United States District Court, District of Columbia
matter is before the Court on its initial review of
Plaintiffs pro se complaint and application for
leave to proceed in forma pauper is. The Court will
grant the in forma pauperis application and dismiss
the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3), failure to state a
claim, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), and
based on judicial immunity, see 28 U.S.C. §
se litigants must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Jarrell v. Tisch, 656 F.Supp. 237, 239
(D.D.C. 1987). A complaint "that is excessively long,
rambling, disjointed, incoherent, or full of irrelevant and
confusing material will patently fail [Rule 8(a)'s]
standard, and so will a complaint that contains an untidy
assortment of claims that are neither plainly nor concisely
stated, nor meaningfully distinguished from bold conclusions,
sharp harangues and personal comments." Jiggetts v.
D.C., 319 F.R.D. 408, 413 (D.D.C. 2017), aff'd
sub nom., Cooper v. D.C., No. 17-7021, 2017 WL 5664737
(D.C. Cir. Nov. 1, 2017). "[E]ven a pro se
complainant must plead 'factual matter' that permits
the court to infer 'more than the mere possibility of
misconduct.'" Atherton v. D.C. Office of the
Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681-82 (D.C Cir. 2009); see
also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009).
has filed a prolix complaint, consisting of 105 pages, in
which she attempts to bring myriad civil and criminal causes
of action. She sues three federal magistrate judges, a
federal bankruptcy judge, and the clerk of the court
(collectively "Judicial Defendants"), all of whom
are associated with the United States District Court for the
District of Arizona ("District of Arizona"). She
also sues two United States Marshals ("USMS
Defendants"), who are employed with the District of
Arizona. Additionally, she sues an individual, Roy R. Lustig
("Lustig"), who is a plaintiff in federal
bankruptcy matters brought against Stone in the United States
District Court for the District of Florida and the District
of Arizona. Lastly, she sues the U;S. Attorney General, the
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the U.S.
Inspector General, and the President of the United States
(collectively, "Government Defendants"). She
requests injunctive relief and monetary damages.
reading of the complaint reveals that the crux of all of
Plaintiffs claims is her profound disagreement with the
outcome of these legal proceedings in the District of
Arizona. In fact, Plaintiff already attempted to move this
Court to intervene in those matters to no avail. See
Stone v. Zipps, et al., No. 19-cv-1401 (UNA) (dismissed
May 16, 2019). Given that her prior matter was dismissed,
Plaintiff now attempts another bite at the apple by filing
the instant complaint and couching her claims under different
theories, though her disputes, named defendants, and issues
and claims, are largely the same. "The doctrine of
res judicata prevents repetitious litigation
involving the same causes of action or the same issues."
I.A.M. Nat'l Pension Fund v. Indus. Gear Mfg.
Co., 723 F.2d 944, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Drake v.
Fed. Aviation Admin., 291 F.3d 59, 66 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
(holding that parties are precluded from litigating claims
that "were or could have been raised in that
action.") (internal citation omitted). To the extent
that Plaintiff raises any viable new claims or issues, and
names new parties, this matter is nonetheless dismissed.
Court lacks jurisdiction to review the decisions of another
district court. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331,
1332 (general jurisdictional provisions); United States
v. Choi, 818 F.Supp.2d 79, 85 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing
Lewis v. Green, 629 F.Supp. 546, 553 (D.D.C. 1986));
Fleming v. United States, 847 F.Supp. 170, 172
(D.D.C. 1994), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 1150 (1995).
The claims against Lustig, the Judicial Defendants, and the
USMS Defendants are all predicated on their involvement in
filing, overseeing, and/or executing legal determinations in
another federal court. Aside from their involvement in that
litigation, and bald allegations of vast conspiracies, it is
unclear what facts, if any, are applicable to intended claims
against Lustig and USMS, and Plaintiff has dually failed to
state a claim against them.
the alleged actions of the Judicial Defendants all occurred
while they were acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial
capacity. Such actions are thus protected under the doctrine
of immunity. Judges are absolutely immune from suits for
"all actions taken in the judge's judicial capacity,
unless these actions are taken in the complete absence of all
jurisdiction." Sindram v. Suda, 986 F.2d 1459,
1460 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Caldwell v. Kagan, 865
F.Supp.2d 35, 42 (D.D.C. 2012) ("Judges have absolute
immunity for any actions taken in a judicial or
quasi-judicial capacity."). It is also well-settled that
clerks and other court officials are immune from suit for
actions done in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity.
See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978);
Wagshal v. Foster, 28 F.3d 1249, 1252 (D.C. Cir.
1994); Sindram, 986 F.2d at 1460; Hilska v.
Suter, 2008 WL 2596213 (D.D.C. 2008),
aff'd, 308 Fed.Appx. 451 (D.C. Cir. 2009). This
District has further explained that "RICO claims must be
denied if they simply constitute another way of attacking a
judge's rulings," and that judicial immunity
"applies where the RICO- the RICO-challenged acts are
judicial in nature." See, e.g., Thomas v.
Wilkins, 61 F.Supp.3d 13, 20 (D.D.C. 2014) (internal
citations omitted). An act does not become any less judicial
by virtue of an allegation of malice, corruption or
conspiracy. Id. Therefore, the Judicial Defendants
are immune from suit.
claims against the Government Defendants are based on her
discontent that they have failed to take criminal action
against some of these defendants. This Court has no authority
to compel the government to initiate a criminal investigation
or to prosecute a criminal case. See Shoshone-Bannock
Tribes v. Reno, 56 F.3d 1476, 1480 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(citations omitted); see also Cox v. Sec'y of
Labor, 739 F.Supp. 28, 30 (D.D.C. 1990) (citing cases).
The decision of whether or not to prosecute, and for what
offense, rests with the prosecution. See, e.g.,
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978).
"[I]n American jurisprudence at least, a private citizen
lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or
nonprosecution of another." Linda R.S. v. Richard
D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973); see also Sargeant v.
Dixon, 130 F.3d 1067, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Powell
v. Katzenbach, 359 F.2d 234, 234-35 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
(per curiam), cert, denied, 384 U.S. 906 (1966);
Sattler v. Johnson, 857 F.2d 224, 227 (4th Cir.
1988); Sibley v. Obama, 866 F.Supp.2d 17, 22 (D.D.C.
2012). Nor may Plaintiff compel a criminal investigation by
any law enforcement agency by filing a civil complaint.
See Otero v. U.S. Attorney General, 832 F.2d 141,
141-42 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam); see also Jafree v.
Barber, 689 F.2d 640, 643 (7th Cir. 1982). "[A]n
agency's decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether
through civil or criminal process, is a decision generally
committed to an agency's absolute discretion."
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985). For
these reasons, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against
the Government Defendants, and those claims shall also be
of these reasons, Plaintiffs complaint is subject to
dismissal. An Order consistent with this ...