United States District Court, District of Columbia
COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
appearing pro se, has sued two private, non-profit
organizations -- United States Veterans Initiative
(“U.S. VETS”) and The Community Partnership --
for discrimination in violation of the Fair Housing Act
(“FHA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et
seq. He also sues under the District of Columbia Human
Rights Act, D.C. Code §§ 2-1401.01 et
seq., and the District of Columbia Consumer Protection
Procedures Act, D.C. Code §§ 28-3901 et
seq. Am. Compl. at 2, 5 [Dkt. # 9]. U.S. VETS has moved
to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Mot. to Dismiss Pl.'s
Am.Compl. [Dkt. # 14]. Plaintiff has opposed the motion [Dkt.
## 21, 26], and U.S. VETS has replied [Dkt. # 19].
consideration of the parties' submissions, and for the
reasons explained below, the Court finds that plaintiff lacks
constitutional standing to sue under the FHA. Therefore, it
will dismiss the federal claim and, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(c)(3), will decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the non-federal claims.
Organizational Structure and Services Rendered
VETS states that it “is the nation's largest
non-profit provider of comprehensive services to homeless and
at-risk veterans.” Mem. at 3. It contracts with The
Community Partnership for the Prevention of Homelessness,
which in turn “coordinates the District of
Columbia's Continuum of Care” for citizens in
need. Id., n.2. Housing and
programmatic services are funded by “federal government
grants” from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development (“HUD”) for permanent housing; the
Veterans Administration for transitional housing; and the
Department of Labor for work force programs. Mem. at 3, n.3.
This action arose from plaintiff's participation in the
Permanent Supportive Housing Program (“SHP”)
administered by U.S. VETS. Id. at 3-4; see
also Am. Compl. at 3. “Through leasing funds, . .
. U.S. VETS makes housing affordable for program
participants.” Mem. at 5. It “does not manage or
own properties or apartment buildings” in the District
but rather “enters into lease agreements directly with
the landlord or management company to rent apartments for
occupancy use by its veterans.” Id. During the
relevant time period, U.S. Vets had housing
“arrangements” for SHP participants at two
locations in the District. Id. at 5-6.
to U.S. VETS, plaintiff is a veteran who has been enrolled in
the SHP for more than eight years. He resided “in a
shared 2-bedroom unit” located on Atlantic Street in
the District's southeast quadrant from 2010 until January
2016. Mem. at 6; see also Def.'s Ex. B, Feb. 12,
2018 Letter of Determination, No. Probable Cause Finding
(“Feb. 12th Dec.”) [Dkt. # 14-2]. When
plaintiff's roommate moved out in late 2015, plaintiff
lived alone “for a short time” until in January
2016 U.S. VETS terminated the “property lease with the
landlord because of ongoing maintenance problems and housing
code violations.” Mem. at 7. U.S. VETS had “to
move a dozen veterans, ” including plaintiff who
“[u]ltimately . . . was relocated to 2613 Douglas
Place, S.E. . . . in the Manor Village Apartment complex . .
. where he lived in a 2-bedroom apartment with a
roommate.” Id. (citing Am. Compl. at 3; Orig.
Compl. ¶¶ 8-10, 12).
25, 2017, plaintiff filed a gender discrimination charge with
HUD, claiming that U.S. VETS had discriminated when it failed
to offer him “his own apartment unit, while a female
client did not have to share an apartment unit.” Feb.
12th Dec. at 1, 6. On June 14, 2017, HUD referred
the matter to the D.C. Office of Human Rights
(“OHR”), having “determined that the fair
housing law” enforced by OHR “is substantially
equivalent to the [FHA]” and that OHR “has the
authority to address housing discrimination complaints within
the area where [plaintiff's] complaint arose.”
Def.'s Ex. A, June 14, 2017 Acceptance Letter (citing 42
U.S.C. § 3610(f)) [Dkt. # 14-1 at 10-11]. Following an
investigation and an exhaustive analysis, OHR issued the
foregoing no probable cause determination. Notably, it found
that the female to whom plaintiff compared himself “was
in a different program, ” which unlike the SHP,
“allow[ed] for single occupancy.” Feb.
12th Dec. at 3. On June 22, 2018, OHR denied
plaintiff's request for reconsideration and advised him
of his right to file a Petition for Review in D.C. Superior
Court, within three years from the date of service of the
decision. Def.'s Ex. C [Dkt. # 14-3]. Plaintiff filed
suit in this Court on December 13, 2018.
Plaintiff's Allegations and Claims
Amended Complaint, plaintiff alleges the following. On
October 8, 2010, U.S. VETS “execute[d] a rental
agreement for exclusive rights for apartment #301 at 425
Atlantic Street, SE.” Am. Compl. at 3 ¶ 1.
Pursuant to the terms of the lease “under DHS, ”
plaintiff's rent was “zero.” Id. In
June 2012 while plaintiff was away, U.S. VETS “removed
[his] personal property” from the apartment without his
consent and placed it in “apartment # 302 without a
valid lease agreement.” Id. ¶¶ 2-3.
Plaintiff “occupied apartment # 302 for four and a half
years without a valid rental agreement.” Id.
¶ 5. On “January 20th, 2017, U.S. VETS entered
Apartment 302 “and removed [plaintiff's] belongings
when he was not home and without his consent.”
Id. ¶ 7. It “took” the belongings
“to 2613 Douglass Pl SE #203 without [plaintiff's]
consent and without him being present.” Id.
¶ 8. On January 30, 2017, U.S. VETS “appeared at
the apartment . . . and presented [plaintiff] with a blank
lease” that he “refused to sign[.]”
Id. ¶ 9. Plaintiff was given “an
ultimatum” to sign and date the lease or “take
his belongings and go live in the streets.”
Id. Allegedly, U.S. VETS “altered” the
lease to make it appear as though plaintiff “had agreed
to the terms and conditions of their rental agreement and the
program called SHP.” Id. ¶ 11.
has not clearly delineated his claims. He demands an
unspecified award of monetary damages for “breach of
contract” and at least “$50, 000 for each
violation” of the FHA. Am. Compl. at 5.
Motions to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(1)
may move under Rule 12(b)(1) to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. To survive such a motion, plaintiff
bears the burden of establishing that the Court has subject
matter jurisdiction over its claims. Moms Against Mercury
v. FDA, 483 F.3d 824, 828 (D.C. Cir. 2007). In
determining whether there is jurisdiction, the Court may
“consider the complaint supplemented by undisputed
facts evidenced in the record, or the complaint supplemented
by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of
disputed facts.” Coal. for Underground Expansion v.
Mineta, 333 F.3d 193, 198 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also 5B Charles Alan
Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice &
Procedure § 1350 (3d ed. 2017) (noting the “wide
array of cases from the four corners of the federal judicial
system involving the district court's broad discretion to
consider relevant and competent evidence on a motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction to resolve
factual issues”). “Although a court must accept
as true all factual allegations contained in the complaint
when reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule ...