MEMORANDUM OPINION
JAMES
E. BOASBERG, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff,
appearing pro se, is a federal prisoner incarcerated
at Fort Dix Federal Correctional Institution in New Jersey.
He has filed an application to proceed in forma
pauperis and a complaint under the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a. Plaintiff seeks correction of “the
inaccurate descriptions” in his presentence report
(“PSR”) prepared by the United States Probation
Office in the Middle District of North Carolina. Compl. at 7.
For the reasons explained below, the in forma
pauperis application will be granted and this case will
be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which
requires immediate dismissal of a prisoner's complaint
that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Plaintiff
has sued Chief U.S. Probation Officer Melissa A. Alexander,
Senior U.S. District Judge Norwood Carlton Tilley, Jr., and
the U.S. Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”). The complaint
stems from plaintiff's 1995 conviction in the U.S.
District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina and
resulting life sentence. See USA v. Harvey, No.
6:94-cr-00302-NCT-3 (M.D. N.C. Aug. 25, 1995) (Judgment).
Plaintiff “requests that this Court issue injunctive
relief” in the form of an order to the judicial
defendants to “verify” the alleged inaccurate
information in his PSR and “to take notice and to
amend” said information “to ensure that future
decisions affecting me are not based on discredited
information.” Compl. at 8. For the reasons explained
next, plaintiff states no claim against the defendants.
Regarding
Judge Tilley, this Court lacks jurisdiction to compel its
sister court to act. See United States v. Choi, 818
F.Supp.2d 79, 85 (D.D.C. 2011) (district courts
“generally lack[] appellate jurisdiction over other
judicial bodies, and cannot exercise appellate mandamus over
other courts.”) (citing Lewis v. Green, 629
F.Supp. 546, 553 (D.D.C. 1986)); accord Atchison v. U.S.
Dist. Courts, 240 F.Supp.3d 121, 126, n.6 (D.D.C. 2017)
(“It is a well-established principle that a district
court can neither review the decisions of its sister court
nor compel it to act.”). In addition, a complaint
against a federal judge who has “done nothing more than
[his] duty” constitutes “a meritless
action.” Fleming v. United States, 847 F.Supp.
170, 172 (D.D.C. 1994), aff'd, No. 94-5079, 1994
WL 474995 (D.C. Cir. July 27, 1994).
As for
Chief Probation Officer Alexander, the Privacy Act does not
apply to federal probation offices (staff included) because
they are “administrative units of the United States
courts, ” and federal courts “are not subject to
the Privacy Act.” Fuller-Avent v. U.S. Prob.
Office, 226 Fed. App'x 1, 2 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (per
curiam) (citations omitted). Therefore, plaintiff has no
viable claim against this defendant.
Finally,
“the Bureau of Prisons has [properly] exempted its
inmate record systems from the . . . accuracy and amendment
provisions” of the Privacy Act. Lane v. Fed. Bureau
of Prisons, 442 Fed. App'x 578 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (per
curiam) (citing Martinez v. Bureau of Prisons, 444
F.3d 620, 624 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (per curiam); White v.
United States Probation Office, 148 F.3d 1124, 1125
(D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam)). The Privacy Act authorizes
the head of an agency to exempt any system of records that is
“maintained by an agency or component thereof which
performs as its principal function any activity pertaining to
the enforcement of criminal laws, including . . .
correctional . . . authorities, and which consists of . . .
reports identifiable to an individual compiled at any stage
of the process of enforcement of the criminal laws . . .
through release from supervision.” 5 U.S.C. §
552a(j)(2). Pursuant to this authority, BOP has exempted
certain record systems from the Privacy Act, including the
Inmate Central Record System, Stanko v. Fed. Bureau of
Prisons, 842 F.Supp.2d 132, 140 (D.D.C. 2012), which
houses plaintiff's PSR, Jeter v. Fed. Bureau of
Prisons, 841 F.Supp.2d 214, 216 (D.D.C. 2012),
aff'd, No. 12-5285, 2013 WL 1733552 (D.C. Cir.
Mar. 22, 2013) (citing 28 C.F.R. § 16.97(a)(4)).
Consequently, the Privacy Act “afford[s] inmates and
former inmates no cause of action regarding such
records.”[1] Harrison v. Fed. Bureau of
Prisons, 248 F.Supp.3d 172, 181 (D.D.C. 2017) (citing
cases)).
For the
foregoing reasons, this case will be dismissed. A separate
order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
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Notes:
[1] Plaintiff cites Sellers v. Bureau
of Prisons, 959 F.2d 307 (D.C. Cir. 1992), for the
proposition that as part of maintaining accurate records, BOP
has a duty to verify information capable of being verified.
Compl. at 5. But “apparently the Sellers
directive . . . is no longer controlling . . . ‘as it
was decided before the Bureau of Prisons exempted the
relevant system of records from the accuracy provision.'
” Earle v. Holder, 815 F.Supp.2d 176, 183
(D.D.C. 2011), aff'd, No. 11-5280, 2012 WL
1450574 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 20, 2012) (quoting Lane,
2010 WL 288816) (other citation omitted)). In any event,
plaintiff alleges that a “BOP Case Manager”
indeed “contacted” the Probation Office “by
faxing the information” he had provided “but was
...