MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
TIMOTHY J. KELLY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff
Louis Vuitton filed this lawsuit against Defendants, alleging
that they operated a large-scale counterfeiting business that
imported, sold, and distributed counterfeit goods bearing its
luxury brand trademarks. In the operative complaint,
Plaintiff brings seven causes of action against Defendant Xin
Feng Zhuang, including various claims under the Lanham Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a), 1125(c), and the common
law of the District of Columbia. Before the Court is
Zhuang's motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of
personal jurisdiction, improper venue, and failure to state a
claim under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2),
12(b)(3), and 12(b)(6), respectively. For the reasons
explained below, the Court will deny Zhuang's motion in
its entirety.
I.
Lack of Personal Jurisdiction
Zhuang
first argues that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over
him because he is a resident of Maryland, and he “does
not own any businesses, real property or pay taxes in the
District of Columbia.” ECF No. 23-1 at 3-4. “To
establish personal jurisdiction over a nonresident, a court
must engage in a two-part inquiry: A court must first examine
whether jurisdiction is applicable under the state's
long-arm statute and then determine whether a finding of
jurisdiction satisfies the constitutional requirements of due
process.” GTE New Media Servs. Inc. v. BellSouth
Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1347 (D.C. Cir. 2000). At the
motion to dismiss stage, the plaintiff need only make a
prima facie showing of the factual basis for
asserting personal jurisdiction over a defendant. See
Crane v. N.Y. Zoological Soc'y, 894 F.2d 454, 456
(D.C. Cir. 1990). The plaintiff can make that showing through
“arguments on the pleadings, ‘bolstered by such
affidavits and other written materials as [the plaintiff] can
otherwise obtain.'” Urban Inst. v. FINCON
Servs., 681 F.Supp.2d 41, 44 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting
Mwani v. bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2005)).
And the Court must resolve all “factual discrepancies
appearing in the record . . . in favor of the
plaintiff.” Crane, 894 F.2d at 456.
As
relevant here, the District of Columbia's long-arm
statute provides that “[a] District of Columbia court
may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts
directly or by an agent, as to a claim for relief arising
from the person's . . . transacting any business in the
District of Columbia.” D.C. Code § 13-423.
Plaintiff's operative complaint alleges that Zhuang and
the other Defendants ran a counterfeiting business at 1320-22
Fifth Street N.E. in the District of Columbia. See,
e.g., ECF No. 20 ¶¶ 7, 9, 12, 13, 28. Further,
Plaintiff's investigator asserts in a sworn declaration
that he bought counterfeit Louis Vuitton merchandise from
Zhuang at that location on two occasions. ECF No. 27-1
¶¶ 6-8, 10-12. These allegations plainly arise from
Zhuang's “transacting . . . business in the
District of Columbia, ” D.C. Code § 13-423, so his
alleged conduct falls within the long-arm statute.
To
satisfy the second step of the inquiry, the Court must
determine whether exercising personal jurisdiction would
comport with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Plaintiff's burden is to “show ‘minimum
contacts' between the defendant and the forum
establishing that ‘the maintenance of the suit does not
offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.'” GTE New Media, 199 F.3d at 1347
(quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310, 316 (1945)). This standard is met when “the
defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State
are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled
into court there.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
As
previously described, Plaintiff alleges that Zhuang helped
run a counterfeiting business in the District of Columbia,
and that its investigator bought counterfeit merchandise from
him in the District of Columbia. Thus, Plaintiff has easily
shown that Zhuang certainly ought to “anticipate being
haled into court” here. World-Wide Volkswagen,
444 U.S. at 297. For his part, Zhuang denies any involvement
in operating the counterfeiting business or in selling
counterfeit goods at its location. See ECF No. 23-3.
But at this stage, the Court must resolve factual disputes in
Plaintiffs favor. Crane, 894 F.2d at 456. The Court
will therefore deny Zhuang's motion to dismiss for lack
of personal jurisdiction because Plaintiff has made out the
requisite prima facie case.
II.
Improper Venue
Zhuang
also moves to dismiss the complaint for improper venue. ECF
No. 23-1 at 4. Under Rule 12(b)(3), a case may be dismissed
“when venue is ‘wrong' or
‘improper' in the forum in which it was
brought.” Atl. Marine Const. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct.
for the W. Dist. of Tex., 134 S.Ct. 568, 577 (2013). If
venue is improper, the case must either be dismissed or, if
it is “in the interest of justice, ” be
transferred to any district in which it could have been
brought. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). As relevant here, venue is
proper where “a substantial part of the events or
omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(b)(2).
In
evaluating a motion to dismiss for improper venue, the Court
“accepts the plaintiffs well-pled factual allegations
regarding venue as true, draws all reasonable inferences from
those allegations in the plaintiffs favor and resolves any
factual conflicts in the plaintiffs favor.” James
v. Verizon Servs. Corp., 639 F.Supp.2d 9, 11 (D.D.C.
2009). The Court may also consider material outside the
pleadings. Herbert v. Sebelius, 925 F.Supp.2d 13, 17
(D.D.C. 2013). “To prevail on a motion to dismiss for
improper venue, the defendant must present facts that will
defeat the plaintiffs assertion of venue.” Khalil
v. L-3 Commc 'ns Titan Grp., 656 F.Supp.2d 134, 135
(D.D.C. 2009) (quoting James, 639 F.Supp.2d at 11).
Still, the burden remains on the plaintiff to establish that
venue is proper. Williams v. GEICO Corp., 792
F.Supp.2d 58, 62 (D.D.C. 2011).
Zhuang
argues that “Plaintiff [has] failed to provide any
proof or allege any specific fact to support the claim
against Defendant Zhuang that a substantial part of the
actions giving rise to the claims in the Amended [Complaint]
occurred in this judicial district.” ECF No. 23-1 at 4.
This argument simply ignores the operative complaint. The
gist of that complaint, as already described, is that
Defendants operated a counterfeiting business at 1320-22
Fifth Street N.E., Washington, D.C., located in this judicial
district. See ECF No. 20 ¶¶ 7, 9, 12, 13,
28. Moreover, Plaintiffs investigator asserts that Zhuang
personally sold him counterfeit merchandise at that location
two times. See ECF No. 27-1. And although Zhuang has
denied doing so, see ECF No. 23-3, at this stage,
the Court must resolve factual conflicts in Plaintiffs favor.
Therefore, Plaintiff has carried its burden of showing that
venue is proper because “a substantial part of the
events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred”
in this judicial district. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). The
Court will thus deny Zhuang's motion to dismiss for
improper venue.
III.
Failure to State a Claim
Finally,
Zhuang moves to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a
claim. ECF No. 23-1 at 4-11. A court will deny a motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) when the “complaint . . .
contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Thus,
a plaintiff need not plead “detailed factual
allegations, ” but must specify more than “an
unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation.” Id. (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555). “In evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion, the Court must construe the complaint ‘in favor
of the plaintiff, who must be granted the benefit of all
inferences that can be derived from the facts
alleged.'” Hettinga v. United States, 677
F.3d 471, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting Schuler v. United
States, 617 F.2d 605, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).
Zhuang
argues that although Plaintiff's complaint alleges that
he is directly, contributorily, and vicariously liable for
trademark infringement, it fails to plead the
“elements” of those three types of liability. ECF
No. 23-1 at 5. But in fact, the complaint adequately alleges
facts supporting all those theories such that the Court may
“draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable” under them. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. As
for direct liability, the complaint alleges that Defendants,
including Zhuang, directly infringed on Plaintiff's
trademarks through their counterfeiting business. ECF No. 20
¶¶ 25-62. Specifically, the complaint alleges that
Zhuang “personally and knowingly” sold
counterfeit Louis Vuitton products there. Id. ¶
13. As for the other two theories, “[o]ne infringes
contributorily by intentionally inducing or encouraging
direct infringement . . . and infringes vicariously by
profiting from direct infringement while declining to
exercise a right to stop or limit it.”
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