United States District Court, District of Columbia
P. MEHTA UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
se Plaintiff Clarence Jackson alleges that Defendants
Office of the Mayor of the District of Columbia and the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals Committee on Admissions
(“COA”) improperly denied him the opportunity to
take the District of Columbia bar exam for a fifth time.
See Compl., ECF No. 1, at 2-3. Construed liberally,
Plaintiff's Complaint asserts the following claims: (1)
violation of the Sixth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments
of the United States Constitution; (2) discrimination under
the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”); (3)
breach of contract; and (4) intentional and negligent
infliction of emotional distress. See generally id.
court now considers, on remand, Defendants' Renewed and
Narrowed Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint. For the
reasons that follow, Plaintiff's claims and this matter
are dismissed in their entirety.
facts alleged are as follows. On November 19, 2010, Plaintiff
applied to sit for the District of Columbia bar for a fifth
time. See Notice of Filing, ECF No. 11 [hereinafter
Notice of Filing II], at 36. Plaintiff, however, failed to pay
the required fees and to provide proof of law school
graduation. So, on November 24, 2010, the COA denied
Plaintiff's application for those reasons. Id.
at 37 (notice to Plaintiff from the COA).
years later, on December 31, 2015, Plaintiff filed suit
against the COA in D.C. Superior Court. Plaintiff claimed
that the denial of his application constituted a breach of
contract, intentionally inflicted emotional distress, and
violated his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
See Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 17
[hereinafter Defs.' Mot.], at 2-3; see also id.,
Ex. A, ECF No. 17-1 [hereinafter D.C. Super. Ct. Docket]. On
April 1, 2016, the D.C. Superior Court granted, without
explanation, the COA's motion to dismiss the complaint.
See Notice of Filing, ECF No. 10 [hereinafter Notice
of Filing I], at 14.
about April 5, 2016, Plaintiff filed a petition with the D.C.
Mayor's Office, apparently seeking to challenge the
COA's refusal to let him sit for the bar exam. See
Id. at 5. The Mayor's Office denied the petition
because “[a] lawsuit has been filed for this
claim.” Id. Plaintiff appealed this decision
to the D.C. Court of Appeals, but the court denied the appeal
as untimely. See Id. at 24.
April 7, 2016, Plaintiff asked the D.C. Superior Court to
clarify why it dismissed his complaint. That request went
unanswered for more than a year. See Id. at 13.
filed this action on October 11, 2016. See Compl. He
sued both the COA and the Mayor's Office, challenging the
COA's denial of his application to sit for the bar exam
and the Mayor Office's refusal to review that decision.
See Id. at 1-3. The Complaint asserts multiple
claims, including violations of the Sixth, Thirteenth, and
Fourteenth Amendments, as well as the ADA. Plaintiff also
advances causes of action for breach of contract, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of
emotional distress. See Id. at 3-4.
March 2017, the court granted Defendants' motion to
dismiss, finding the action barred by three doctrines:
Rooker-Feldman, Younger abstention, and res
judicata. See Jackson v. Office of the Mayor of
D.C., No. 1:16-CV-02049 (APM), 2017 WL 932990, at *2
(D.D.C. Mar. 8, 2017). In December 2018, the Court of Appeals
reversed, holding each doctrine inapplicable. See Jackson
v. Office of the Mayor of D.C., 911 F.3d 1167, 1170-71
(D.C. Cir. 2018). It remanded the case for this court to
consider the alternative bases for dismissal not previously
considered. Id. at 1171-72.
remand, Defendants renewed their motion to dismiss, advancing
the following grounds for dismissal: (1) Plaintiff fails to
state a claim; (2) the COA is immune from suit; (3) the
claims against the COA are time-barred; and (4) Plaintiff
failed to give the District of Columbia notice of his
intentional and negligent infliction claims as required by
D.C. Code § 12-309. See generally Defs.'
Renewed and Narrowed Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 37 [hereinafter
Defs.' Renewed Mot.]. Plaintiff did not offer a new
response to the Renewed Motion. Instead, he indicated only
that he was “oppose[d] to any and all filings by
[D]efendant in this case since its pendency in this
court” and that his “pre-appeal response to
[D]efendant's motion to dismiss will be renewed
again.” Response to Order of the Court, ECF No. 41,