attorney's Office of the
Southern District of New York” indicate that the grand
jury that returned the May 3, 2013 indictment “was
empaneled on or about September 22, 2011, for an 18-month
term and that its term was extended for three additional
six-month terms, for a total term of 36 months.”
On July
7, 2017, Abakporo directed a FOIA request to EOUSA,
requesting (1) the dates on which the grand jury's term
was extended from September 22, 2011, to May 2, 2013, and (2)
any court orders effectuating those extensions, ECF No. 22-1
at 6. His request was motivated, apparently, by his belief
that the grand jury term was not properly extended. ECF No. 1
¶ 14. On August 11, 2017, EOUSA denied his request. ECF
No. 1-1 at 1. In a letter to Abakporo, EOUSA informed him
that “[g]rand jury material is exempt from mandatory
release pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3), which exempts
from release ‘matters specifically exempted from
disclosure by statute.'” ECF No. 1-1 at 1. For that
reason, EOUSA asserted, because “Rule 6(e) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure . . . provides that grand
jury proceedings shall be secret, disclosure of grand jury
information is prohibited by law.” ECF No. 1-1 at 1.
Abakporo appealed this determination, but it was denied for
the same reasons. ECF No. 1-1 at 3-7. On April 5, 2018, he
filed this lawsuit, alleging that EOUSA wrongfully withheld
the records at issue from him. ECF No. 1. The parties have
each moved for summary judgment. ECF Nos. 12, 17. The sole
question on which their motions turn is whether EOUSA has met
its burden of proving that the records requested by Abakporo
are properly subject to FOIA's Exemption 3.
II.
Legal Standard
“Summary
judgment is appropriately granted when, viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the non-movants and drawing
all reasonable inferences accordingly, no reasonable jury
could reach a verdict in their favor.” Lopez v.
Council on Am.-Islamic Relations Action Network, Inc.,
826 F.3d 492, 496 (D.C. Cir. 2016). “The evidence
presented must show ‘that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.'” Id.
(quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a)). “In the FOIA context, a
district court reviewing a motion for summary judgment
conducts a de novo review of the record, and the responding
federal agency bears the burden of proving that it has
complied with its obligations under the FOIA.”
MacLeod v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., No.
15-cv-1792 (KBJ), 2017 WL 4220398, at *6 (D.D.C. Sept. 21,
2017) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B)). “[T]he
vast majority of FOIA cases can be resolved on summary
judgment.” Brayton v. Office of the U.S. Trade
Rep., 641 F.3d 521, 527 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
If the
agency has invoked any of FOIA's exemptions, “[t]he
burden is on the agency to justify withholding the requested
documents.” EPIC v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland
Sec., 777 F.3d 518, 522 (D.C. Cir. 2015). “Summary
judgment is warranted on the basis of agency affidavits when
the affidavits describe the justifications for nondisclosure
with reasonably specific detail, demonstrate that the
information withheld logically falls within the claimed
exemption, and are not controverted by either contrary
evidence in the record nor by evidence of agency bad
faith.” Larson v. Dep't of State, 565 F.3d
857, 862 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Miller v. Casey,
730 F.2d 773, 776 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). The agency cannot rely
on “conclusory and generalized allegations of
exemptions.” Morley v. CIA, 508 F.3d 1108,
1115 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting Founding Church of
Scientology of Wash., D.C., Inc. v. Nat'l Sec.
Agency, 610 F.2d 824, 830 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).
III.
Analysis
Exemption
3 covers records that are “specifically exempted from
disclosure by statute” if that statute “requires
that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner
as to leave no discretion on the issue” or
“establishes particular criteria for withholding or
refers to particular types of matters to be withheld.”
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3). To successfully invoke this
exemption, EOUSA “need only show that the statute
claimed is one of exemption as contemplated by Exemption 3
and that the withheld material falls within the
statute.” Larson, 565 F.3d at 865 (citation
omitted).
EOUSA
asserts this exemption based on Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 6(e), which bars the disclosure of matters
occurring before a grand jury. See Fed. R. Crim. P.
6(e)(2)(B). Because Congress affirmatively enacted it, Rule
6(e) is recognized as a “statute” for Exemption 3
purposes. See Fund for Constitutional Gov't v.
Nat'l Archives & Records Serv., 656 F.2d 856,
867 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Rule 6(e) does not prevent disclosure
of all information related to a grand jury; the relevant test
is whether disclosure “tend[s] to reveal some secret
aspect of the grand jury's investigation, [such as] the
identities of witnesses or jurors, the substance of
testimony, the strategy or direction of the investigation,
the deliberations or questions of jurors, and the
like.” Lopez v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 393
F.3d 1345, 1349 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Abakporo
is entitled to summary judgment because EOUSA has not
demonstrated that the dates the grand jury's term was
extended, or any court orders authorizing those extensions,
“tend to reveal some secret aspect of the grand
jury's investigation” so that they are covered by
Exemption 3. Id.
First,
there is no self-evident reason why this would be so. The
records and information at issue appear to concern the grand
jury's administrative procedures, as opposed to the
substance of any specific investigation. As a result, it is
hard to see how those materials would tend to reveal
information such as “the identities of witnesses or
jurors, the substance of testimony, the strategy or direction
of the investigation, [or] the deliberations or questions of
jurors.” Id. This is all the more so because
the government has already disclosed that the relevant grand
jury was “empaneled on or about September 22, 2011, for
an 18-month term and that its term was extended for three
additional six-month terms, for a total term of 36
months.” See ECF No. 22-1 at 2 n.2. The
specific dates the grand jury's term was extended, and
any related court orders doing so, would appear to reveal
little beyond that already-public information.
Second,
the declaration submitted by EOUSA in support of its
invocation of Exemption 3 offers no explanation as to how
these dates, or the orders reflecting them, would tend to
reveal a secret aspect of the grand jury's
investigation.[4] The declaration simply asserts, in a
conclusory and generalized manner, that “releasing
[the] information . . . would run the risk of piercing [the]
grand jury cloak of secrecy by revealing information
contemplated by the determining body.” ECF No. 17-1 at
4. The declaration does not describe how disclosing the
information at issue would pierce the cloak of secrecy, or
why doing so would reveal secret grand-jury information to
Abakporo. The declaration is thus of little help to EOUSA in
...