United States District Court, District of Columbia
RANDOLPH D. MOSS, United States District Judge.
September 4, 1997, three Hamas suicide bombers detonated
explosives at a pedestrian mall on Ben Yehuda Street in
Jerusalem, Israel. See Campuzano v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, 281 F.Supp.2d 258, 260–61 (D.D.C. 2003).
Among the nearly two hundred injured were Diana Campuzano,
Avi Elishis, and Gregg Salzman (“the Campuzano
plaintiffs”). Id. In 2000, the
Campuzano plaintiffs filed suit against the Islamic
Republic of Iran (“Iran”), the Iranian Ministry
of Information and Security (“MOIS”), the Iranian
Revolutionary Guard Corps (“IRGC”), and three
Iranian officials (“the Campuzano
defendants”) under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(“FSIA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1602 et seq.
Id. The Campuzano plaintiffs alleged that
the Campuzano defendants were liable for their
injuries because they had provided material support to Hamas
to carry out the attack. Id. The Court concluded
that it had subject matter jurisdiction over the
Campuzano plaintiffs’ claims and found that
the defendants were liable. Id. at 269. Accordingly,
on September 10, 2003, the Court entered a default judgment
against Iran and the other defendants and awarded the
Campuzano plaintiffs compensatory and punitive
damages. Id. at 270–79; see also Dkt.
52, Civ. No. 00-2328.
than fourteen years later, nine immediate family members of
the Campuzano plaintiffs, who were not parties to
the Campuzano suit, filed this action against Iran,
the MOIS, and the IRGC under the FSIA, seeking damages for
their “pecuniary loss and loss of income; loss of
guidance, companionship and society; loss of consortium;
severe emotional distress and mental anguish; and loss of
solatium” as a result of the Campuzano
plaintiffs’ injuries. Dkt. 2 at 15, 16 (Amd. Compl.
¶ 83, Prayer). Plaintiffs have voluntarily dismissed the
MOIS and the IRGC as defendants, see Dkt. 26; Minute
Order (Jul. 18, 2019) (Order of Dismissal), but they continue
to press their claims against Iran. Iran, in their view, is
liable for their injuries under the “terrorism
exception” to the FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1605A, because
the Ben Yehuda Street attack would not have occurred
“but-for Iran’s ‘provision of material
support or resources’” to Hamas, Dkt. 21 at 10
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1)). The matter is now
before the Court on Plaintiffs’ motion seeking entry of
a default judgment against Iran. Dkt. 21. For the reasons
described below, the Court will enter a default judgment
against Iran and will award Plaintiffs compensatory damages.
in this case are nine family members of the
Campuzano plaintiffs: Stanley and Roberta Salzman
(the parents of Gregg Salzman), Lee Salzman (the brother of
Gregg Salzman), Ramiro and Mabel Campuzano (the parents of
Diana Campuzano), Jorge Campuzano (the brother of Diana
Campuzano), Brenda Elishis (the mother of Avi Elishis), the
estate of David Elishis (the late father of Avi Elishis), and
Sara Walzman (the sister of Avi Elishis). Dkt. 21 at 7.
Plaintiffs are all U.S. citizens. Id.; Dkt. 28; Dkt.
33. Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint seeks compensatory
damages for “pecuniary loss and loss of income; loss of
guidance, companionship and society; loss of consortium;
severe emotional distress and mental anguish; and loss of
solatium.” Dkt. 2 at 15 (Amd. Compl. ¶ 83). They
also allege that Defendants’ conduct “warrant[s]
an award of punitive damages under 28 U.S.C. §
1605A(c).” Id. (Amd. Compl. ¶ 87). In
their motion for default judgment, however, Plaintiffs seek
only solatium damages. See Dkt. 21 at 13–16.
a garden variety suit, the entry of a default judgment is
“not automatic” and requires the exercise of
sound discretion. See Mwani v. bin Laden, 417 F.3d
1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Sanchez v. Devashish Hospitality,
LLC, 322 F.R.D. 32, 36 (D.D.C. 2017); Boland v.
Yoccabel Const. Co., Inc., 293 F.R.D. 13, 17 (D.D.C.
2013) (citing Jackson v. Beech, 636 F.2d 831, 836
(D.C. Cir. 1980)). The Court must-at a minimum-satisfy itself
that it has subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims and
personal jurisdiction over the defendants. See Jerez v.
Republic of Cuba, 775 F.3d 419, 422 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
(“A default judgment rendered in excess of a
court’s jurisdiction is void.”); Mwani,
417 F.3d at 6 (explaining that the Court must “satisfy
itself that it has personal jurisdiction before entering
judgment against an absent defendant.”). In cases
brought against a foreign state, however, the Court’s
discretion to enter a default judgment is even more narrowly
circumscribed. By statute, no federal or state court may
enter a default judgment against a foreign state or
instrumentality “unless the claimant establishes his
claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the
court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e). This is the same
standard that applies to default judgments against the United
States under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(d). See
Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 864 F.3d 751, 785 (D.C. Cir.
2017); Hill v. Republic of Iraq, 328 F.3d 680, 683
(D.C. Cir. 2003).
must, accordingly, carry the burden of showing that the Court
has subject matter and personal jurisdiction, and they must
establish their right to recover by producing evidence
satisfactory to the Court. To establish subject matter
jurisdiction, Plaintiffs must show that: (1) the
“terrorism exception” to the FSIA applies-that
is, they must show that they seek money damages from a
foreign state for personal injury or death caused by a
covered act of terrorism or “the provision of material
support or resources for such an act;” (2) the foreign
state was designated as a state sponsor of terrorism at the
time of the act of terrorism (or because of the act) and
remained so designated at the time the suit was brought (or
shortly before suit was brought); and (3) “the claimant
or the victim was, at the time” of the act of
terrorism, “a national of the United States, ” a
member of the U.S. military, or an employee (or contractor)
of the United States acting within the scope of her
employment. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a). To establish personal
jurisdiction, Plaintiffs must show that the Court has subject
matter jurisdiction over their claims and that Iran was
served in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1608. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1330(b). And, to establish a right to recover,
Plaintiffs must offer evidence showing that they satisfy
either (1) each of the elements of the cause of action set
forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c) or (2) each of the
elements of a common law tort cause of action. See
Owens, 864 F.3d at 809.
case, such as this, in which Plaintiffs allege that a foreign
state materially supported acts of terrorism, the district
court must determine “how much and what kinds of
evidence the plaintiff must provide.” Han Kim v.
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 774 F.3d
1044, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 2014). But the Court must do so in
light of Congress's purpose in enacting § 1605A-that
is, to “compensate the victims of terrorism . . . [so
as to] punish foreign states who have committed or sponsored
such acts and [to] deter them from doing so in the future,
” id. at 1048 (citation omitted)-and the
difficulty in obtaining “firsthand evidence and
eyewitness testimony . . . from an absent and likely hostile
sovereign, ” Owens, 864 F.3d at 785.
case comes before the Court in a unique posture. Because
Plaintiffs are seeking damages for loss of solatium, their
injuries stem from the same terrorist attack that injured the
Campuzano plaintiffs, and their claims present-at
least at the threshold-the same essential questions posed in
the Campuzano case: that is, whether Iran provided
“material support” to Hamas and whether that
support was the proximate cause of the injuries the
Campuzano plaintiffs suffered. The
Campuzano court made extensive findings of fact
regarding the Ben Yehuda Street attack, the
Campuzano plaintiffs’ injuries, and
Iran’s relationship to Hamas. See Campuzano,
281 F.Supp.2d at 261–68. The Court then concluded,
based on those factual findings, that Iran was liable for the
Campuzano plaintiffs’ injuries. Id.
at 270. Plaintiffs ask this Court to adopt the findings of
fact and conclusions of law in Campuzano. Dkt. 21 at
10–11. The Court declines to do so.
principal argument why the liability determinations in
Campuzano are binding on this Court-that “Iran
would be collaterally estopped from re-litigating th[ose]
determinations, ” Dkt. 21 at 11-is incorrect. See
Weinstein v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 175 F.Supp.2d 13,
17–19 (D.D.C. 2001) (explaining why offensive
collateral estoppel does not apply to default judgments
entered under the terrorism exception to the FSIA); see
also Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27, cmt. e
(1982) (“In the case of a judgment entered by
confession, consent or default, none of the issues [are]
actually litigated.”); Arizona v. California,
530 U.S. 392, 413–14 (noting the “general rule
that issue preclusion attaches only ‘[w]hen an issue of
fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid
and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the
judgment’” (quoting Restatement (Second) of
Judgments § 27 (1982))).
fallback contention that the Court should adopt the findings
of fact from Campuzano, moreover, fares no better.
See Weinstein, 175 F.Supp.2d at 20
(“[F]indings of fact made during this type of one-sided
[FSIA] hearing should not be given a preclusive
effect.”). Although prior decisions in this district
“have . . . frequently taken judicial notice of
earlier, related proceedings, ” Rimkus v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 750 F.Supp.2d 163, 171 (D.D.C. 2010),
that does not mean that the Court should simply accept the
facts found in the earlier opinion, which would amount to an
exercise of collateral estoppel. The Court may, however,
“review evidence considered in” the prior
proceeding “without necessitating the re-presentment of
such evidence.” Murphy v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, 740 F.Supp.2d 51, 59 (D.D.C. 2010).
Plaintiffs did not provide the Court with the evidence upon
which the Campuzano decision was premised, and
because only a portion of that evidence is available in the
Campuzano docket, the Court held a telephonic
conference with counsel on August 28, 2019, and explained
that it could not, based on the then-existing record,
adjudicate Plaintiffs’ claims. Minute Order (Aug. 28,
2019). In response, Plaintiffs have now filed with the Court
the essential evidence from the Campuzano case. Dkt.
30; Dkt. 31; Dkt. 32. Upon review of that evidence, the Court
concludes that it can take judicial notice of the evidence
admitted and relied upon in the Campuzano case and
can-based on the Court’s independent assessment of that
evidence (but with the benefit of the guidance offered by the
Campuzano decision)-adjudicate Plaintiffs’
FINDINGS OF FACT
Salzman, Lee Salzman, Roberta Salzman, Ramiro Campuzano,
Mabel Campuzano, and Jorge Campuzano filed this case on
November 16, 2017. Dkt. 1 at 1 (Compl.). On November 20,
2017, they amended their complaint to add Brenda Elishis
(both individually and as the administratrix of the estate of
her late husband, David Elishis) and Sara Walzman as
plaintiffs. Dkt. 2 at 1 (Amd. Compl.). The Clerk first
attempted to effect service on Defendants on December 1,
2017. See Dkt. 7, 8. After that attempt failed, the
Clerk requested the Department of State to serve Defendants
through diplomatic channels. Dkt. 12 at 1. The summons,
amended complaint, and notice of suit were delivered to the
Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with the assistance of
the Foreign Interest Section of the Embassy of Switzerland in
Tehran because the United States does not maintain diplomatic
relations with Iran. See Dkt. 17 at 1. The State
Department, however, requested that the Foreign Interest
Section serve only one defendant: “the Islamic Republic
of Iran.” Id. at 11. After the return of
service was filed on May 15, 2018, id. at
1–12, Plaintiffs filed an affidavit in support of
default against the Islamic Republic of Iran, Dkt. 18.
Relying on Plaintiffs’ affidavit, the Clerk entered
default against Iran on July 9, 2018. Dkt. 20 at 1.
Plaintiffs then moved for entry of a default judgment against
Iran on July 26, 2018, Dkt. 21, and subsequently requested
that the other two defendants, which had not yet been served,
be dismissed from the case, Dkt. 26. On July 18, 2019, the
Court dismissed the MOIS and the IRGC as Defendants. Minute
Order (July 18, 2019).
Plaintiffs’ claims relate to an attack that occurred
almost 22 years ago, the Court initially stayed the action,
pending a decision by the D.C. Circuit on the question of
whether the ten-year statute of limitations contained in 28
U.S.C. § 1605A(b) is subject to forfeiture by a
defaulting foreign state. Minute Order (Aug. 20, 2018). After
the D.C. Circuit answered that question in the affirmative,
see Maalouf v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 923 F.3d
1095 (D.C. Cir. 2019), the Court lifted the stay and
scheduled a status conference to address further proceedings
in the action, Minute Order (May 10, 2019). On August 26,
2019, the Court ordered Plaintiffs to submit evidence
sufficient to show that they were U.S. nationals at the time
of the Ben Yehuda Street attack. Minute Order (Aug. 26,
2019). Shortly thereafter, the Court informed
Plaintiffs’ counsel during a telephonic status
conference that the then-existing factual record was, in the
Court’s view, deficient. Minute Order (Aug. 28, 2019).
Plaintiffs then, in response, supplemented the record with
the essential evidence that had been offered and admitted in
the Campuzano case. Dkt. 30; Dkt. 31; Dkt. 32. Other
evidence from the Campuzano case is available in the
docket in that action, Civ. No. 00-2328, and the Court has
reviewed that evidence-i.e., the testimony of
witnesses that was offered at the hearing-as well.
motion for entry of a default judgment is now ripe for
adjudication. In lieu of holding an evidentiary hearing, the
Court will rely on Plaintiffs’ declarations submitted
in this case, the testimony presented at the
Campuzano evidentiary hearing, and the evidence from
the Campuzano case that Plaintiffs have re-filed in
this matter. See Kim, 774 F.3d at 1047 (explaining
that “FSIA leaves it to the court to determine
precisely how much and what kinds of evidence the plaintiff
must provide, requiring only that it be ‘satisfactory
to the court.’” (quoting 28 U.S.C. §
1608(e)); see also Braun v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, 228 F.Supp. 3d 64, 75 (D.D.C. 2017) (noting that
“[c]ourts may rely on uncontroverted factual
allegations that are supported by affidavits” as
evidence to support an entry of default judgment);
Hekmati v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 278 F.Supp. 3d
145, 157 (D.D.C. 2017); Weinstein, 175 F.Supp.2d at
The Ben Yehuda Street Terrorist Attack
suit arises out of the Ben Yehuda Street attack, which took
place on September 4, 1997. Three suicide bombers packed
their bombs with “nails, screws, pieces of glass, and
chemical poisons” in order to maximize “pain,
suffering, and death.” Campuzano, 281
F.Supp.2d at 261 (citing U.S. Dep’t of State, Patterns
of Global Terrorism: 1997, Middle East Overview, available at
(last accessed Sept. 25, 2019); see also Dkt. 30-2
at 15 (Paz Expert Report ¶¶ 81-82); Trial Tr. at
8–9, Campuzano v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
281 F.Supp.2d 258 (D.D.C. 2003), No. 00-cv-2328 (ECF 42). The
attack killed five people and wounded “nearly two
hundred others.” Campuzano, 281 F.Supp.2d at
261 (citing U.S. Dep’t of State, Patterns of Global
Terrorism: 1997, Middle East Overview); see also
Trial Tr. at 8–9, Campuzano, No. 00-cv-2328
(ECF 42). Eventually two Hamas operatives, Muadh Said Bilal
and Omar Abdel Rahman al-Zaban, were arrested and charged
with carrying out the bombing. Dkt. 30-2 at 13 (Paz Expert
Report ¶¶ 69–70); Dkt. 30-4 at 12–13
(Shaked Expert Report ¶ 27); see also Trial Tr.
at 25, 29–31, 40–41, Campuzano, No.
00-cv-2328 (ECF 42). Both were convicted for murder,
attempted murder, and membership in Hamas. Dkt. 30-2 at 13
(Paz Expert Report ¶ 80); Dkt. 30-4 at 12–13
(Shaked Expert Report ¶ 27); see also Trial Tr.
at 40, Campuzano, No. 00-cv-2328 (ECF 42). Hamas
also claimed responsibility for the bombing. Dkt. 30-2 at
13–16 (Paz Expert Report ¶ 83); Dkt. 30-3 at 8
(Clawson Expert Report ¶ 28); Dkt. 30-4 at 12–13
(Shaked Expert Report); see also Trial Tr. at 9,
27–29, 53, Campuzano, No. 00-cv-2328 (ECF 42).
Yehuda Street attacks inflicted serious physical injuries on
each of the Campuzano plaintiffs. Diana Campuzano
suffered, inter alia, permanent damage to her
vision, sulfuric-acid inflicted burns, a
“destroyed” upper sinus cavity, and a massive
skull fracture. See Campuzano, 281 F.Supp.2d at 263;
see also Trial Tr. at 10–11,
Campuzano, No. 00-cv-2328 (ECF 41); Dkt. 21-1 at
8–10 (R. Campuzano Decl. ¶¶ 25–32). She
suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder
(“PTSD”), and, even two decades later, she cannot
concentrate properly, remains uncomfortable in crowds, and is
easily frustrated. See Id . at 11 (R. Campuzano
Decl. ¶ 35). Avi Elishis was eighteen at the time of the
bombing. Campuzano, 281 F.Supp.2d at 264 (citing
Trial Tr. at 84 (ECF 42)). But see Dkt. 21-4 at 1
(B. Elishis Decl. ¶ 3) (stating that Avi was seventeen).
His body was embedded with shrapnel, and Avi also suffered
first- and second-degree burns, which required months of
painful treatment. Campuzano, 281 F.Supp.2d at 264;
see also Trial Tr. at 89–91,
Campuzano, No. 00-cv-2328 (ECF 42); Dkt. 21-4 at
4–7 (B. Elishis Decl. ¶¶ 12–18,
23–28). Since the bombing, Avi has lived in constant
physical and emotional pain. Campuzano, 281
F.Supp.2d at 264; see also Dkt. 21-4 at 8 (B.
Elishis Decl. ¶ 29). Gregg Salzman sustained burns and
permanent nerve damage to his upper lip stemming from a
shrapnel wound as a result of the attack. See
Campuzano, 281 F.Supp.2d at 265 (citing Trial Tr. at
111– 18 (ECF 42)); see also Dkt. 21-7 at
2–3 (S. Salzman Decl. ¶¶ 10–12). He
also suffers from PTSD and “constant physical
pain.” Campuzano, 281 F.Supp.2d at 265 (citing
Trial Tr. at 123– 24 (ECF 42)); Dkt. 21-7 at 3 (S.
Salzman Decl. ¶¶ 12–13, 19).
Iran’s Provision of Material Support to Hamas
“an Islamic militant terrorist organization, ”
has long had “a close relationship” with Iran.
Campuzano, 281 F.Supp.2d at 262; see also
Trial Tr. at 17, Campuzano, No. 00-cv-2328 (ECF 42)
(“By 1992, . . . Iran form[ally] recognized Hamas as
the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people
and it became the only Palestinian organization to establish
what they called an embassy in Tehran.”); Dkt. 30-2 at
5 (Paz Expert Report ¶ 29). At the Campuzano
evidentiary hearing, four experts testified regarding
Iran’s provision of material support to Hamas and its
role in the Ben Yehuda Street Attack: Dr. Bruce Tefft
(retired CIA officer and counterterrorism expert), Dr. Rueven
Paz (researcher and former member of the Israeli General
Security Service), Ronni Shaked (researcher and former member
of the Israeli General Security Service), and Patrick Clawson
(deputy director of the Washington Institute for Near East
Policy). See Trial Tr. at 6, 44, 60,
74–75, Campuzano, No. 00-cv-2328 (ECF 42);
see also Dkt. 30-2 (Paz Expert Report); Dkt. 30-3
(Clawson Expert Report); Dkt. 30-4 (Shaked Expert Report);
Dkt. 32-1 (Tefft curriculum vita); Dkt. 32 (Tolchin Decl.
¶ 2) (noting that Bruce Tefft testified at the hearing
but did not submit an expert report). The plaintiffs also
offered the videotaped deposition of Yigal Presler, a
counterterrorism advisor to the Israeli Prime Minister.
Campuzano, 281 F.Supp.2d at 262 (citing Ex. 56,
Presler Dep. Tr. at 12); see also Trial Tr. at 82,
Campuzano, No. 00-cv-2328 (ECF 42); Dkt. 31-1 at
10–16 (Presler Dep.). The Court relies on their
uncontroverted and credible testimony to find the following
facts and to conclude that Iran provided both economic
assistance and terrorist training to Hamas and that the Ben
Yehuda Street attack could not have occurred without that
respect to economic assistance, by 1992, Iran was providing
Hamas $30 million a year. Trial Tr. at 17,
Campuzano, No. 00-cv-2328 (ECF 42); see
also Dkt. 30-3 at 7–19 (Clawson Expert Report);
Dkt. 30-2 at 9–11 (Paz Expert Report). Iran’s
financial contributions to Hamas between 1990 and 1995
totaled “over $100 million.” Trial Tr. at 17,
Campuzano, No. 00-cv-2328 (ECF 42). This support was
channeled through the MOIS, Iran’s intelligence
service, and the IRGC. Dkt. 30-3 at 9 (Clawson Expert Report
¶ 32); Trial Tr. at 21, 71, 81, Campuzano, No.
00-cv-2328 (ECF 42). Indeed, “Iranian government
support for terrorism is an official state policy, and the
approval of high-ranking Iranian political figures . . . was
necessary for Iranian agencies such as the MOIS to support
Hamas with training and economic assistance.” Dkt. 30-2
at 10 (Paz Expert Report ¶ 50); see also Dkt.
30-3 at 6, 10 (Clawson Expert Report); Trial Tr. at 34,
50–53, 80–81, Campuzano, No. 00-cv-2328
(ECF 42). Iran “encourage[ed] and push[ed] Hamas to
carry out such attacks [as the Ben Yehuda Street attack] as a
[matter of] policy.” Trial Tr. at 34,
Campuzano, No. 00-cv-2328 (ECF 42). Based on the
extensive evidence and testimony proffered in the
Campuzano case and re-filed in this case, the Court
finds that Iran provided Hamas substantial financial support
to assist and to encourage Hamas to engage in terrorist
attacks, like the attack at issue here.
Court also finds, crediting that same evidence, that Iran
provided training and assistance that was foreseeably used to
carry out the Ben Yehuda Street attack. The IRGC, the
“action arm or paramilitary arm” of MOIS,
provided “all terrorist type[s] of training” at
its base in Bekka Valley, Lebanon. Trial Tr. at 13–14,
Campuzano, No. 00-cv-2328 (ECF 42). Of particular
relevance here, the IRGC trained Hamas members, including the
Hamas operative Mahmoud Abu Hanoud, who organized, planned,
and executed a number of attacks, including the Ben Yehuda
Street attack. Campuzano, 281 F.Supp.2d at 262;
see also Trial Tr. at 50–51,
Campuzano, No. 00-cv-2328 (ECF 42); Dkt. 30-2 at
11–15 (Paz Expert Report); Dkt. 30-4 at 13–15
(Shaked Expert Report). Because the Ben Yehuda Street
bombings required “highly trained” operatives to
build the bombs, recruit the suicide bombers, and plan the
operation, see Trial Tr. at 20, 29–30,
Campuzano, No. 00-cv-2328 (ECF 42), and because
nothing in the record suggests that those operatives received
sufficient training from other sources, the Court finds that
the bombing could not have occurred without Iranian
sponsorship, see, e.g., Dkt. 30-4 at 16
(Shaked Expert Report ¶ 39) (That attack was
“carried out under the direction of Mahmoud Abu Hanoud
using the full gamut of terrorism training acquired by him
from his Iranian instructors, ” and “[i]t is
highly unlikely that lacking Abu Hanoud’s organization
and logistical training three Hamas operatives could have
successfully infiltrated the heavily guarded environs of the
Ben Yehuda Street mall in downtown Jerusalem carrying
explosive laden briefcases”).
of the Campuzano plaintiffs’ injuries, tending
to them, and dealing with their lasting effects imposed
significant hardships on Plaintiffs. Eight of the nine family
members have submitted declarations detailing their mental
anguish and emotional suffering. See Dkt. 21-7 (S.
Salzman Decl.); Dkt. 21-8 (R. Salzman Decl.); Dkt. 21-9 (L.
Salzman Decl.); Dkt. 21-1 (R. Campuzano Decl.); Dkt. 21-2 (M.
Campuzano Decl.); Dkt. 21-3 (J. Campuzano Decl.); Dkt. 21-4
(B. Elishis Decl.); Dkt. 21-6 (S. Walzman Decl.). Plaintiff
Brenda Elishis also seeks damages as the admistratrix of the
estate of David Elishis, her late husband. See Dkt
21-4 at 7–10 (B. Elishis Decl. ¶¶ 29,
33–34). Having reviewed Plaintiffs’ declarations,
the Court makes the following findings of fact regarding the
effect of the Campuzano plaintiffs’ injuries
on each family member:
Salzman (“Stanley”) is Gregg Salzman’s
father. Dkt. 21-7 at 1 (S. Salzman Decl. ¶ 1). After the
attack, Gregg Salzman called his father and told him that
he’d been in a bombing. Id. at 2 (S. Salzman
Decl. ¶ 6). Stanley could not immediately travel to
Israel, but, when he was able to eventually visit, he
witnessed Gregg “in great pain, ” with
“burned skin” wrapped in bandages. Id.
(S. Salzman Decl. ¶¶ 8–10). He
“couldn’t watch” as Gregg underwent the
“painful and bloody process” of having his
bandages changed “multiple times every day.”
Id. (S. Salzman Decl. ¶ 11). “Shrapnel
from the bomb [also] ripped up Gregg’s face and damaged
a nerve in his face, ” leaving him with
“tremendous pain from this nerve injury” to this
day. Id. at 3 (S. Salzman Decl. ¶ 12).
“[T]he thought that Gregg could have been killed,
” moreover, continues to make Stanley
“terrified.” Id. at 3 (S. Salzman Decl.
also attested that he had to support Gregg financially for
many years because Gregg was unable to sustain a career due
to his mental health and physical injuries. Id. (S.
Salzman Decl. ¶¶ 13–14). This included
providing Gregg with “a place to live” and
“help[ing] with . . . his bills, medical expenses, and
student loans.” Id. (S. Salzman Decl. ¶
14). The financial stress of supporting Gregg resulted in
Stanley having to twice refinance his own home. Id.
at 3 (S. Salzman Decl. ¶ 14). Gregg caused tensions in
Stanley’s marriage, which contributed to his divorce.
Id. at 3–4 (S. Salzman Decl. ¶ 17). After
Stanley’s other son Lee got divorced- also in part
because of the “Gregg issue, ” see Dkt.
21-9 at 3 (L. Salzman Decl. ¶¶ 12–13)-Lee
moved in with Stanley. Dkt. 21-7 at 3–4 (S. Salzman
Decl. ¶ 17). To accommodate Lee, Stanley moved into the
basement. Id. Today, Stanley has a lingering
“feeling of sorrow.” Id. at 4 (S.
Salzman Decl. ¶ 19). He “wish[es]” that he
could do something to stop Gregg’s pain, and it
“pains [him] that [he] cannot make [Gregg’s] pain
go away.” Id. at 4 (S. Salzman Decl. ¶
Salzman (“Roberta”) is Gregg Salzman’s
mother. Dkt. 21-8 at 1 (R. Salzman Decl. ¶ 1). “As
a mother, ” it was “devastating” for
Roberta to hear that Gregg was “in a bombing.”
Id. at 3 (R. Salzman Decl. ¶ 9). She was
“frightened to the core” to hear that
“other people sitting next to Gregg were killed and
more severely maimed, ” and that Gregg was only alive
“because of a twist of fate.” Id. (R.
Salzman Decl. ¶ 9).
and Gregg had a difficult relationship for many years, but it
was just beginning to improve around the time of the bombing.
Id. at 2 (R. Salzman Decl. ¶ 6). “Due to
the injuries Gregg suffered, ” however, it became
difficult to continue improving the relationship.
Id. at 2 (R. Salzman Decl. ¶ 6). Although she
has been able to improve her relationship with Lee, she has
not been able to do the same with Gregg. Id. (R.
Salzman Decl. ¶ 6). Had it not been for the bombing,
Roberta “very much believe[s]” that she
“would have been able to make a lot of progress”
in her relationship with Gregg. Id. (R. Salzman
Decl. ¶ 7). She feels as though the “terrorists
who attacked Gregg robbed Gregg” and her of the
“chance to grow closer” and she will
“forever lament” that. Id. at 2 (R.
Salzman Decl. ¶ 7).
Roberta stated that Gregg “was never able to start a
true career, ” despite having graduated from
chiropractic school a year before the bombing. Id.
at 3 (R. Salzman Decl. ¶ 11). It “breaks [her]
heart” to know that Gregg “has been in pain
constantly for years and there is no cure or relief for
it.” Id. (R. Salzman Decl. ¶ ...