MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
BERYL
A. HOWELL CHIEF JUDGE
Eleven
of the sixteen plaintiffs in this lawsuit have filed a third
motion to proceed under pseudonyms in their instant suit
against the Department of Justice alleging, individually and
on behalf of a class of female New Agent Trainees and
Intelligence Analyst Trainees, violations by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
et seq., the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 12111 et seq.,
and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§ 701, et seq. See Compl. ¶ 1. The
plaintiffs' original motion to proceed under pseudonyms
was denied on June 6, 2019, because the moving plaintiffs
failed to provide sufficient detail to assess the privacy
interests at stake and therefore failed to meet their burden
of showing that those privacy interests outweighed the
public's presumptive and substantial interest in knowing
the details of judicial litigation. See Memorandum
& Order, Bird v. Barr, 19-cv-1581 (D.D.C. June
6, 2019) at 4-5, ECF No. 3. All sixteen plaintiffs, were,
however, permitted to seal their home addresses in light of
their "risk of being targeted for threats of violence or
retaliation from subjects of [an] investigation."
Id. at 8 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). The plaintiffs' second motion to proceed under
pseudonyms was also denied on June 26, 2019. See
Min. Order (June 26, 2019) (noting that second motion
appeared to be in "draft" form, with the majority
of supporting declarations undated and unsigned, with
attempts to reach counsel telephonically unsuccessful).
The
moving plaintiffs' third motion supplies additional
facts, supported with sworn declarations, concerning each
plaintiffs reasons for seeking to proceed under a pseudonym.
Each moving plaintiff, with the exception of L.M., highlights
the concomitant risks posed to her safety and career in law
enforcement and intelligence agencies, and potential
operations of those agencies, should her name, position,
location, and other personal details be made publicly
available. For the reasons set forth below, the moving
plaintiffs' motion is granted in part and denied as to
L.M., subject to any further consideration by the United
States District Judge to whom this case is randomly
assigned.[1]
I.
BACKGROUND
The
plaintiffs allege that, since April 10, 2015 and continuing
to the present, while attending the FBI's Training
Academy in Quantico, Virginia, they were sexually harassed,
subjected to a hostile work environment and outdated gender
stereotypes, terminated, constructively discharged, or
otherwise subjected to retaliation in whole or in part
because of their gender or disability. Compl. ¶ 1. Eight
of the eleven moving plaintiffs seeking to proceed under
pseudonyms currently work in law enforcement or the
intelligence communities and fear that disclosure of their
identities will put their safety at risk, damage their
reputation at work, inhibit their ability to complete
undercover assignments or other investigations in which their
true identities must be shielded, possibly jeopardizing the
success of such assignments and investigations, or will
violate policies requiring that their work and/or identities
be kept confidential. See Pls.' Mem. Supporting
Mot. to Proceed Anonymously ("Pls.' Mem.") at
6-9. Further, the plaintiffs allege that two of the named
plaintiffs in this case have already been retaliated against
for their participation in this lawsuit, including one
plaintiff who has been threatened with dismissal, and that
they therefore have a reasonable fear of retaliation if their
names are exposed. See Id. at 2-5.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
Generally,
a complaint must state the names of the parties and address
of the plaintiff. Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(a) ("The title of the
complaint must name all the parties."); LCvR 5.1(c)(1)
("The first filing by or on behalf of a party shall have
in the caption the name and full residence address of the
party," and "[f]ailure to provide the address
information within 30 days of filing may result in the
dismissal of the case against the defendant."); LCvR
11.1 (same requirement as LCvR 5.1(c)(1)). These rules
promote the public's interest "in knowing the names
of [ ] litigants" because "disclosing the
parties' identities furthers openness of judicial
proceedings," Doe v. Pub. Citizen, 749 F.3d
246, 273 (4th Cir. 2014); see also Doe v. Frank, 951
F.2d 320, 322 (11th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) ("This rule
serves more than administrative convenience. It protects the
public's legitimate interest in knowing all of the facts
involved, including the identities of the parties.").
Thus, the D.C. Circuit has instructed that "parties to a
lawsuit must typically openly identify themselves in their
pleadings," with "[b]asic fairness dictat[ing] that
those among the defendants' accusers who wish to
participate ... as individual party plaintiffs must do so
under their real names." United States v. Microsoft
Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1463-64 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (per
curiam) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted,
alteration in original).
The
reasons that public disclosure of litigants' identities
is generally required include that "[p]ublic openness
may cause all trial participants to perform their duties more
conscientiously," In re U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt.
Data Sec. Breach Litig. ("OPM Breach Litig."),
No. 17-5217, 2019 WL 2552955, at *28 (D.C. Cir. June 21,
2019) (Williams, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); such
openness "induce[s] unknown witnesses to come forward
with relevant testimony," id. (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted); requiring parties to
disclose their identities "foster[s] an appearance of
fairness, thereby heightening respect for the judicial
process," id. (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted); and disclosure of litigants'
identities is "a matter of 'basic fairness,
'" id. (quoting Microsoft Corp.,
56 F.3d at 1463 (alteration omitted), because a "case
brought anonymously can let a winning plaintiff inflict
'disgrace' on a defendant and can let a losing
plaintiff launch defamatory charges 'without shame or
liability, '" id. (quoting Doe v.
Smith, 429 F.3d 706, 710 (7th Cir. 2005)), creating a
"structural asymmetry that can tilt the scales
unfairly," id.
Notwithstanding
these good reasons for public openness about litigants'
identities, "a district court has discretion to
'grant the 'rare dispensation' of anonymity
against the world, '" id. (quoting
Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d at 1464 (quoting James
v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 238 (4th Cir. 1993))), and the
Federal Rules recognize that privacy protections may be
necessary for filings made with the Court. Specifically, in
2007, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2 was adopted in
response to the E-Government Act of 2002, which
"requires the Supreme Court to prescribe rules 'to
protect privacy and security concerns relating to electronic
filing of documents and the public availability ... of
documents filed electronically.'" Fed.R.Civ.P. 5.2,
Adv. Comm. Note (2007) (quoting Pub. L. No. 107-347, §
205(c)(3)). To this end, Rule 5.2, for example, requires,
"[u]nless the court orders otherwise," that certain
personal information be redacted as well as that only a
"minor's initials" be used, Fed.R.Civ.P.
5.2(a)(1)-(4), and further authorizes the court, "[f]or
good cause," to issue a protective order that
"require[s] redaction of additional information" or
restricts "a nonparty's remote electronic access to
a document filed with the court," id. 5.2(e).
Courts
have employed two different but analogous multi-factor tests
in determining whether a party may be permitted "to
proceed anonymously" by evaluating whether "the
impact of the plaintiffs anonymity" outweighs "the
public interest in open proceedings" and the
"fairness to the defendant." Nat'l
Ass'n of Waterfront Emp'rs v. Chao
("Chao"), 587 F.Supp.2d 90, 99 (D.D.C. 2008)
(RMC). The first test consists of the six factors set forth
in United States v. Hubbard, 650 F.2d 293, 317-21
(D.C. Cir. 1980):
(1) the need for public access to the documents at issue; (2)
the extent to which the public had access to the document
prior to the sealing order; (3) the fact that a party has
objected to disclosure and the identity of that party; (4)
the strength of the property and privacy interests involved;
(5) the possibility of prejudice to those opposing
disclosure; and (6) the purpose for which the documents were
introduced.
Doe v. CFPB ("Doe I"), No. 15-cv-l 177
(RDM), 2015 WL 6317031, at *2 (D.D.C. Oct. 16, 2015). In
other cases, a "five-part test to balance the concerns
of plaintiffs seeking anonymity with those of defendants and
the public interest" has been applied. Eley v.
District of Columbia, No. 16-cv-806 (BAH), 2016
WL 6267951, at *1 (D.D.C. Oct. 25, 2016). These five factors,
drawn from James, 6 F.3d at 238, are:
(1) whether the justification asserted by the requesting
party is merely to avoid the annoyance and criticism that may
attend any litigation or is to preserve privacy in a matter
of a sensitive and highly personal nature; (2) whether
identification poses a risk of retaliatory physical or mental
harm to the requesting party or even more critically, to
innocent non-parties; (3) the ages of the persons whose
privacy interests are sought to be protected; (4) whether the
action is against a governmental or private party; and (5)
the risk of unfairness to the opposing party from allowing an
action against it to proceed anonymously.
Chao, 587 F.Supp.2d at 99 (citing Yacovelli v.
Moeser, No. 1:02CV596, 2004 WL 1144183, at *6-8 (M.D.
N.C. May 20, 2004) (quoting James, 6 F.3d at 238));
Roe v. Doe, No. 18-cv-666 (CKK), 2019 WL 1778053, *2
(D.D.C. Apr. 23, 2019); Doe v. Teti, No. 15-mc-01380
(RWR), 2015 WL 6689862, at *2 (D.D.C. Oct. 19, 2015); Roe
v. Bernabei & Wachtel PLLC,85 F.Supp.3d 89, 96
(D.D.C. 2015) (TSC); Doe v. U.S. Dep't of State,
No. 15-cv-01971 (RWR), 2015 ...