United States District Court, District of Columbia
COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
before the Court is Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant Larry
Klayman's  Motion to Stay Enforcement of Judgment
Pending Appeal Without Bond (“Pl.'s Mot.”).
In their  Response to Plaintiff's Motion to Stay
Enforcement of Judgment Pending Appeal Without Bond,
Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs argue that Klayman has failed
to meet his burden to demonstrate that a bond is not
required. The Court agrees.
the posting of a supersedeas bond, a party may obtain a stay
pending appeal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(b). “The purpose of the
supersedeas bond is to secure the appellee from loss
resulting from the stay of execution.” Fed.
Prescription Serv., Inc. v. Am. Pharm. Ass'n, 636
F.2d 755, 760 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Because the stay benefits the
appellant and “deprives the appellee of the ultimate
benefits of [the] judgment, a full supersedeas bond should be
the requirement in normal circumstances.” Id.
Normal circumstances include those “where there is some
reasonable likelihood of the judgment debtor's inability
or unwillingness to satisfy the judgment in full upon
ultimate disposition of the case.” Id. A
district court, however, may in its discretion “order
partially secured or unsecured stays” in “unusual
circumstances.” Id. at 760-61. The moving
party has the burden to “‘objectively demonstrate
the reasons for such a departure.'” Grand Union
Co. v. Food Employers Labor Relations Ass'n, 637
F.Supp. 356, 357 (D.D.C. 1986) (quoting Poplar Grove
Planting & Ref. Co. v. Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc.,
600 F.2d 1189, 1191 (5th Cir. 1978)).
Court of Appeals has emphasized three considerations when
reviewing a district court's exercise of discretion in
granting a stay without bond: (1) the damage award amount,
(2) the net worth of the moving party in relation to the
damage award, and (3) the residency status of the moving
party. Fed. Prescription Serv., 636 F.2d at 761. For
example, in Federal Prescription Service, Inc. v.
American Pharmaceutical Association, the net worth of
the moving party was “about 47 times the amount of the
damage award, ” and the moving party was “a
long-term resident of the District of Columbia” who had
not indicated “any intent to leave.” Id.
The Court of Appeals viewed these factors as supporting the
district court's exercise of discretion in granting the
stay without bond. Id.; cf. Athridge v.
Iglesias, 464 F.Supp.2d 19, 24-25 (D.D.C. 2006)
(granting stay of enforcement of judgment pending appeal
where defendants presented over $7 million in real estate
holdings to guarantee judgment).
factors are evident here, and Klayman has neither
“objectively demonstrate[d] a present financial ability
to facilely respond to a money judgment” nor
“presente[d] to the court a financially secure plan for
maintaining that same degree of solvency during the period of
an appeal.” Athridge, 464 F.Supp.2d at 24
(internal quotation marks omitted). As for the damages award
and Klayman's net worth, the total judgments in this case
exceed $2.8 million, and while Klayman has not indicated his
net worth, he has admitted that he “simply cannot post
bond for a $2.8 million-dollar judgment.” Pl.'s
Mot. at 6. This admission, and the “reasonable
likelihood” of Klayman's “inability or
unwillingness to satisfy the judgment in full upon ultimate
disposition of the case, ” heavily weighs against
granting a stay of enforcement of the judgment without bond.
See Fed. Prescription Serv., 636 F.2d at 760-61.
Moreover, Klayman does not assert that he is a District of
Columbia resident, and in fact has not disclosed his
Klayman has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating why
the Court should impose a stay of the enforcement of the
judgment without a bond. See, e.g., Gates v.
Syrian Arab Republic, No. 06-cv-1500 (RMC), 2009 WL
10693489, at *2 (D.D.C. Oct. 21, 2009) (denying motion for
stay without bond because moving party did not address
relevant considerations and demonstrated “reasonable
likelihood of . . . unwillingness to satisfy the judgment in
full upon ultimate disposition of the case”);
Godfrey v. Iverson, No. 05-cv-2044, 2007 WL 3001426,
at *1 (D.D.C. Oct. 16, 2007) (denying motion for stay without
bond because neither defendant was District of Columbia
resident and there were no “unusual circumstances,
” even though moving party had “sufficient assets
and income to satisfy the judgment”); Grand Union
Co., 637 F.Supp. at 358 (denying motion for stay without
bond because moving party failed to address all relevant
considerations, despite having net worth allegedly
“thousands of times greater than the amount of the
foregoing reasons, this Court shall DENY
Plaintiff's  Motion to Stay Enforcement of Judgment
Pending Appeal Without Bond.
appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
 Because the issue in contention
between the parties is whether the Court should stay
enforcement of the judgment pending appeal without a
bond, the Court shall focus its analysis on whether a
stay should be issued without a bond, rather than on whether
a stay should be issued at all. Many of the authorities that
Klayman cites address the general considerations relevant to
whether a stay for enforcement of a judgment pending appeal
should be issued, but those factors are inapplicable to
whether a bond should be required for any such stay. See,
e.g., Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776
(1987) (listing “factors regulating the issuance of a
stay”); Doe v. Trump, ...