MEMORANDUM OPINION
COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY UNITE STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Presently
before the Court is Defendant District of Columbia Public
Schools' [66] Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.
Defendant moves for judgment on Plaintiff Daoud Rasheed's
Second Amended Complaint on the grounds that (1)
Plaintiff's Title VII claims are time-barred by the
statutory 90-day time period; (2) Plaintiff has not exhausted
his Title VII claims; and, (3) if Plaintiff has no federal
claim, this Court should not assert supplemental jurisdiction
over Plaintiff's District of Columbia Human Rights Act
(“DCHRA”) claims. Upon consideration of the
pleadings, the relevant legal authorities, and the record in
this case, this Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART
Defendant's [66] Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings.[1] This Court shall GRANT Defendant's
motion as it pertains to Plaintiff's hostile work
environment claims and DENY Defendant's motion as it
pertains to Plaintiff's religious discrimination claims
and the timeliness of Plaintiff's Title VII claims.
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff
Daoud Rasheed's Second Amended Complaint is predicated on
an alleged denial - because of his religion - of employment
benefits including equal pay, work assignments, schedule, and
leave time. Second Am. Compl. ¶ 64, ECF No. 15.
Plaintiff alleges that he suffered various types of
discrimination for being a Muslim, such as being humiliated
for adhering to a traditional Muslim appearance, denied leave
time for his religious practices of afternoon prayer and an
annual pilgrimage, assigned disproportionately large
workloads; and suffering a pay decrease, as well as the
termination of his employment. Id. ¶¶
23-25, 33, 62, 66, 69, 72.
Plaintiff
began working for Defendant on December 8, 2009 and received
a final notice of termination of employment on August 7,
2015. Id. ¶¶ 10, 62. During his employment
with Defendant, Plaintiff served as a custodian in three
different schools in the District of Columbia Public School
System. Id. ¶¶ 10-12. Plaintiff alleges
that throughout his employment with Defendant, he experienced
religious discrimination and was subjected to a hostile work
environment because he was Muslim. Id. ¶¶
73, 81. After being terminated, Plaintiff filed a charge of
discrimination with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”) on December 31, 2015,
alleging religious discrimination and retaliation. Ex. 66-1.
Plaintiff stated that the allegedly discriminatory incidents
occurred between November 12, 2013 and August 7, 2015.
Id. The EEOC issued Plaintiff a right-to-sue letter
with a mailing date of January 8, 2016. Ex. 66-3.
On
April 8, 2016, Plaintiff filed his original [1] Complaint pro
se in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia. Compl., ECF No. 1. Plaintiff filed an [2] Amended
Complaint on April 11, 2016, again filing pro se. Am. Compl.,
ECF No. 2. Defendant filed a [4] Motion to Dismiss the
Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Procedure
12(b)(6), and subsequently Plaintiff filed a [13] Consent
Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint.
Def.'s Mot., ECF No. 4; Pl's Mot., ECF No. 13. This
Court granted Plaintiff's [13] Consent Motion for Leave
to File a Second Amended Complaint, and this Court denied
Defendant's [4] Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint.
Plaintiff's [15] Second Amended Complaint alleges claims
under Title VII for religious discrimination and hostile work
environment and identical claims under the DCHRA. Second Am.
Compl., ECF No. 15. The parties were engaged in discovery
until this Court granted Defendant's [64] Consent Motion
to Stay Discovery pending resolution of the instant Motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings. Defendant's Motion is ripe
for consideration by this Court.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
A party
may move for judgment on the pleadings “[a]fter the
pleadings are closed-but early enough not to delay
trial.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). The standard for reviewing
a motion for judgment on the pleadings is “virtually
identical” to that applied to a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Baumann v.
District of Columbia, 744 F.Supp.2d 216, 221 (D.D.C.
2010) (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). Under rule 12(c) - as under rule
12(b)(6) - a party may move to dismiss a complaint on the
grounds that it “fail[s] to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
“[A] complaint [does not] suffice if it tenders
‘naked assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further
factual enhancement.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868
(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). Rather, a
complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations that,
if accepted as true, “state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937.
A
motion to dismiss may be granted on statute of limitations
grounds only if apparent from the face of the complaint.
See Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Lexington Ins.
Co., 357 F.Supp.2d 287, 292 (D.D.C.2005). “Because
statute of limitations defenses often are based on contested
facts, the court should be cautious in granting a motion to
dismiss on such grounds; ‘dismissal is appropriate only
if the complaint on its face is conclusively
time-barred.'” Rudder v. Williams, 47
F.Supp.3d 47, 50 (D.D.C. 2014) (quoting Firestone v.
Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
Because
a Rule 12(c) motion “would summarily extinguish
litigation at the threshold and foreclose the opportunity for
discovery and factual presentation, ” courts must
approach such motions “with the greatest of care”
and deny them “if there are allegations in the
complaint which, if proved, would provide a basis for
recovery.” Haynesworth v. Miller, 820 F.2d
1245, 1254 (D.C. Cir. 1987), abrogated on other grounds
by Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 126 S.Ct. 1695, 164
L.Ed.2d 441 (2006). “The court is limited to
considering the facts alleged in the complaint, any documents
attached to or incorporated in the complaint, matters of
which the court may take judicial notice, and matters of
public record.” Baumann, 744 F.Supp.2d at 222.
Accordingly,
for purposes of the pending motion, this Court takes judicial
notice of the Charge of Discrimination filed by Plaintiff
with the D.C. Office of Human Rights, Ex. 66-1, the Intake
Questionnaire provided by the United States Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, Ex. 66-2, and the Dismissal and
Notice of Rights issued by the United States Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, Ex. 66-3. See Grant v. Dep't
of Treasury, 194 F.Supp.3d 25, 28 n.2 (D.D.C. 2016) (a
“Final Agency Decision . . . [is] [an] official, public
document[] subject to judicial notice”). Judicial
notice is taken solely for the purposes of ascertaining when
the Charge of Discrimination was filed with the D.C. Office
of Human Rights (December 31, 2015), the claims addressed in
the Charge and in the Intake Questionnaire, and the date the
EEOC mailed a Dismissal and Notice of Rights (January 8,
2016).
III.
DISCUSSION
A.
Plaintiff's Title VII Claims Are Not Time-Barred
Pursuant
to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a plaintiff may
commence a civil action claiming discrimination “within
ninety days after the giving of [an EEOC right-to-sue]
notice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). The 90-day
period is tolled the day after the EEOC right-to-sue letter
is received. Akridge v. Gallaudet Univ., 729
F.Supp.2d 172, 178 (D.D.C. 2010) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P.
6(a)(1)). It is presumed that the right-to-sue letter was
mailed on the same date of its issuance. Akridge,
729 F.Supp.2d at 178; Anderson v. Local 201 Reinforcing
Rodmen,886 F.Supp. 94, 97 (D.D.C. 1995). When the
receipt date of the right-to-sue notice is unknown or
disputed, courts may presume that the letter was ...