MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
TIMOTHY J. KELLY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Yvette
Beaulieu, a former employee of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation proceeding pro se, has sued 60
government officials for alleged constitutional violations,
various forms of discrimination, and retaliation in violation
of Title VII and the First Amendment. Her complaint
incorporates over 1, 500 pages of exhibits, including emails,
annotated news articles, and employment records. See
ECF Nos. 2 through 2-14. Defendants have moved to dismiss all
claims. ECF No. 30. For the reasons explained below, the
Court will grant Defendants' motion in part and deny it
in part. Beaulieu's Title VII retaliation claim will
proceed, her remaining claims will be dismissed, and all
Defendants will be dismissed except for Attorney General
William Barr.[1]
I.
Legal Standard
“To
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atl Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). “A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the
legal sufficiency of a plaintiff s complaint; it does not
require a court to ‘assess the truth of what is
asserted or determine whether a plaintiff has any evidence to
back up what is in the complaint.'” Herron v.
Fannie Mae, 861 F.3d 160, 173 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting
Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir.
2002)). The plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of all
reasonable inferences from the facts alleged, Hettinga v.
United States, 677 F.3d 471, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2012), but
“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements . . . do not
suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678.[2]
While
a pro se complaint “must be construed
liberally, the complaint must still present a claim on which
the Court can grant relief.” Budik v. Dartmouth
Hitchcock Med. Ctr., 937 F.Supp.2d 5, 11 (D.D.C. 2013).
“A court considering a pro se plaintiffs
complaint should look to all filings, including filings
responsive to a motion to dismiss, to discern whether the
plaintiff has nudged [her] claim[s] across the line from
conceivable to plausible.” Mehrbach v. Citibank,
N.A., 316 F.Supp.3d 264, 268 (D.D.C. 2018) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Still, “the Court need not
assume the role of the pro se plaintiffs advocate,
” id, and “it is not the Court's job
to canvass the record for documents supporting a pro
se party's position.” Sun v. D.C Gov
't, 133 F.Supp.3d 155, 168 n.6 (D.D.C. 2015).
II.
Analysis
Liberally
construed, Beaulieu's complaint contains ten identifiable
“grievances” or claims: (1) a violation of her
due process rights; (2) Title VII discrimination; (3) Equal
Pay Act discrimination; (4) age discrimination; (5) genetic
information discrimination; (6) Title VII retaliation; (7)
First Amendment retaliation; (8) a violation of the No. Fear
Act; (9) a violation of her Sixth Amendment right to counsel;
and (10) other miscellaneous claims, including what she calls
“Uncontrollable Systemic Factors” and a
“perceived conflict” of the “laws pertinent
to Executive Privilege, State Secrets, and Brady v.
Maryland” with the Ninth Amendment. ECF No. 1
(“Compl.”) at 18-19. As explained below, the only
claim she has plausibly alleged is Title VII retaliation.
A.
Due Process
Beaulieu
alleges that “there [was] no due process”
concerning the “discrimination, retribution,
harassment, and the resulting termination” that she
allegedly experienced. Id. at 4. She then alleges
that “it is unknown whether I was or am under
investigation for criminal or national security related
matters (and easily deniable after the fact).”
Id. at 4-5. Beaulieu does not explain whether her
claim is a procedural or substantive due process claim. To
bring a procedural due process claim, she must allege (1)
“deprivation of a protected liberty or property
interest, ” (2) “by the government, ” (3)
“without the process that is ‘due' under the
Fifth Amendment.” NB ex rel. Peacock v. District of
Columbia, 794 F.3d 31, 41 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
Alternatively, to make out a substantive due process claim,
she must allege that “egregious government
misconduct” deprived her of a constitutionally
recognizable liberty or property interest. George Wash.
Univ. v. District of Columbia, 318 F.3d 203, 206, 209
(D.C. Cir. 2003).
Beaulieu's
due process claim fails under either theory. Even assuming
she had a property interest in her job from which she was
terminated, Thompson v. District of Columbia, 530
F.3d 914, 918 (D.C. Cir. 2008), the complaint does not
explain any alleged deficiencies with the extensive process
she was apparently afforded, see, e.g., ECF No. 2-6, at 66,
76 (“numerous 90-day [Performance Improvement Plan]
periods”); Id. at 71 (“weekly
‘counseling' sessions”); ECF No. 2-9 at 92-94
(“letter . . . to advise [Beaulieu] of the proposal to
remove [her] from [her] current position, ” giving
“right to reply to this proposal” and
“right to select an attorney or representative to
assist”). Because she does not sufficiently allege that
she was “deprived of a meaningful opportunity to be
heard, [she] cannot make out a viable procedural due process
claim.” Kelley v. District of Columbia, 893
F.Supp.2d 115, 124 (D.D.C. 2012); see McManus v. District
of Columbia, 530 F.Supp.2d 46, 73 (D.D.C. 2007)
(dismissing plaintiffs' due process challenge to their
terminations because they did not “identify the
specific process that the District allegedly failed to afford
each of them”). Moreover, she does not plead any facts
suggesting that the government committed
“egregious” misconduct. And although the
complaint also refers to “alternative competing
hypothes[e]s, ” Compl. at 4, behind the various events
alleged, that speculation does nothing to nudge her due
process claim “from conceivable to plausible.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Her due process claim must
therefore be dismissed.
B.
Discrimination
Beaulieu
alleges that she suffered discrimination prohibited under
four statutes: the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA), the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA),
Title VII, and the Equal Pay Act. Under the first three,
“the two elements of a discrimination claim are that:
(i) the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action (ii)
because of the plaintiffs race, color, religion, sex,
national origin, age, or [genetic information].”
Baloch v. Kempthorne, 550 F.3d 1191, 1196 (D.C. Cir.
2008); see 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.
(ADEA); 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(a) (GINA); 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-16(a) (Title VII). The Equal Pay Act also prohibits sex
discrimination by requiring certain employers to pay equal
wages for equal work, with certain exceptions and
limitations. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d).
1.
ADEA and GINA
Beaulieu
does not allege that Defendants acted against her because of
her age or genetic information, which is fatal to her ADEA or
GINA claims. As for the former, she merely alleges, without
further explanation or detail, that recent college graduates
with less work experience received her same salary. See
Compl. at 7. And as to the latter, she does not allege what
genetic information purportedly subjected her to
discrimination. See Id. at 4 (alleging that
discrimination may have “potentially” occurred
based on her “DNA”). In fact, she appears to base
her GINA claim on her “ethnicity, ”
“national origin, ” or “race, ” which
is a claim properly brought under Title VII, as opposed to
the GINA. See ECF No. 2-8 at 31, 118-19; Robinson v.
Dungarvin Nevada, LLC, No. 2:16-CV-902-JAD-PAL, 2018 WL
547225, at *5 (D. Nev. Jan. 24, 2018) (“Race is
protected under Title VII, not under GINA.”),
aff'd, 738 Fed.Appx. 543 (9th Cir. 2018). For these
reasons, her claims under the ADEA and the GINA must be
dismissed.
2.
...