MEMORANDUM OPINION
This
matter is before the court on its initial review of
plaintiffs pro se complaint and application for
leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The court will
grant the in forma pauperis application and dismiss
the case on the basis of lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3), failure to state a
claim, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), and
judicial immunity, see 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).
Plaintiff
is a resident of Suffolk County, Massachusetts and sues: four
judges for the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit ("First Circuit"), a magistrate judge and
the chief judge of the United States District Court for the
District of Massachusetts ("District of
Massachusetts"), and three attorneys, all of whom are
located in Boston, Massachusetts. Plaintiff provides a
rambling list of various state and federal amendments,
statues, rules, declarations, and restatements, however, no
relevant basis is provided to justify reliance on such legal
authority.
The
crux of plaintiff s claims is predicated on her profound
disagreement with the decisions and ultimate outcome of legal
proceedings she filed in the District of Massachusetts,
see Okereke v. Uber Technologies, Inc., Nos.
16-cv-12487, 16-02372-H (D. Mass. docketed Dec. 7, 2016), and
appealed to the First Circuit, see Okereke v. Uber
Technologies, Inc., No. 17-01896 (1st Cir. docketed Mar.
12, 2019). Plaintiff is suing the judges and opposing counsel
involved in this prior litigation based on what she believes
to be a "miscarriage of justice or error of law."
She disputes an "unlawful verdict" which resulted
in dismissal. She seeks monetary damages and requests that
this court to either accept transfer of her prior litigation
and/or reopen the case and enter judgment in her favor.
First,
this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction[1] to review the
decisions of another district court. See 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1331, 1332 (general jurisdictional provisions);
United States v. Choi, 818 F.Supp.2d 79, 85 (D.D.C.
2011) (citing Lewis v. Green, 629 F.Supp. 546, 553
(D.D.C. 1986)); Fleming v. United States, 847
F.Supp. 170, 172 (D.D.C. 1994), cert, denied, 513
U.S. 1150(1995). To the extent that plaintiff seeks transfer
of her litigation, she must file a motion in her existing
litigation. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404.
Second,
judges are absolutely immune from suits for money damages for
"all actions taken in the judge's judicial capacity,
unless these actions are taken in the complete absence of all
. jurisdiction." Sindram v. Suda, 986 F.2d
1459, 1460 (D.C. Cir. 1993); see also Mireles v.
Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9 (1991) (acknowledging that a long
line of Supreme Court precedents have found that a
"judge is immune from a suit for money damages");
Caldwell v. Kagan, 865 F.Supp.2d 35, 42 (D.D.C.
2012) ("Judges have absolute immunity for any actions
taken in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity.").
"The scope of the judge's jurisdiction must be
construed broadly where the issue is the immunity of the
judge." Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356
(1978). Further, "a judge will not be deprived of
immunity because the action he took was in error, was done
maliciously, or was in excess of his authority." M;
see also Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11 ("[J]udicial
immunity is not overcome by allegations of bad faith or
malice."). In determining whether a judge was acting in
his judicial capacity, courts should look to the "nature
of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally
performed by a judge, and to -the expectations of the
parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his
judicial capacity." Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12
(quoting Stump, 435 U.S. at 362). Plaintiff argues
that the named judges acted in complete absence of
jurisdiction, but this argument lacks merit; the whole of the
complaint relates to plaintiffs displeasure that the case was
not stayed for arbitration, and that the matter was
eventually dismissed. These actions are unequivocally
judicial in nature.
Third,
the complaint contains only general, conclusory allegations
against all defendants. The court "shall dismiss"
an action in which a plaintiff is proceeding in forma
pauperis "at any time if the court determines that.
. . (B) the action . . . (ii) fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted." 28 U;S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). A court's sua sponte
consideration of dismissal the in forma pauperis
statute is akin to evaluation of a motion to dismiss under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure require of a complaint is that it
contain" 'a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order
to 'give the defendant fair notice of what the . . .
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'"
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)
(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957));
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). A plaintiff must furnish "more than
labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation
of the elements of a cause of action." Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555-56. To sufficiently state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, "a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'"
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A complaint is plausible
on its face "when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Even affording plaintiff
"the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from
the facts alleged," Kowal v, MCI Commc'ns
Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994), the
complaint fails to adequately state any civilly actionable
claims or the grounds upon which they rest.
For all
of these reasons, plaintiffs complaint is subject to
dismissal. An order consistent with this memorandum opinion
is issued separately.
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Notes:
[1] Plaintiff has also failed to
demonstrate that the named defendants have minimum contacts
with the District of Columbia, and this court cannot exercise
personal jurisdiction over any of the named defendants.
See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2);
see also ...