United States District Court, District of Columbia
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This
matter, filed pro se, is before the Court on
consideration of plaintiff s application to proceed in
forma pauperis [Dkt. # 2] and her "Amended
Complaint in the nature of a Bill in Equity as an Original
Suit" [Dkt. #3]. The application will be granted, and
this case will be dismissed as frivolous. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) (requiring dismissal of the
case "at any time" the court determines that it is
frivolous).
Plaintiff
is a resident of Hemet, California. Plaintiff has sued in
their personal capacities two federal judges in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Washington
and three United States Attorneys in Seattle, Washington. Am.
Compl. ¶ 11; see Compl. Caption. Plaintiffs
Amended Complaint, like the original pleading, is far from
clear. It is misleadingly captioned "United States of
America Ex Rel Eileen Ray Lawrence," and plaintiffs
reason for including the United States as "a
party," Am. Compl. ¶ 4, is seriously flawed. She
"brings this complaint ex rel in behalf of the United
States of America because the defendants are impairing a
contract for which the United States is a party-beneficiary,
which the defendants have impaired." Id. ¶
18. Apart from that illogical explanation, it is reasonably
safe to conclude that the government has not consented to
this lawsuit. Therefore, it is deemed to be brought solely by
Lawrence.
Plaintiffs
claims stem from the federal prosecution of her daughter,
Diane Renee Erdmann, in the Western District of Washington.
See Am. Compl. Ex. 7 (Crim. Docket for USA v.
Hansen, No. 2:18-cr-00092-RAJ-2). Plaintiff alleges that
she posted bond in the criminal case for $300 million, which
"was accepted by the court and entered as item # 72 on
the [criminal] docket."[1] Id. ¶ 101.
Therefore, plaintiff posits, her daughter is "a
beneficiary of the Eileen Raye Lawrence trust/estate, that
makes ... Raye a co-surety for Diane Renee Erdmann Cestui
Que Trust[.]" Am. Compl. ¶ 74. Because of the
alleged bond, plaintiff claims that she "owns" the
criminal case, id. ¶ 102, "had every right
to bring this matter before the trial court for dismissal,
id. ¶ 74, and "has demanded [it] be
dismissed, yet the defendant judges have failed to comply,
willfully committing insurrection and rebellion to United
States laws," id. ¶ 102. Plaintiff claims
that the defendants have "robbed" her, and she
demands that the "bond be liquidated and all proceeds
returned" to her. Id. ¶ 105.
An
"in forma pauperis complaint is properly
dismissed as frivolous ... if it is clear from the face of
the pleading that the named defendant is absolutely immune
from suit on the claims asserted." Crisafi v.
Holland, 655 F.2d 1305, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Judges
enjoy absolute immunity from suits based on acts taken in
their judicial capacity, so long as they have jurisdiction
over the subject matter.[2] Moore v. Burger, 655 F.2d
1265, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (citing cases).
Consequently, a complaint, such as here, against judges who
have "done nothing more than their duty" is "a
meritless action." Fleming v. United States,
847 F.Supp. 170, 172 (D.D.C. 1994), cert, denied 513
U.S. 1150 (1995); see accord Caldwell v. Kagan, 777
F.Supp.2d 177, 179 (D.D.C. 2011) (finding "claims
against the district and court of appeals judges ... patently
frivolous because federal judges are absolutely immune from
lawsuits predicated, as here, for their official acts").
Furthermore, "prosecutors are entitled to absolute
immunity for conduct intimately associated with the judicial
phase of the criminal process." Atherton v. D.C.
Office of Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 686 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Plaintiffs
Amended Complaint contains no discernible allegations against
the named prosecutors, much less any suggesting that they
engaged in conduct beyond their '''role as an
advocate for the State, '" which entitles them
"'to the protections of absolute
immunity.'" Id. (quoting Kalina v.
Flectcher, 522 U.S. 118, 126 (1997) (emphasis in
original)).
More
generally, complaints lacking "an arguable basis either
in law or in fact" are subject to dismissal as
frivolous. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325
(1989); see Crisafi, 655 F.2d at 1307-08 ("A
court may dismiss as-Trivolous complaints reciting bare legal
conclusions ..., or postulating events and circumstances of a
wholly fanciful kind."). Plaintiffs complaint satisfies
this standard as well; therefore, this case will be dismissed
with prejudice. See Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d
1205, 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (per curiam) ("A dismissal
with prejudice is warranted . .. when a trial court
'determines that the allegation of other facts consistent
with the challenged pleading could not possibly cure the
deficiency.'") (quoting Jarrell v. United States
Postal Serv., 753 F.2d 1088, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(emphasis omitted)). A separate order accompanies this
Memorandum Opinion.
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Notes:
[1] A "Notice to the Parties"
entered March 8, 2019, on the criminal docket acknowledges
the filing of the Indemnity Bond three days earlier but adds:
"The Court does not intend to take any action on this
document, which has been filed by a non-party in this
case."
[2] Plaintiff asserts that "the
judges and the U.S. Attorneys know their Article I court does
not have judicial authority to fine or imprison any living
Man or Woman" and thus have "act[ed] outside their
jurisdiction from the beginning," Am. Compl. ¶ 16,
but her premise is unfounded. The U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Washington is an Article III court
possessing the same powers as this and any other federal
district court. See 28 U.S.C. § 132 (creation
and composition of district courts); id. § 128
(creating two judicial districts in Washington state);
see also 18U.S.C. ยง 3231 (granting original
jurisdiction in the district courts over ...