MEMORANDUM OPINION
Ketanji Brown Jackson United States District Judge.
As a
longtime resident of the District of Columbia, plaintiff
Willie Jackson has seen new construction projects transform
District neighborhoods. One such project hit particularly
close to home on March 15, 2015, when Defendants 2800 Sherman
Avenue, LLC (“2800 Sherman”) and Capital City
Real Estate, LLC (“Capital City”) (collectively,
“the Private Defendants”) began constructing on a
new multi-unit residential building next door to
Jackson's house. (See Am. Compl., ECF No. 6,
¶ 11.) Jackson claims that over the next three years,
the Private Defendants' employees engaged in tortious
conduct against him and his property, and that they joined
together with Defendants Mayor Muriel Bowser and the District
of Columbia (collectively, “the Public
Defendants”) in a collective and concerted effort to
displace longtime African-American and poor District
residents and replace them with younger, more affluent, white
residents. Jackson brings this lawsuit alleging that
Defendants' conduct violated his constitutional rights
and the common law.
Before
this Court at present are three motions that the parties
filed in this matter: the Private Defendants' motion to
dismiss Jackson's amended complaint for failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (see Priv. Defs.'
Mot. to Dismiss Am. Compl. for Failure to State A Claim Upon
Which Relief May Be Granted (“Priv. Defs.'
Mot.”), ECF No. 7); the Public Defendants' motion
to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) and motion for partial summary
judgment (see Pub. Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss
Pl.'s Am. Compl. & Mot. for Partial Summ. J.
(“Pub. Defs.' Mot.”), ECF No. 8); and
Jackson's motion for summary judgment (see
Pl.'s Mot. for Summ. J. (“Pl.'s Mot.”),
ECF No. 18). On March 29, 2019, this Court issued an Order
that GRANTED both the Private
Defendants' and the Public Defendants' motions to
dismiss (thereby dismissing Jackson's lawsuit), and
DENIED Jackson's motion for summary
judgment as moot. (See Order, ECF No. 24.) This
Memorandum Opinion explains the reasons for that Order. In
short, the Court concluded that Jackson's amended
complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to support a
plausible claim that Defendants violated his constitutional
rights, and given the insufficiency of Jackson's federal
claim, the Court further declined to exercise pendent
jurisdiction over Jackson's state common law claims.
I.
BACKGROUND
A.
Basic Facts[1]
Jackson
has owned his home in Washington, D.C., for almost thirty
years. (See Am. Compl. ¶ 26.) On or about March
25, 2015, Defendant Capital City began construction on a
“multi-unit, multi-level residential apartment and
condominium” building that Defendant 2800 Sherman
owned, and that happened to be located next door to
Jackson's home. (Id. at ¶ 1; see also
Id. ¶ 11.) According to Jackson's complaint,
defendants District of Columbia and Mayor Bowser caused 2800
Sherman and Capital City to construct the building, at least
in part, because Bowser and the District “created,
established, authorized and condoned the custom and practice
of economically revitalizing the city.” (Id.
¶ 2.) Indeed, Jackson alleges that “[e]very
project by every investor is completed with the encouragement
and support and authorization of the District of
Columbia[.]” (Id. ¶ 7.) The amended
complaint is unclear as to the scope and contours of the
alleged District policy of economic revitalization, but it
asserts that the policy originated as early as 1992. (See
Id. ¶ 3.)
According
to the amended complaint, throughout the three-year period
during which construction took place next to Jackson's
home, Capital City employees trespassed on Jackson's
property; urinated on his land; pulled a no-trespassing sign
from his property, broke it, and threw it at him; and called
Jackson a racist. (See Id. ¶ 5.) Capital City
also allegedly used a crane to airlift materials over
Jackson's property and over the heads of Jackson and a
guest “without safety precautions and without proper
city permits” (id.), and otherwise
“failed to take adequate and safe precautions prior to
conducting demolitions on [2800 Sherman's] property
thereby causing severe damages to [Jackson's]
house” (id. ¶ 8). The construction also
allegedly “altered property boundaries thereby
decreasing the amount of [Jackson's] property.”
(Id. ¶ 9.) Furthermore, according to the
amended complaint, 2800 Sherman and Capital City would not
have committed these violations “without the implied
authority, or reasonable belief or expectation that they were
acting with the consent and acquiescence of the Mayor on
behalf of the District of Columbia.” (Id.
¶ 6.)
Jackson's
amended complaint further alleges that, through the
District's economic revitalization policy, the Mayor and
the District “ha[ve] condoned, established and engaged
in a systematic pattern, custom and practice of affording low
income, minorities and seniors inadequate protection and in
many case no protection from being displaced from their homes
and lifetime neighborhoods.” (Id. ¶ 2.)
Specifically, “[t]he poor, minority and low-income home
owners and seniors are being forced to relocate and abandon
their lifetime homes and neighborhoods in favor of the
younger and economic[ally] affluent white middle and upper
class.” (Id.; see also id. (asserting
that “[b]uilders and contractors, with city support and
with the blessings of the Mayor of the District of Columbia[,
] swiftly move into city neighborhoods and move out the
existing residents by destroying adjacent property and
offering little or nothing for repairs . . . result[ing] [in]
a building that none of these residents can afford, thus
transforming the city of Washington[, ] D.C.[, ] into an
elite and white owned paradise”)). To bolster this
contention, the amended complaint includes various data about
median income levels for different racial groups in the
District, as well as allegations about the difficulties of
affording housing in the city. (See Id. ¶ 3.)
The amended complaint further maintains that all of the
alleged “unauthorized acts were a joint
enterprise” between 2800 Sherman and Capital City, on
the one hand, and Mayor Bowser and the District, on the
other. (Id. ¶ 25.)
B.
Procedural History
Jackson
initiated the instant lawsuit on June 11, 2018. (See
Compl., ECF No. 1.) On July 28, 2018, Jackson filed the
operative six-count amended complaint (see Am.
Compl.), and both the Private Defendants (2800 Sherman and
Capital City) and the Public Defendants (Mayor Bowser and the
District) responded with motions to dismiss, on August 8,
2018, and August 13, 2018, respectively (see ECF
Nos. 4, 5).
The
first count of Jackson's first amended complaint alleges
that Defendants have violated Jackson's civil rights
under the United States Constitution. In this regard, Jackson
specifically invokes “28 U.S.C. 1983, ”
“Equal Protection[, ]” and the “Fifth
Amendment[.]” (Id. at 12; see also
Id. ¶¶ 29-37 (Count I).)[2] Elsewhere in his
complaint, Jackson references sections 1985 and 1986 of Title
42, as well as the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments. (See Id. ¶ 12.) Counts
II through VI of Jackson's complaint allege that both
sets of Defendants have committed various common law tort
violations that have injured him. Specifically, Jackson
accuses Defendants of trespass (see Id. ¶¶
38-42 (Count II)); invasion of privacy (see Id.
¶¶ 43- 45 (Count III)); negligent supervision of
their employees (see Id. ¶¶ 46-49 (Count
IV)); negligence (see Id. ¶¶ 50-56 (Count
V)); and intentional infliction of emotional distress
(see Id. ¶¶ 57-62 (Count VI)). To remedy
all of the alleged violations, Jackson seeks monetary
damages, punitive damages, and unspecified injunctive and
equitable relief. (See Id. at 21.)
On
August 8, 2018, the Private Defendants filed a motion to
dismiss Jackson's amended complaint (see Priv.
Defs.' Mot.), and on August 13, 2018, the Public
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss and for partial summary
judgment (see Pub. Defs.' Mot.). In their motion
to dismiss, the Private Defendants argue that they “are
not state actors and [thus] cannot be held liable for
constitutional violations” under Section 1983. (Priv.
Defs.' Mem. in Supp. of Priv. Defs.' Mot.
(“Priv. Defs.' Mem.”), ECF No. 7-1, at 4;
see also Id. at 4-5.) They further argue that
Jackson's amended complaint fails to provide
“sufficient detail as to place the defendants on notice
of his [common law] claims.” (Id. at 5;
see also Id. at 5-6.) The Private Defendants also
contend that “the complaint does not set forth facts
sufficient to establish the sort of extreme or outrageous
conduct needed to support a claim for intentional infliction
[of emotional distress].” (Id. at 7; see
also Id. at 7-8.)
In
their motion to dismiss and for partial summary judgment, the
Public Defendants argue, first, that the claims against Mayor
Bowser should be dismissed as duplicative of the claims
against the District. (See Pub. Defs.' Mot. at
7.) In addition, they contend that Jackson's amended
complaint fails to state a Section 1983 claim against the
District for several reasons: (1) because “the
Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to the District”
(id. at 8); (2) because the amended complaint fails
to allege any facts to support a claim that the District
violated Jackson's First, Fourth, or Eight Amendment
rights (see Id. at 8-9); and (3) because not only
does the amended complaint fail to allege “with any
specifics the date of District misconduct which gives rise to
its liability in this case or more specifically what polices
caused [Jackson's] injuries” (id. at 11
(emphasis omitted), but it is also “devoid of any facts
showing that the District or its employees participated in
any part of the constructions events that allegedly caused
[Jackson's] injuries” (id. at 11-12).
With
respect to Jackson's common law claims, the Public
Defendants insist that “the alleged misconduct was
committed by employees of Defendant Capital City, not
District employees[, ]” and that Jackson “has not
alleged the existence of any employer-employee relationship
between the District and the Defendant Capital City's
employees” and “has not alleged that Defendant
Capital City was an independent contractor of the
District.” (Id. at 12.) The Public Defendants
further argue that to the extent Jackson's common law
claims stem from conduct occurring between March 25, 2015,
and June 11, 2015, they are barred by the statute of
limitations and are subject to dismissal on this basis alone.
(See Id. at 13.) The Public Defendants finally argue
that the Court should enter judgment in favor of the District
on Jackson's common law claims because the doctrine of
sovereign immunity bars Jackson's negligent supervision
claims against the District (see Id. at 13-14); the
public duty doctrine bars Jackson's negligence claims
(see Id. at 15-16); and section 12-309 of the D.C.
Code, which contains mandatory notification requirements,
bars all of Jackson's common law claims in light of his
failure to provide adequate notice to the District (see
Id. at 16-18).
Jackson's
responses to the arguments of the Private Defendants and the
Public Defendants vary. As relevant here, Jackson asserts
that the Private Defendants can and should be held liable
under Section 1983 because they “partnered and
cooperated with the District of Columbia and were the moving
force behind the unconstitutional custom and policy of the
Government of the District of Columbia and became the implied
agent of the Government and had the Government's actual
or apparent authority and consent[.]” (Pl.'s
Opp'n to Priv. Defs.' Mot. (“Pl.'s Priv.
Opp'n”), ECF No. 13, at 11.) Moreover, Jackson
contends that the Private Defendants' common law notice
arguments are “disingenu[ous] and lack merit,
especially since the defendants are either aware or in
possession [of] and in some instances, have almost exclusive
access to the very information they purportedly seek to
obtain.” (Id. at 9.)
In
response to the Public Defendants' myriad contentions,
Jackson argues that the claims against Mayor Bowser are not
duplicative of those against the District because the Mayor
“represents the municipal corporation of the District
of Columbia[, ]” and she is able to act in ways that a
“fictitious person” cannot. (Pl.'s Opp'n
to Pub. Defs.' Mot. (“Pl.'s Pub.
Opp'n”), ECF No. 9, at 3.) Jackson also maintains
that the amended complaint states a viable Section 1983 claim
because the Fifth Amendment applies to the District (see
id.), and “[t]he First[, ] Fourth[, ] and Eighth
Amendments are Constitutional infringements suffered by the
Plaintiff, and others similarly situated, because of the
execution of the city's wide spread and pervasive
‘custom' and policy.” (Id.) Jackson
further maintains that the defendants had an
“intertwining and interlocking relationship”
resulting in their “engag[ing] in an enterprise having
its express purpose to deprive the Plaintiff and others
similarly situated of their homes and liberty or freedom to
remain in their life time homes and neighborhoods by engaging
in an unorthodox activity of eminent domain.”
(Id. at 8.) And Jackson insists that he
“brings this action based on constitutional
deprivations pursuant to governmental ‘custom' and
‘policy' and ‘practice' even though it
has not received formal approval through the body's
official decision making channels.” (Id. at
10.) Finally, in defense of his common law claims, Jackson
argues that the statute of limitations does not apply, and
that he “complied with the six-month requirement of
D.C. Code 12-309 because the Defendant[s'] acts [are]
continuous and ongoing” (id. at 11) and
because he has personally “complained to the
District's Metropolitan Police Department on numerous
occasions.” (Id.)[3]
After
the parties fully briefed these motions, Jackson filed his
own motion for summary judgment (see Pl.'s
Mot.), which appears to reiterate arguments from the amended
complaint and Jackson's oppositions to Defendants'
motions to dismiss. (See, e.g., Mem. in Supp. of
Pl.'s Mot., ECF No. 18-2, at 6-7 (“[Jackson]
contends that because of the intertwining and interlocking
relationship between the Defendants that Defendants actively
engage in an enterprise having as its express purpose to
unconstitutionally deprive [Jackson] and others similarly
situated of their homes and liberty or freedom to remain in
their life time homes and neighborhoods by engaging in an
unorthodox activity of eminent
domain.”).)[4] Jackson's summary judgment motion
became ripe on January 2, 2019.
II.
APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARD
A.
Motions To Dismiss ...