United States District Court, District of Columbia
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
N. McFADDEN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
se Plaintiff Edward Johnson has filed several pleadings
outlining his claims against Local Lodge 1759 (“Local
Lodge”) and his former employer, Allied Aviation
Services (“Allied”). Even so, it is not easy to
discern his claims. Allied has moved to dismiss Mr.
Johnson's Complaint, and Local Lodge seeks judgment on
the pleadings. For the reasons stated below, the Court will
grant Local Lodge's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
and grant in part and deny in part Allied's Motion to
Court has afforded Mr. Johnson ample opportunity to outline
his claims against Allied and Local Lodge (collectively,
“the Defendants”). His original Complaint was too
vague and ambiguous for the Defendants to respond.
See ECF No. 1. So the Court granted the
Defendants' Motions for a More Definite Statement and
instructed Mr. Johnson to file an Amended Complaint. ECF No.
17. Mr. Johnson did so, but his Amended Complaint was still
difficult to interpret. See ECF No. 18. Local Lodge
filed an Answer, see ECF No. 19, while Allied moved
to dismiss, see ECF No. 20.
Court directed Mr. Johnson to respond to Allied's Motion
to Dismiss. See ECF No. 21. But rather than
addressing Allied's arguments, Mr. Johnson supplemented
his Amended Complaint again. ECF No. 22. Local Lodge then
moved for judgment on the pleadings, ECF No. 23, and the
Court warned Mr. Johnson he needed to respond, ECF No.
Rather than substantively responding, Mr. Johnson filed a
two-paragraph pleading styled as a “MOTION; Showing
Cause for Complaint, Complaint.” ECF No. 27.
Mr. Johnson's filings are far from clear, the Court is
mindful of its obligation to hold a pro se
litigant's pleadings to a less stringent standard than
what represented parties face. See Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). So the Court considers Mr.
Johnson's pleadings collectively and construes them
liberally. With that in mind, the following is the
Court's understanding of Mr. Johnson's factual
allegations and legal claims.
originally fired Mr. Johnson in March 2016, but in July 2016
he received an offer to return to work. ECF No. 22 at
After Mr. Johnson returned to work, he had various job
performance issues, including a truck accident. See
ECF No. 18 at 2. On June 20, 2017, he was
“resting” and “nodding” his head
during his lunch break. Id. at 2; ECF No. 22 at 2-3.
Allied's Director of Human Resources, Michael Baylor,
discovered Mr. Johnson and fired him for sleeping on the job.
ECF No. 22 at 2-3; ECF No. 22-1 at 2. Mr. Johnson, who is
Hispanic, maintains that his colleague, who is African
American, was asleep nearby, but Mr. Baylor took no action
against him. See ECF No. 22 at 2-3; ECF No. 22-1 at
Johnson appears to make three claims. First, he alleges that
Allied discriminated against him based on his race.
See ECF No. 22-1 at 2. Second, Mr. Johnson alleges
that Allied terminated him in retaliation for his filing a
complaint with the National Labor Relations Board
(“NLRB”) over his March 2016 termination.
See ECF No. 18 at 3; ECF No. 27 at 1. Finally, he
alleges that Allied violated the collective bargaining
agreement by terminating him without a union representative
present and acting outside the disciplinary action plan.
See ECF No. 1; ECF No. 18 at 3; ECF No. 27 at 1.
has moved to dismiss Mr. Johnson's Complaint under Rule
12(b)(6), ECF No. 20, and Local Lodge has moved for judgment
on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), ECF No. 23.
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim
for relief “plausible on its face.” Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A court must
treat the complaint's factual allegations as true,
“even if doubtful in fact.” Id. at 555.
But a court need not accept as true legal conclusions set
forth in a complaint. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009). In deciding a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), a
court may consider the facts alleged in the complaint,
documents attached to it as exhibits or incorporated by
reference, and matters about which the court may take
judicial notice. Abhe & Svoboda, Inc. v. Chao,
508 F.3d 1052, 1059 (D.C. Cir. 2007). A motion for judgment
on the pleadings “is functionally equivalent to a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.” Rollins v. Wackenhut
Servs., Inc., 703 F.3d 122, 130 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
Lodge is entitled to judgment on the pleadings. To survive a
motion for judgment on the pleadings, a complaint need only
provide sufficient facts, accepted as true to state a claim
for relief that is plausible on its face. See
Rollins, 703 F.3d at 130 (“Other circuits have
held that Iqbal and Twombly apply to Rule
12(c) . . . and we do likewise.”). But even accepting