United States District Court, District of Columbia
MEMORANDUM OPINION
DABNEY
L. FRIEDRICH UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
In the
early 1990s, the World Bank helped the Chinese government
fund construction of the Shuikou Hydroelectric Power Station
(the “Shuikou Dam”). The project forced nearby
villagers to resettle, and the Chinese government allegedly
broke its promise to compensate those villagers. With this
putative class action, Renjie Zhan sues the World Bank for
its role in the project. Compl., Dkt. 1. Before the Court is
the World Bank's Motion to Dismiss for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim.
Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. 10. Because the Bank is immune from
this type of suit under the International Organizations
Immunities Act, the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction
and will grant the Bank's motion.
I.
BACKGROUND[1]
The
World Bank, which comprises two separate institutions, the
International Development Association (IDA) and the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD),
“is an international financial institution”
charged with “assisting the development of its member
nation's territories, promoting and supplementing private
foreign investment, and promoting long range balanced growth
in international trade.” Mendaro v. World
Bank, 717 F.2d 610, 611 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The United
States joined the 140-member Bank in 1945. See
Id. The Bank's toolkit includes the ability to
lend directly to member nations. See Id. at
12.
In the
“early 1990s, ” the Bank helped the Chinese
government finance the Shuikou Dam with a direct loan. Compl.
¶ 5. As part of this construction project, the
government identified areas that would become submerged once
the dam was complete. Id. The village with the
“most serious losses from the submersion” was a
village called Xiadun. Id. at ¶ 8. “All
farmland” and “[p]art of the forest” in
Xiadun were submerged. Id. To help the villagers
living in those and other areas resettle, the government
offered them “an extremely low compensation
arrangement.” Id. at ¶ 5. But a
“self-fattening policy” of bribery, corruption,
and embezzlement kept the government from compensating these
villagers until 2002, when the government started making
“very small” compensation payments. See
Id. at ¶¶ 10-12.
As for
the World Bank's role, Zhan alleges that the Bank was
supposed to keep a “close watch” on the
resettlement process but instead “turned a blind eye to
the behavior of government officials and to the difficulty of
the migrants on the ground in the Submersion District.”
Id. at ¶ 14. And because of the Bank's
“protection, ” government corruption continues to
stymie the resettled villagers from receiving compensation
for their lost property. Id. at ¶ 15.
Zhan,
proceeding pro se, purports to represent 252 Xiadun
villagers who “did not receive any compensation for
their lost land or houses.” Id. at ¶ 9.
Zhan filed the Complaint on July 2, 2019, seeking $12, 332,
500 to compensate for the villagers' lost homes, another
$2, 520, 00 “to cover damages and other costs incurred
by the plaintiffs as a result of this incident, ” and
“all costs related to this lawsuit.” Id.
at ¶¶ 16-18. The World Bank moved to dismiss under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction and under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. For the
reasons that follow, the Court will dismiss this case under
Rule 12(b)(1). Because the Court lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction, it will not consider the World Bank's Rule
12(b)(6) arguments.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
A court
facing with a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss must accept
“all material factual allegations in the complaint and
construe the complaint liberally, granting plaintiff the
benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts
alleged.” Am. Nat'l Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 642
F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted). But
“the court need not accept factual inferences drawn by
plaintiffs if those inferences are not supported by facts
alleged in the complaint, ” and the court need not
“accept plaintiff's legal conclusions.”
Disner v. United States, 888 F.Supp.2d 83, 87
(D.D.C. 2012) (quotation omitted). Nor is the court
“limited to the allegations of the complaint.”
Hohri v. United States, 782 F.2d 227, 241 (D.C. Cir.
1986), vacated on other grounds, 482 U.S. 64 (1987). It
“may consider such materials outside the pleadings as
it deems appropriate to resolve the question whether it has
jurisdiction to hear the case.” Scolaro v. D.C. Bd.
of Elections & Ethics, 104 F.Supp.2d 18, 22 (D.D.C.
2000). And “[i]f the court determines at any time that
it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss
the action.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3).
III.
ANALYSIS
Thanks
to two Executive Orders, the World Bank's two constituent
intuitions are “public international organizations
entitled to the privileges, exemptions, and immunities
conferred by the” International Organizations
Immunities Act (IOIA). Exec Order No. 9, 751, 11 Fed. Reg. 7,
713 (July 13, 1946) (designating the IBRD); see
Exec. Order No. 11, 966, 42 Fed. Reg. 4, 331 (Jan. 24, 1977)
(designating the IDA). The IOIA provides that such
organizations “shall enjoy the same immunity from suit
and every form of judicial process as is enjoyed by foreign
governments . . . .” 22 U.S.C. § 288a(b).
This
immunity has two main exceptions. First, the IOIA limits this
immunity “to the extent that such organizations may
expressly waive their immunity for the purpose of any
proceedings or by the terms of any contract.”
Id. And second, the Supreme Court held recently that
the IOIA's reference to “same immunity” means
the same immunity that foreign governments enjoy “at
any given time, ” not the immunity they enjoyed when
Congress passed the IOIA. Jam v. Int'l Fin.
Corp., 139 S.Ct. 759, 772 (2019). “Today, that
means that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act”
(FSIA)-which did not exist when Congress enacted the
IOIA-“governs the immunity of international
organizations.” Id.
The
World Bank is thus immune from suit unless an FSIA exception
applies or the Bank expressly waived its immunity under the
IOIA. Neither is present here.
First,
no FSIA exception applies. It is the plaintiff's burden
to establish subject-matter jurisdiction, yet Zhan does not
identify a relevant FSIA exception. See Hudes v. Aetna
Life Ins. Co., 806 F.Supp.2d 180, 186 (D.D.C. 2011). And
in any event, no FSIA exception could apply. As explained
below, the World Bank has not “waived its
immunity” expressly, nor is there any plausible
argument that the Bank waived its immunity implicitly. 28
U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1). This suit is not “based
upon” an act connected to “a commercial activity
of the foreign state . . . that causes a direct effect in the
United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). The
“gravamen” of this suit centers not on commercial
activity but rather on the Chinese government's tortious
actions in China and against Chinese citizens. OBB
Personenverkher AG v. Sachs,136 S.Ct. 390, 395-96
(2015). This case does not involve “rights in property
taken in violation of international law.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1605(a)(3). It does not involve rights in any
“property in the United States, ” let alone
property “acquired by succession or gift” or
“immovable property.” 28 U.S.C. §
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