MEMORANDUM OPINION
Colleen Kollar-Kotelly, United States District Judge.
Currently
pending before the Court is Defendants' [47] Motion to
Sever and Transfer Venue. Upon consideration of the briefing,
[1] the
relevant authorities, and the record as a whole, that motion
is DENIED. In an exercise of its discretion,
the Court decides not to sever the claims in this case into
three separate cases. The Court also decides that the
interests of justice do not warrant transfer of the unsevered
case to a different forum.
This
case concerns immigrants' access to counsel in three
separate detention facilities. To briefly summarize
Defendants' two-pronged motion, they first ask to sever
the claims in the [57] First Amended Complaint into three
separate cases corresponding to the respective
facilities.[2] Then Defendants would have the Court
transfer the respective cases as follows: the case involving
LaSalle Detention Facility, in Jena, Louisiana, to the
Western District of Louisiana; that regarding Irwin County
Detention Center in Ocilla, Georgia, to the Middle District
of Georgia, Valdosta Division; and that concerning Stewart
Detention Facility in Lumpkin, Georgia, to the Middle
District of Georgia, Columbus Division. The main reason that
Plaintiffs oppose the severance and transfer is their
insistence that this case is about Defendants'
administration of detention policies-in particular, the
Performance Based National Detention Standards
(“PBNDS”)-that apply to all three facilities.
Those Defendants are predominantly located in this
jurisdiction.
The
Court's discretion to sever claims into separate lawsuits
springs from Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21, which
permits severance of “any claim against a party.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 21; see also M.M.M. on behalf of J.M.A. v.
Sessions, 319 F.Supp.3d 290, 295 (D.D.C. 2018).
“In making this determination, courts consider multiple
factors, including: (1) whether the claims arise out of the
same transaction or occurrence; (2) whether the claims
present common questions of law or fact; (3) concerns related
to judicial economy, multiplicity of litigation, and orderly
and efficient resolution of disputes; (4) the availability of
witnesses and other evidentiary proof; and (5) the potential
for confusion, undue delay, or prejudice to any party.”
M.M.M. on behalf of J.M.A., 319 F.Supp.3d at 295
(citations omitted).[3]
In an
exercise of its discretion, the Court finds that the claims
in this case should not be severed. Immigrants'
difficulties accessing counsel at all three facilities
allegedly stem from Defendants' administration of
national standards, such as the PBNDS. See, e.g.,
1st Am. Compl., ECF No. 57, ¶ 210 (“Defendants
direct, manage and control the U.S. immigrant detention
system and the conditions of confinement therein, including
at LaSalle, Irwin, and Stewart.”); id. ¶
240 (“Defendants' PBNDS are the primary mechanism
through which they execute their duty to ensure
constitutional access to counsel for the thousands of
detained immigrants across the United States.”).
Resolution of the legal and factual issues in this case-even
conditions that may differ from one facility to another-
would seem to turn on those national standards and
Defendants' enforcement of them. Moreover, splitting the
claims into separate cases would unnecessarily multiply
litigation; the gravamen is not the practices of the
different contractors running the three facilities, but
rather Defendants' responsibility for enforcing their own
standards.[4] From that perspective, a substantial
portion of the witnesses and other evidentiary proof are
likely common to, or interchangeable across, problems at each
of the facilities. And proceeding separately may hinder the
expeditious resolution of Plaintiff's concerns due to the
risk of inconsistent timelines and decisions across the
various courts.
Even
though the Court declines to sever the claims, the Court
could transfer the case as a whole. Requesting this in the
alternative, Defendants propose transfer to the Middle
District of Georgia, home to two of the three facilities at
issue. Defs.' Mem. at 18 n.8. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a), “a district court may transfer any
civil action to any other district . . . where it might have
been brought” “[f]or the convenience of parties
and witnesses, in the interest of justice.” The party
moving to transfer venue bears the burden of establishing
that convenience and the interests of justice weigh in favor
of transfer. See Int'l Bhd. of Painters & Allied
Trades Union v. Best Painting & Sandblasting Co.,
Inc., 621 F.Supp. 906, 907 (D.D.C. 1985). Section
1404(a) vests discretion in the district court to conduct an
“individualized, case-by-case” analysis of
whether transfer is appropriate. Stewart Org., Inc. v.
Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
Determining
whether transfer is appropriate pursuant to section 1404(a)
calls for a two-part inquiry. First, the Court must ask
whether the transferee forum is one where the action
“might have been brought” originally. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a). Second, the Court must consider whether
private and public interest factors weigh in favor of
transfer. E.g., Lentz v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 464 F.Supp.2d 35, 36-37 (D.D.C. 2006) (citation
omitted).
When,
as here, one or more defendants is a federal agency, or an
officer or employee thereof sued in his or her official
capacity, venue is generally permissible where
(A) a defendant in the action resides, (B) a substantial part
of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred,
or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the
action is situated, or (C) the plaintiff resides if no real
property is involved in the action.
28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1). Each of the Defendants in this
case is a federal agency, or an officer or employee thereof
sued in his or her official capacity. It is undisputed that
venue is available in this jurisdiction, where a number of
these Defendants reside.
As for
the proposed transferee forum, it appears that Plaintiff does
not reside in the Middle District of Georgia. See
Defs.' Mem. at 19 n.10. But there is some dispute as to
whether any of the Defendants can be considered a resident of
that district. See Defs.' Reply at 17 &
n.10; Pl.'s Sur-Reply at 11 n.7. It is little help to
move to the “substantial part” prong, as to which
the parties argue whether this case primarily concerns local
conditions at specific detention facilities or instead
high-level decision-making at headquarters and regional
command posts. The Court need not decide whether the case
could have been brought in the Middle District of Georgia,
because even if could have been, transfer would be
inappropriate for the reasons that follow.
In
considering whether to transfer an action, the Court
considers the following private interest factors:
(1) the plaintiffs' choice of forum, unless the balance
of convenience is strongly in favor of the defendants; (2)
the defendants' choice of forum; (3) whether the claim
arose elsewhere; (4) the convenience of the parties; (5) the
convenience of the witnesses of the plaintiff and defendant,
but only to the extent that the witnesses may actually be
unavailable for trial in one of the fora; and (6) the ease of
access to sources of proof.
Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Bosworth, 180 F.Supp.2d
124, 127 (D.D.C. 2001) (citation omitted). Plaintiff chose
this forum. And based on Plaintiff's theory of the case,
the balance of convenience does not overcome Plaintiff's
selection. Defendants prefer a forum where two of the
facilities that are but-for causes of this case are located.
Yet, it will be more convenient for the parties to proceed in
this jurisdiction than in the Middle District of Georgia
because this case focuses predominantly on Defendants'
policy and enforcement decisions at the national and regional
levels. Most of the evidence as to those issues is likely
found in this jurisdiction and other jurisdictions outside of
the Middle District of Georgia. While some witnesses as to
specific factual issues at the detention facilities may need
to travel from those facilities, there is no indication that
they “may actually be unavailable for [any]
trial” if it were to proceed in this jurisdiction. Some
evidence regarding detention conditions may reside at the
detention facilities, but that factor is not dispositive
where other sources-pertaining more aptly to policy and
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