MEMORANDUM OPINION
RANDOLPH D. MOSS United States District Judge.
The
matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Larry Klayman's
motion for reconsideration of the Court's order
dismissing the complaint and motion for recusal or
disqualification. Dkt. 25. Having reviewed Plaintiff's
motion for reconsideration, id., Defendants
opposition, Dkt. 26, and Plaintiff's reply, Dkt. 27, the
Court concludes that Plaintiff's motion merely rehashes
his prior arguments. The Court will, accordingly, deny the
motion for the same reasons set forth in the Court's June
5, 2019 Memorandum Opinion, Dkt. 22. To the extent that
Plaintiff seeks to bring the Court's attention additional
examples of alleged misconduct by the Office of Disciplinary
Counsel (“ODC”), see Dkt. 27 at 1-2
(referring the Court to a “whistleblower
report”); Dkt. 27-1 (Ex. 1) (“Whistleblower
Report”), that information is irrelevant for present
purposes. The Court dismissed Plaintiff's complaint based
on the legal insufficiency of the allegations contained in
the complaint. Plaintiff cannot supplement those allegations
by attaching an exhibit to a motion for reconsideration.
The
Court will also deny Plaintiff's motion for recusal or
disqualification pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and
455. Under 28 U.S.C. § 144, a litigant must submit an
affidavit stating “the facts and the reasons for his
belief that bias or prejudice exists . . . not less than ten
days before the beginning of the term at which the proceeding
is to be heard, or good cause shall be shown for failure to
file it within such a time.” Id. Similarly,
although 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) “contains no express
timeliness provision, most circuits considering the matter
have concluded that a litigant must raise the
disqualification issue within a reasonable time after the
grounds for it are known.” United States v.
Barrett, 111 F.3d 947, 951 (D.C. Cir.1997) (citations
omitted). Plaintiff did not seek recusal or disqualification
in this case until after the Court had granted
Defendants' motion to dismiss. Absent some intervening
development, that is too late. See SEC v. Loving Spirit
Found. Inc., 392 F.3d 486, 492 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(“Crucial to the integrity of the judicial process, the
timeliness requirement ensures that a party may not wait and
decide whether to file based on ‘whether he likes
subsequent treatment that he receives.'” (quoting
In re United Shoe Mach. Corp., 276 F.2d 77,
79 (1st Cir. 1960))); see also Klayman v. Judicial Watch,
Inc., 278 F.Supp.3d 252, 258 (D.D.C. 2017)
(“[M]ere dissatisfy action with a ruling of this Court
is insufficient to warrant recusal or
disqualification.”). Here, the only new fact that
Plaintiff identifies is the Court's decision dismissing
the complaint. His disagreement with that decision does not
warrant recusal.
In any
event, Plaintiff's motion also fails on the merits for
the reasons set forth in the Court's opinion denying
Plaintiff's motion for recusal in Klayman v.
Fox, No. 18-1579 (D.D.C.) (ECF 5). In short,
“[t]he fact of past political activity alone will
rarely require recusal.” Higganbotham v. Oklahoma
ex rel. Okla. Transp. Comm'n, 328 F.3d 638, 645
(10th Cir. 2003). That is because judges “separate
themselves from politics when going on the bench.”
MacDraw, Inc. v. CIT Grp. Equip. Fin., Inc., 138
F.3d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 1998). Recusal in a case such as this
would not only be unwarranted but would foster the
erroneous-and corrosive-perception that judicial decisions
are based on politics, rather than the relevant law and
facts. Plaintiff's only new argument in this case is that
the Court is clearly biased because “Judge Moss
dismissed [the complaint] without prejudice, ” thus
revealing that “[he] knew that his order was
wrong.” Dkt. 25 at 3-4. The Court does not follow the
logic of that contention. It may be that Plaintiff would face
substantial-and, perhaps, insurmountable-hurdles in
attempting to file an amended complaint that would overcome
the deficiencies the Court identified in his original
complaint. But providing him with the opportunity to try to
do so hardly reflects judicial bias.
For the
reasons stated above, the Court will DENY
Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration and for recusal or
disqualification, Dkt. 25.[1] Because Plaintiff has indicated that he
does not intend to file an amended complaint, see
Id. at 6, the Court will now enter final judgment.
A
separate order will issue.
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Notes:
[1] The Court will also
DENY Plaintiff's “Renewed Motion
for Oral Argument, ” Dkt. 28, on the ground that oral
argument would not assist in the resolution of ...