OPINION AND ORDER
CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff
Carolina Young has sued Defendant Washington Metropolitan
Area Transit Authority (“WMATA”), alleging
retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Young,
proceeding pro se, filed her complaint in District
of Columbia Superior Court. WMATA removed the case to federal
court and moved to dismiss the complaint. Young has since
obtained counsel to represent her and now seeks leave to
amend her complaint. WMATA opposes that motion, contending
that any amendment would be futile and unable to survive a
renewed motion to dismiss. The Court disagrees. Because
Young's proposed Amended Complaint adequately states a
claim, the Court will permit her to file it.
I.
Background
Young
alleges the following facts in her proposed Amended
Complaint[1]: in April 2017, she joined Mott MacDonald,
a global management and engineering firm, as a Contract
Specialist. Proposed Amended Complaint, ECF No. 9-2
(“Am. Compl.”) ¶¶ 3, 9. Mott MacDonald
assigned her to work at WMATA. Id. ¶ 3. All her
work was dedicated to WMATA and conducted on WMATA premises,
using WMATA equipment. Id. ¶ 11. WMATA approved
her leave, set her schedule, oversaw her timesheets, trained
her, assigned her work, and supervised that work. She had a
WMATA supervisor and a Mott MacDonald supervisor.
Id. ¶¶ 11-12.
Young,
who is Hispanic, id. ¶ 3, further alleges that
a WMATA co-worker “cornered and blocked” her and
said “that he was ‘glad President Trump [was]
letting the Hispanic people of Puerto Rico die, '”
calling them “‘nothing but vermin sucking up the
government teat.'” Id. ¶ 16. The
co-worker told her “that he was a 6'2” white
man, and [could] do whatever he wanted.” Id.
He indicated his view that “the Neo-Nazi and White
Supremacist[] incident that happened in Charlottesville, VA,
was justifiable and praised President Trump's handling of
the incident.” Id. In January 2018, Young
reported this incident and others she perceived as
discriminatory to Mott MacDonald, which in turn reported them
to WMATA. Id. ¶ 18. WMATA investigated her
complaint and concluded that its anti-harassment policies had
not been violated. Id. ¶ 19. During the
investigation, WMATA shared details about Young's
complaint with parties that Young says did not need to know
about it, who then questioned her. Id. ¶ 20.
In June
2018, Young was reassigned within WMATA as a “Contract
Administrator” in the Procurement and Supplies Office
under the supervision of Judy Ann Davis. Id. ¶
21. At their first meeting, Davis was “hostile and
confrontational.” Id. ¶ 22. She said
Young had a reputation for being “trouble” and
that several employees had complained about Young's
“defensiveness.” Id. Young alleges that
Davis's demeanor and comments stemmed from her complaints
because Davis knew about them and there was no other basis
for any negative reputation. Id. ¶¶ 22-24.
In mid-July, Young reported to both WMATA and Mott MacDonald
that Davis was retaliating against her for her previous
discrimination claims. Id. ¶ 25. She also met
with an equal employment opportunity official from
WMATA's Office of Civil Rights and filed an internal
complaint. Id. ¶ 28.
On
August 1, WMATA terminated Young, and she was escorted out of
the building. Id. ¶ 29. The same day, Mott
MacDonald terminated her; she was told WMATA no longer needed
her services and there were no other openings at Mott
MacDonald. Id. ¶ 30. A WMATA employee told
another Mott MacDonald employee who had been assigned to the
same contract as Young to reapply for the position through
the Sparks Group, a staffing agency. Id. ¶ 31.
No. one gave Young that information. Id. In October
2018, a recruiter from the Sparks Group contacted Young to
inform her of a job opening at WMATA for a “Senior
Contract Administrator” in the Procurement and Supplies
Office, supporting Davis. Id. ¶¶ 35-36.
According to Young, the position was nearly identical to the
one she held prior to her termination. Id. ¶
35. The Sparks Group submitted Young's resume to WMATA
but never heard back. Id. ¶ 37.
II.
Legal Standard
Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) gives courts discretion whether
to grant leave to amend a complaint. Fed. Rule Civ. P. 15(a).
“Leave to amend a complaint should be freely given in
the absence of undue delay, bad faith, undue prejudice to the
opposing party, repeated failures to cure deficiencies, or
futility.” Richardson v. United States, 193
F.3d 545, 548-49 (D.C. Cir. 1999). A proposed amended
complaint is futile if it would not survive a motion to
dismiss. When assessing whether a proposed amended complaint
would survive a motion to dismiss, courts apply the same
standards as they would to review such motion. See In
re Interbank Funding Corp. Sec. Litig., 629
F.3d 213, 215-16 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). The
party opposing amendment bears the burden of showing why
leave to file an amended pleading should not be granted.
Smith v. Café Asia, 598 F.Supp.2d 45, 48
(D.D.C. 2009).
III.
Analysis
Here,
WMATA contends that Young's proposed amendment is futile
because it fails to state a claim for relief and is thus
susceptible to a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Def.'s Opp'n
to Mot. Leave to File Am. Compl. (“Opp'n”),
at 1-2. WMATA identifies two perceived shortcomings in the
proposed Amended Complaint: (1) a failure to engage in
statutorily protected activity against which Title VII
outlaws retaliation and (2) a failure to allege that WMATA
was Young's employer. The Court will consider each point
in turn.
A.
Retaliation Claims
WMATA
contends Young's retaliation claim is not viable because
she has not alleged that she engaged in statutorily protected
activity. Opp'n at 2-8. “To prove unlawful
retaliation, a plaintiff must show: (1) that [s]he opposed a
practice made unlawful by Title VII; (2) that the employer
took a materially adverse action against [her]; and (3) that
the employer took the action ‘because' the employee
opposed the practice.” Harris v. District of
Columbia Water & Sewer Auth., 791 F.3d 65, 68 (D.C.
Cir. 2015) (quoting McGrath v. Clinton, 666 F.3d
1377, 1379-80 (D.C. Cir. 2012)).
WMATA
insists that Young's allegations do not suffice because
the incidents she reported do not constitute discrimination
in violation of Title VII. But its briefing focuses not on
Young's retaliation claim, but on a
discrimination claim she does not make
here.[2] Whether or not the interactions Young
reported would suffice to constitute discrimination under
Title VII is not relevant here. The D.C. Circuit has
interpreted Title VII's anti-retaliation provision as
“extending to a practice that the employee reasonably
and in good faith believed was unlawful under the
statute.” McGrath, 666 F.3d at 1380 (emphasis
in original). In other words, Young's “retaliation
claim does not rise or fall on the success of her underlying,
good-faith discrimination claim, ” Nurriddin v.
Bolden, 818 F.3d 751, 757 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 2016), but
rather depends on whether Young reasonably and honestly
thought she was opposing illegal discrimination. The facts
she alleges here clear that bar: she reported an interaction
in which a co-worker referred to Hispanic people as
“vermin, ” ...