MEMORANDUM OPINION
REGGIE
B. WALTON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
The
plaintiff, Samuel Shipkovitz, proceeding pro se,
originally filed this civil action against the defendants,
Jeff Sessions, [1] in his official capacity as the Attorney
General of the United States Department of Justice (the
“Department”); Advanced Discovery, Inc.
(“Advanced Discovery”); Philip Carrillo
(“Carrillo”); June Burton (“Burton”);
and Kirkland & Ellis LLP (“Kirkland &
Ellis”), in the Superior Court of the District of
Columbia (“Superior Court”), alleging
“reverse racial discrimination, age discrimination,
national origin discrimination[, ] and religious
discrimination . . . [by] the defendants, ” as well as
“intentional business and contractual opportunities
interference by [ ] Carrillo and Advanced Discovery.”
Complaint (“Compl.”) ¶ 1. Currently before
the Court are (1) Defendant Advanced Discovery, Inc.'s
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint (“Advanced
Discovery's Mot. to Dismiss”); (2) the
Plaintiff's Motion to File First Amended Complaint[ ](If
Required) and Motion for Remand (the “Rule 15(a)(1)
Motion” or “Pl.'s 15(a)(1) Mot.”); (3)
the Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Revised First
Amended Complaint and Opposition to Motion for Remand (the
“Rule 15(a)(2) Motion” or “Pl.'s
15(a)(2) Mot.”); and (4) the Plaintiff's Request
for Status-As to Previously Filed Motion to Serve Defendant
Carrillo by Publication (the “Request for Status”
or “Pl.'s Req.”). Upon careful consideration
of the parties' submissions, [2] the Court concludes for the
reasons set forth below that it must deny the plaintiff's
request for an order instructing Advanced Discovery not to
file an answer or motion for summary judgment raised in the
context of his purported limited appearance, deny as moot the
plaintiff's request for leave to File the First Amended
Complaint raised in his Rule 15(a)(1) Motion, deny as moot
Advanced Discovery's motion to dismiss, hold in abeyance
the plaintiff's Rule 15(a)(2) Motion, and deny as moot
the plaintiff's Request for Status.
I.
BACKGROUND
The
plaintiff initiated this civil action against the defendants
in Superior Court on March 15, 2018. See Compl. at
1. The Department attempted to remove the case to this Court
on May 30, 2018. See Dep't's Not. at 1.
After being “informed by the [Department] that [the
Department's Notice] in [the] Superior Court was
rejected, ” Advanced Discovery's Not. ¶ 6,
Advanced Discovery filed its own Notice with this Court on
June 18, 2018, see id. ¶¶ 6-8. The
plaintiff then filed: (1) his Notice in this Court, stating
that “he had dismissed [the Attorney General] from his
[ ] Superior Court case” prior to Advanced
Discovery's removal of the case to this Court, Pl.'s
Not. at 1; and (2) a request for a limited appearance in this
Court to oppose removal, see Pl.'s Limited
Appearance at 1, and a request that “this Court order
Advanced Discovery to not file an [a]nswer nor [m]otion [f]or
[s]ummary [j]udgment until a further order of this Court,
” id. at 4. Construing the plaintiff's
Notice and request for a limited appearance together as a
motion for remand, on June 29, 2018, Advanced Discovery filed
an opposition to the plaintiff's motion for remand, as
well as a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). See Advanced Discovery's
Remand Opp'n at 1; Advanced Discovery's Mot. to
Dismiss at 1. Thereafter, on July 18, 2018, the plaintiff
filed a motion to amend his Complaint pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1) and to remand this case to
Superior Court. See Pl.'s 15(a)(1) Mot. at 1-2.
Then, on December 31, 2018, the plaintiff filed a second
motion to amend his Complaint, this time pursuant to Rule
15(a)(2). See Pl.'s 15(a)(2) Mot. at 2. As of
the date of this Memorandum Opinion, the only defendants
currently before the Court in this lawsuit are the Department
and Advanced Discovery.[3]
II.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A.
Motions to Remand
A
defendant may remove a civil case from a state court to the
federal district court embracing the place where such action
is pending when the district court has original jurisdiction.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2018). However,
“[b]ecause federal courts are courts of limited
jurisdiction, the removal statute is to be strictly
construed, ” Kopff v. World Research Grp.,
LLC, 298 F.Supp.2d 50, 54 (D.D.C. 2003), and
“[t]he party opposing a motion to remand bears the
burden of establishing that subject[-]matter jurisdiction
exists in federal court, ” Int'l Union of
Bricklayers & Allied Craftworkers v. Ins. Co. of the
W., 366 F.Supp.2d 33, 36 (D.D.C. 2005) (Walton, J.). As
the District of Columbia Circuit has explained, “[w]hen
it appears that a district court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over a case that has been removed from a state
court, the district court must remand the case . . . .”
Republic of Venezuela v. Philip Morris, Inc., 287
F.3d 192, 196 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citing 28 U.S.C. §
1447(c)); see Int'l Union of Bricklayers, 366
F.Supp.2d at 36 (“[T]he court must resolve any
ambiguities concerning the propriety of removal in favor of
remand.” (quoting Johnson-Brown v. 2200 M. St.,
LLC, 257 F.Supp.2d 175, 177 (D.D.C. 2003))).
B.
Motions to Amend
Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1) provides that
[a] party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course
within: (A) 21 days after serving it, or (B) if the pleading
is one to which a responsive pleading is required, 21 days
after service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after
service of a motion under 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is
earlier.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). “In all other cases, a party
may amend its pleading only with the opposing party's
written consent or the [C]ourt's leave.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). The Court should “freely give
leave” to a party to amend a pleading “when
justice so requires.” Id. Although the Court
has sole discretion to grant or deny leave to amend,
“[l]eave to amend a complaint should be freely given in
the absence of undue delay, bad faith, undue prejudice to the
opposing party, repeated failure to cure deficiencies, or
futility.” Richardson v. United States, 193
F.3d 545, 548-49 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citing Foman v.
Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). “The burden is
on the defendant to show that leave to file an amended
complaint should be denied.” Afram v. United Food
& Commercial Workers Unions & Participating
Emp'rs Health & Welfare Fund, 958 F.Supp.2d 275,
278 (D.D.C. 2013).
III.
ANALYSIS
A.
The Plaintiff's Motion to Remand
The
plaintiff requests in his Notice that the Court remand this
case to Superior Court, that he be permitted to participate
in the proceeding before the Court through a limited
appearance, and that he be permitted to amend his Complaint
pursuant to Rule 15(a)(1). See Pl.'s Not. at 1;
Pl.'s Limited Appearance at 1; Pl.'s 15(a)(1) Mot. at
1. Due to the plaintiff's pro se status, the
Court construes the plaintiff's Notice, his request for a
limited appearance, and his Rule 15(a)(1) Motion collectively
as his motion for remand. See Long v. Safeway, Inc.,
842 F.Supp.2d 141, 144 (D.D.C. 2012) (“A court must
construe pro se filings liberally and, absent any
indication of prejudice to the defendant, should read
‘all of the plaintiff's filings
together[.]'” (alteration in original) (quoting
Richard v. United States, 193 F.3d 545, 548 (D.C.
Cir. 1999))). The plaintiff first argues that the
Department's removal of the case was defective because
the Department did not provide a copy of its Notice to
Superior Court or to him. See Pl.'s 15(a)(1)
Mot. at 2. He also argues that Advanced Discovery's
removal of the case to this Court on June 18, 2018, was
improper because “he [ ] dismissed . . . [the] Attorney
General[] from his [ ] Superior Court case” prior to
the Department's and Advanced Discovery's attempts to
remove the case to this Court, Pl.'s Not. at 1, and the
Attorney General's presence in this case was “the
only federal basis [for] removal, ” id. at 3.
Advanced Discovery responds that the “[p]laintiff's
arguments overlook that Advanced Discovery, by its own
initiative, successfully removed the [ ] Superior Court
action to this Court on June 18, 2018 . . . [and] whatever
purported defects were contained in the [Department's]
Notice . . . do not alter Advanced Discovery's own
successful removal of the ...