MEMORANDUM OPINION
Emmet
G. Sullivan, United States District Judge.
Plaintiffs
Allison Fromm, Elizabeth Fromm, and K.I.F., Ms. Allison
Fromm's minor daughter, bring this lawsuit against James
P. Duffy, III, Independent Trustee of the Allison Fromm
Family Trust. Plaintiffs seek to remove Mr. Duffy as
Independent Trustee pursuant to the Uniform Trust Code §
19-1301, et seq. (“UTC”) which grants a court the
authority to remove a trustee when, among other things, the
trustee has committed a serious breach of trust. D.C. Code
§ 19-1307.06.
Pending
before the Court are plaintiffs' motion to remand for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, or, in the alternative,
to strike defendant's notice of removal and to remand
back to the Superior Court of the District of Columbia; and
defendant's motion to dismiss, or, in the alternative, to
transfer venue to the Eastern District of New York. Upon
consideration of the motions, the responses and replies
thereto, the applicable law, and the entire record, the Court
will GRANT IN PART plaintiffs' motion
for remand, and DENY defendant's motion
to dismiss or in the alternative to transfer venue.
I.
Background
Defendant
James P. Duffy is the sole Independent Trustee of the Allison
Fromm Family Trust (“Trust”). Compl., ECF No. 1-1
¶ 11.[1] Plaintiff Allison Fromm is the Individual
Trustee of the Trust and has served in that capacity since
March 22, 1985. Id. ¶ 8. Ms. Fromm, and her
daughter K.I.F., are the lifetime discretionary beneficiaries
of the Trust. Id. ¶ 7. The purpose of the Trust
is to provide for the welfare of Ms. Fromm during her
lifetime, future members of her family following her death,
and to “provide a vehicle whereby all monies coming to
[Ms. Fromm] by and through her family are, to the fullest
extent practicable, preserved intact and transmitted to
future generations of [Ms. Fromm's] family.”
Id. ¶ 12. The Trust assets are managed by BNY
Mellon Wealth Management (“BNY”), which provides
services such as investment, day-to-day management of the
Trust's assets, and information management. Id.
¶ 13.
Mr.
Duffy also provides “professional services” in
connection to the Trust for which he charges fees in excess
of $24, 000 per year. Id. ¶ 14. These services
include review and consideration of the Trust's month end
statements from BNY, and review and consideration of various
communications received from BNY. Id. In 2010, BNY
advised Mr. Duffy that the Fromm family wanted him to resign
because his fees were excessive. Id. ¶ 15. Mr.
Duffy refused, citing among other reasons, the lack of a
suitable replacement as Independent trustee. Id.
The
Trust was drafted by Mr. Duffy in the mid-1980's, who, at
the time, was a licensed attorney admitted to practice law in
New York State. Id. ¶ 6. For reasons unrelated
to the pending motions, Mr. Duffy was disbarred from the
practice of law in April of 2014. Id. ¶ 16. In
May and June 2014, BNY and the Fromm family resumed
discussions related to appointing a different Independent
Trustee. Id. ¶ 17. Four years later, in the
last quarter of 2018, BNY discovered that Mr. Duffy was
disbarred. Id. ¶ 20. In a letter dated January
16, 2019, BNY informed Mr. Duffy that its policies required
him to either resign as Independent Trustee or remove the
Trust account from BNY's management. Id. On that
same date, plaintiffs, through their attorney Mr. Peter D.
Randolph, wrote to Mr. Duffy requesting that he resign as
Independent Trustee and that he appoint Mr. Randolph as his
successor. Id. ¶ 24. Approximately three weeks
later, plaintiffs' attorney emailed Mr. Duffy and again
requested his resignation and the appointment of Mr.
Randolph. Id. ¶ 26. Mr. Duffy did not respond
to the two January 16 letters or to the February 8 email, nor
did he communicate to Ms. Fromm or her attorneys since
receipt of the January 16 letters. Id. ¶¶
21, 25-26.
Unable
to come to a resolution with Mr. Duffy, plaintiffs filed suit
in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, Probate
Division on March 12, 2019. See Not. Of Removal, ECF
No. 1 ¶ 1. Seeking to remove Mr. Duffy as Independent
Trustee, plaintiffs brought suit under the Uniform Trust Code
which provides a Court with the authority to remove a trustee
where (1) “[t]he trustee has committed a serious breach
of trust;” (2) “[l]ack of cooperation among
cotrustees substantially impairs the administration of the
trust;” (3) “[b]ecause of unfitness . . . the
court determines that removal of the trustee best serves the
interests of the beneficiaries;” or (4) “removal
is requested by all of the qualified beneficiaries, the court
finds that removal of the trustee best serves the interests
of all the beneficiaries and is not inconsistent with a
material purpose of the trust, and a suitable co-trustee or
successor trustee is available.” District of Columbia
Code § 19-1307.06(b).
Mr.
Duffy, appearing pro se, removed the Superior Court
action to this Court. See Not. of Removal, ECF No. 1
¶ 1. His alleged basis for removal was 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a) which provides a federal court with jurisdiction when
the parties are from different states and the amount in
controversy exceeds $75, 000. Id. ¶ 3. Soon
after removing the case, Mr. Duffy filed a motion to dismiss,
or in the alternative, transfer venue. Def.'s Mot., ECF
No. 5. Plaintiffs have opposed Mr. Duffy's motion and
have also filed a motion to remand for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, or, in the alternative, motion to strike the
notice of removal. Pls.' Mots., ECF Nos. 4, 6. Both
parties' motions are opposed and ripe for disposition.
II.
Legal Standard
A case
filed in state court may be removed to a federal court if the
case could have originally been brought there. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(a). The subject matter jurisdiction of federal
district courts is limited and is set forth generally at 28
U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332. Absent a federal question,
diversity jurisdiction is required to establish that the case
could have originally been filed in federal court. See
Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987).
A federal court has diversity jurisdiction when: (1) there is
complete diversity of citizenship among the parties--meaning
no plaintiff is a citizen of the same state as any defendant;
and (2) the “amount in controversy” is greater
than $75, 000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
“The
party opposing a motion to remand bears the burden of
establishing that subject matter jurisdiction exists in
federal court.” Int'l Union of Bricklayers
& Allied Craftworkers v. Ins. Co. of the W., 366
F.Supp.2d 33, 36 (D.D.C. 2005)(citations omitted). Because
the removal statue is to be strictly construed, any
ambiguities “concerning the propriety of removal”
shall be construed in favor of remand. Cefarrati v. JBG
Properties, Inc., 75 F.Supp.3d 58, 63 (D.D.C. 2014).
III.
Analysis
A.
Motion to Remand for Lack of Subject ...