MEMORANDUM OPINION
TANYA
S. CHUTKAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Plaintiff
Airiz Coleman Bey, proceeding pro se, brings this
suit alleging various injuries stemming from Deutsche Bank
National Trust Company's (“Deutsche Bank
NTC”) foreclosure of his mortgage note and the
subsequent sale of his home. Defendants Deutsche Bank NTC,
Elizabeth A. Ostermann, Judge Peter J. Kontos, Trumbull
County Assistant Prosecutor Lynn B. Griffith, III, Sheriff
Paul S. Monroe, Deputy Sheriff Dominic Massary, the office of
the Trumbull County Sheriff, Shapiro, Van Ess, Phillips &
Barragate, LLP (“SVPB”), Matthew Murtland, and
Christopher G. Phillips have moved to dismiss Plaintiff's
complaint in its entirety (ECF Nos. 5, 10, 18,
33)[1];
and Plaintiff has filed two opposition briefs (ECF Nos. 28
and 31).
For the
reasons stated below, the court will GRANT
Defendants' motions to dismiss.
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff,
an Ohio resident, owned property at 2710 Orchard Avenue S.E.,
in Warren, Ohio. (ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”) ¶ 1,
Ex. 1 at 5.) In December 2004, Plaintiff mortgaged his
property as security in exchange for a loan of $54, 000 from
New Century Mortgage Corporation. (Compl. Ex. 1 at 9.) From
the record, it appears that Plaintiff was notified by letter
dated April 6, 2015, that he had missed monthly mortgage
payments. (ECF No. 18-5 at 10-11.)
In
November 2015, New Century Liquidating Trust
Successor-in-Interest for New Century Mortgage Corporation,
represented by Carrington Mortgage Services, LLC, assigned
Plaintiff's mortgage to Deutsche Bank NTC. (Compl. Ex. 1
at 29.) The Assignment of Mortgage agreement was prepared by
SVPB and signed by Ostermann, as Vice President of Carrington
Mortgage Services. (Id.)
In
December 2015, Deutsche Bank NTC filed a complaint for
foreclosure against Plaintiff with the Trumbull County, Ohio
Court of Common Pleas. (Compl. ¶ 4, Ex. 1 at 5-8.)
Deutsche Bank NTC was represented by Murtland and Phillips of
SVPB. (Compl. Ex 1. at 8.) Judge Kontos presided over the
action and ultimately granted the foreclosure. (See
Compl. ¶ 8, Ex. 1 at 39, 43.) Subsequently, Trumbull
County Sheriff sold the property to Deutsche Bank NTC.
(See ECF No. 10 (“Def. Judge Peter J.
Kontos' MTD”) at 1; ECF No. 18-13 at 2.)
Following
the sale, Plaintiff brought this case seeking the return of
his home and $10, 000, 000 to compensate him for the
destruction of his property and video projects. (Compl.
¶ 9.)
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A
plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a factual basis
for the court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over
the defendants. Crane v. N.Y. Zoological Soc'y,
894 F.2d 454, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1990). To meet this burden, a
plaintiff must allege “specific acts connecting the
defendant[s] with the forum.” Second Amend. Found.
v. U.S. Conference of Mayors, 274 F.3d 521, 524 (D.C.
Cir. 2001) (alteration in original). In evaluating whether a
plaintiff has established personal jurisdiction, the court
“may receive and weigh affidavits and other relevant
matter[s] to assist in determining the jurisdictional
facts.” Bigelow v. Garrett, 299 F.Supp.3d 34,
41 (D.D.C. 2018) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
However, “when deciding personal jurisdiction without
an evidentiary hearing[, ] . . . the court must resolve
factual disputes in favor of the plaintiff.” Livnat
v. Palestinian Auth., 851 F.3d 45, 57 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
The
court is mindful that pro se pleadings must be
liberally construed, as they are held to “less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.” Budik v. Dartmouth- Hitchcock Med.
Ctr., 937 F.Supp.2d 5, 11 (D.D.C. 2013) (quoting
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Further, “[a]t the motion to
dismiss stage . . . pro se complaints[] are to be construed
with sufficient liberality to afford all possible inferences
favorable to the pleader on allegations of fact.”
Settles v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 429 F.3d 1098,
1106 (D.C. Cir. 2005). However, this liberal standard
“is not . . . a license to ignore the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.” Neuman v. United States, 70
F.Supp.3d 416, 422 (D.D.C. 2014) (quotation marks and
citations omitted).
III.
ANALYSIS
A court
can exercise two forms of personal jurisdiction over a
defendant: general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction.
General jurisdiction “permits a court to assert
jurisdiction over a defendant based on a forum connection
unrelated to the underlying suit, ” while specific
jurisdiction requires an “affiliation between the forum
and the underlying controversy.” Livnat, 851
F.3d at 56 (citation omitted). Courts in this district
determine whether general or specific jurisdiction may be
exercised by reference to District of Columbia law.
United States v. Ferrara, 54 F.3d 825, 828 (D.C.
Cir. 1995), amended (July 28, 1995). Then, they decide
whether exercise of jurisdiction comports with the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See GTE New
Media Servs. Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343,
1347 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“A court must first examine
whether jurisdiction is applicable under the state's
long-arm statute and then determine whether a finding of
jurisdiction satisfies the constitutional requirements of due
process.”).
Section
13-422 of the D.C. Code enables a District of Columbia court
to exercise general jurisdiction “over a person
domiciled in, organized under the laws of, or maintaining his
or its principal place of business in, the District of
Columbia as to any claim for relief.” D.C. Code §
13-422. If a corporate defendant is neither incorporated in
nor has its principal place of business in the District of
Columbia, the court may exercise general jurisdiction,
pursuant to Section 13-334(a) of the D.C. Code, if the
corporate defendant is “doing business in the
District.” D.C. Code § 13-334(a); see also FC
Inv. Grp. LC v. IFX Markets, Ltd., 529 F.3d 1087, 1091
n.5 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“Although section 13-334(a)
expressly addresses service of process, the D.C. Court of
...