MEMORANDUM OPINION
COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
On
January 22, 2019, this Court granted leave for pro
se Defendant to file his [94] Letter to the Court which
references “prison reform” and asserts a claim
for entitlement to additional “good time” credit
to reduce his sentence. The Government responded to the
Defendant's Letter with a [98] Motion to Dismiss. The
Government asserts that Defendant's claim should be
construed as a petition for writ of habeas corpus, which
should be dismissed without prejudice for Defendant to
re-file his claim in the Middle District of Pennsylvania
because this Court does not have “personal jurisdiction
over the only proper respondent, petitioner's custodian
Ronnie R. Holt, the warden at USP-Allenwood where petitioner
is incarcerated[.]” Gov't Mot.. ECF No. 98, at 1.
This Court agrees that Defendant's Letter should be
construed as a Petition for writ of habeas corpus, and as
such, this Court has no jurisdiction over the respondent
warden at USP-Allenwood. Accordingly, the Petition shall be
dismissed without prejudice so that Defendant/Petitioner may
re-file it in the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Pennsylvanian. A separate Order accompanies this
Memorandum Opinion.
Background
On
October 28, 2010, Defendant/Petitioner Tyrone Hines
(“Mr. Hines”) was found guilty by jury verdict of
one count of Bank Robbery and two counts of Attempted Bank
Robbery. See Verdict Form, ECF No. 43. Mr. Hines was
sentenced to a 132-month term of incarceration on each
offense, to run concurrently, followed by three years of
supervised release. Mr. Hines' conviction and sentence
were affirmed on appeal. See Mandate of the United
States Court for the District of Columbia, ECF No. 85. Mr.
Hines moved subsequently to reduce his sentence, but that
motion was denied by this Court. October 15, 2014 Order and
Memorandum Opinion, ECF Nos. 92, 93. Defendant has now moved
for a reduction of his sentence pursuant to the First Step
Act of 2018 (the “Act”), Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132
Stat. 5194. The Act amends the good time credit provision,
with Section 102(b)(1)(A) of the Act amending 18 U.S.C.
§ 3624(b) to provide that a prisoner “may receive
credit towards the service of the prisoner's sentence of
up to 54 days for each year of the prisoner's sentence
imposed by the court.” First Step Act § 102
(b)(1)(A). The effective date of the amendment relies upon
“the date that the Attorney General completes and
releases the risk and needs assessment system . . . added by
section 101(a).” Id. § 102
(b)(2).[1]
Analysis
Mr.
Hines' claim that he is entitled to additional good time
credit relates to the execution of his sentence and affects
the duration of his confinement, and accordingly, his claim
must be raised through a petition for writ of habeas corpus.
See Davis v. U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, 716 F.3d
660, 662 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“channel[ing] state
prisoners' claims for relief - however styled -into
habeas alone if the prisoners seek a remedy that is at the
core of habeas.”) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 475, 489 (1973) (finding that habeas is the exclusive
remedy for a state prisoner challenging deprivation of good
time credits). The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit extended the habeas channeling rule to
claims by federal prisoners. See Chatman-Bey v.
Thornburgh, 864 F.2d 804, 808-10 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(en banc) (habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for
a federal prisoner challenging his parole eligibility date).
The habeas channeling rule was quite broad originally insofar
as habeas was the exclusive remedy for a federal prisoner
bringing any claim that would have a ‘probabilistic
impact' upon the duration of his custody. Razzoli v.
Federal Bureau of Prisons, 230 F.3d 371, 373 (D.C. Cir.
2000). This Circuit has narrowed the rule in light of recent
Supreme Court decisions, with the effect that “a
federal prisoner need bring his claim in habeas only if
success on the merits will ‘necessarily imply the
invalidity of confinement or shorten its
duration.'” Davis, 716 F.3d at 666
(quoting Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 82
(2005)). In Davis, which overruled Razzoli,
230 F.3d 371, the Court noted that the narrower rule
“channel[s] into habeas only claims that would
guarantee a speedier release from prison.” Id.
at 665.
In the
instant case, Mr. Hines' assertion that he is entitled to
an (2711 immediate) early release should be construed as a
habeas claim. Compare Shipp v. Hurwitz, Civil Action
No. 19-1733, 2019 WL 2996541 (D.D.C. July 9, 2019) (where
Plaintiff inmate sought to compel Defendant Bureau of Prisons
(“BOP”) to recalculate available good time credit
for all inmates in BOP custody, the Honorable Rudolph
Contreras found that Plaintiff was not required to bring his
Administrative Procedures Act challenge as a habeas petition
because success on the merits only entitled Plaintiff to have
the BOP recalculate his good time credits and would not
“guarantee a speedier release from prison.”)
Construing
Mr. Hines' claim as a habeas claim, this Court is without
personal jurisdiction over the proper respondent in this
matter; i.e., the prisoner's custodian, which is
typically the warden of the institution in which the prisoner
is incarcerated. Rumsfield v. Padilla, 124 S.Ct.
2711, 2713 (2004) (the proper respondent in a federal habeas
action is the custodian of the prisoner.”) A court may
not award habeas unless it has personal jurisdiction over the
custodian of the prisoner. Stokes v. U.S. Parole
Commission, 374 F.3d 1235, 1239 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (A
district court may not entertain a habeas petition
“unless the respondent custodian is within its
territorial jurisdiction.”); In re Tripati,
836 F.2d 1406, 1407 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (“A habeas
petition may be adjudicated only in the district in which
[petitioner's] immediate custodian, his warden, is
located.”)
In this
case, Mr. Hines is incarcerated at USP-Allenwood, in
Pennsylvania, and Mr. Ronnie R. Holt is the custodian/warden
of that facility. Accordingly, this Court will grant the
Government's [98] Motion to Dismiss Mr. Hines'
Petition. The Petition is dismissed without prejudice to Mr.
Hines re-filing a petition in the proper venue against the
proper respondent.
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Notes:
[1] On July 19, 2019, Attorney General
William Barr released and published a risk and needs
...