Submitted May 24, 2019
Appeal
from the Superior Court of the District of Columbia
(CF2-16339-13) Hon. Ronna Lee Beck, Motion Judge
Paul
H. Zukerberg was on the brief for appellant.
Jessie
K. Liu, United States Attorney, and Elizabeth Trosman, T.
Anthony Quinn, and Elizabeth Gabriel, Assistant United States
Attorneys, were on the brief for appellee.
Before
Glickman and Thompson, Associate Judges, and Washington,
Senior Judge.
Thompson, Associate Judge:
Appellant,
John Larracuente, moved pursuant to D.C. Code §
16-803.02 (2016) (the "record-sealing statute") to
seal the records in Superior Court Case No. 2013-CF2-16339, a
case in which he pled guilty to possession with intent to
distribute (PWID) marijuana. The Superior Court denied the
motion without a hearing, concluding that the government had
shown by a preponderance of the evidence that appellant
possessed an amount of marijuana that exceeded the amount
decriminalized under D.C. Code § 48-904.01(a)(1) (2016),
[1] and
that sealing also was not available under the "interest
of justice standard" of § 16-803.02(a)(2).
Appellant contends in this appeal that (1) the Superior
Court's ruling was based on an erroneous interpretation
and application of the record-sealing statute; (2) the
government failed to meet its burden of establishing that
appellant's conviction was not for conduct that has since
been decriminalized; (3) the Superior Court relied on
speculation in concluding otherwise; and (4) the court abused
its discretion and deprived appellant of due process in
denying his motion without a hearing. For the reasons that
follow, we affirm.
I.
In its
filings opposing appellant's motion to seal, the
government submitted copies of appellant's
plea-proceeding transcript; the police report describing the
items seized from appellant's apartment during execution
of a search warrant on September 11, 2013; the Drug
Enforcement Administration chemical analysis report for the
substance seized; the police Gerstein affidavit; and
other documents. Although the documents refer to differing
estimates or measurements of the weight of the marijuana the
police recovered from appellant's apartment, the
documents indicate that appellant - who told officers that
all of the items in the apartment were his - possessed more
than the now-permissible two ounces of marijuana. The
Superior Court found that the government established by a
preponderance of the evidence that appellant had possessed
"over the decriminalized amount of marijuana[, ]"
and that, more likely than not, appellant intended to
distribute more than the amount permitted by §
48-904.01(a)(1)(B) (one ounce or less). The court therefore
concluded that appellant did not qualify for record-sealing
under § 16-803.02(a)(1) or under the "interest of
justice standard" of § 16-803.02(a)(2) (giving the
Superior Court discretion, in the interest of justice, to
seal records relating to a now-decriminalized offense, even
if that offense was accompanied by an offense that remains
illegal). See Washington v. United States, 206 A.3d
864, 869 (D.C. 2019).
Appellant
contends that the Superior Court misapplied §
16-803.02(a) by failing to take a "categorical
approach," rather than a case-specific-facts approach,
to determine whether the offense of which appellant was
convicted had been decriminalized.[2] Specifically, appellant
argues that § 16-803.02(a) should be interpreted to
mandate approval of a motion to seal so long as the least
culpable act(s) that would satisfy the elements of the
offense to which the records relate have been decriminalized.
Appellant argues that the case-specific-facts approach
creates inequities, [3] and that use of a categorical approach is
necessary to achieve the remedial effect the Council of the
District of Columbia (the "Council") intended in
enacting the record-sealing statute. Appellant further
contends that the government did not negate the possibility
that the marijuana found in his apartment was home-grown
(thus falling within the statutory permission to possess
marijuana produced by cannabis plants grown in the interior
of a home) and also did not prove that appellant's intent
to distribute went beyond transferring, without remuneration,
one ounce or less of marijuana to another person 21 years of
age or older, [4] and thus failed to prove that his conduct
was not decriminalized.
Appellant
argues in the alternative that even if sealing was not
mandated under § 16-803.02(a)(1), the court erroneously
denied him relief under § 16-803.02(a)(2), which he
contends makes sealing available in the interest of justice
even as to the records of conduct that have not been
decriminalized. He seeks an order directing that his records
be sealed.
II.
Our
review on matters of statutory interpretation is de
novo. See Peterson v. United States, 997 A.2d
682, 683 (D.C. 2010). We look first to the statute's
plain language to determine if it is "clear and
unambiguous." Id. at 684 (internal quotation
marks omitted). If the plain language of a statute "is
clear and unambiguous and will not produce an absurd result,
we will look no further." Pixley v. United
States, 692 A.2d 438, 440 (D.C. 1997) (internal
quotation marks omitted). If the language is ambiguous, we
may "turn to legislative history to ensure that [we
interpret the statute in a manner that] is consistent with
legislative intent." Aboye v. United States,
121 A.3d 1245, 1249 (D.C. 2015) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
We
review for abuse of discretion the Superior Court's
denial without a hearing of a motion to seal. See V.C.B.
v. United States, 37 A.3d 286, 290 (D.C. 2012);
White v. United States, 582 A.2d 1199, 1201 (D.C.
1990). "Whether or not a hearing is held in connection
with a motion to seal, a trial court's determinations in
connection with that motion constitute findings of fact and
are reviewed for clear error." Sepu ...